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of the volume is Politics and Folk Religion. Case studies, presented at first at 
i..c drd Symposium of the SIEF Commission of Folk Religion, Szeged, 24—26 September 
1999, Hungary, are dealing without any limitation of boundaries in age and space on the 
relation between politics and religion. There is not only the question of today fundament 
talism, but more theoretically the problem of changable and continuous relation between 
the two fields. Is it a stable characteristic of contact between the two fields, a constant 
effort of politics to use religion as ideology, or an effort of religion to get political power 
through its institutions? Has politics really emerged and filled a part in popular religion, or 
has it always been only the problem of the élite? How do religious movements arise for 
political goals? And how do political movements and institutions use religious or quasi-
religious symbols? How does this problem exist or occur in everyday life, in smaller local 
communities?
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POLITICS AND FOLK RELIGION
(FOREWORD)
3rd SYMPOSIUM OF THE SIEF COMMISSION OF FOLK RELIGION 
24th-26th SEPTEMBER 1999
After two successful meetings of SIEF Commission of Folk Religion in Stock-
holm (Sweden, 1993) and Chaves (Portugal, 1996) the 3rd Symposium is invited and 
organized by the Department of Ethnology, University of Szeged.
Politics and folk religion. The question is once again very timely. The Kosovo 
crisis, Northern Ireland, Dagestan, and I could go on listing all the tensions which 
appear in our world as religious conflicts. I hope that the papers1 presented (and 
published) here will help to give us a better understanding of these processes and 
that at the end of the conference we will be able to say that we have learnt a great 
deal, and can offer our analyses for politicians who are able to make the world a 
more peaceful place.
This conference is an important event, not only for the Department of Ethnol-
ogy, University of Szeged and the City of Szeged, but for the whole of Hungarian 
ethnology. This can be seen in the fact that it has been supported by the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Cultural Heritage, 
the Municipality of Szeged, the University and the Centre of European Studies/ 
Phare Programme.
Popular religion, folk religion or vernacular religion is our Department’s special 
field of teaching and research. Sándor Bálint, the founder of “religiöse Volkskunde” 
or “Volksfrömmigkeitsforschung” in Hungary, was Professor of our Department 
between 1947-1964. We wish to carry on his intellectual legacy. Our current and 
planned research in Hungary, the Carpathian Basin, and elsewhere in Europe, our 
publications, regular Hungarian and international conferences, international rela-
tions and international student seminars all serve this aim. The present conference is 
also part of these efforts.
We have attempted to create an appropriate atmosphere with an exhibiton of 
photography of Magdolna Szabó and Imre Küllős in the conference hall, illustrating 
the conference’ topic with pictures on destroyed Hungarian churches in the Yugo-
slavian war from Croatia and attractive phenomena of religious culture and popular 
religion.
Gábor Barna
1 Unfortunately there are two papers missing from the volume - Margaret MACKAY (Edinburgh): "How 
Shall We Sing the Lord’s Song in a New Land?” and Mare KÖIVA (Tartu): People Waiting for the "White Ship" - 
Symbol and Practice. The paper of Bertalan PUSZTAI: Religion as a Support in Creating Identity has been 
published already elsewhere, the one of Jaanus PLAAT: Religious Movements and Congregations in West Esto-




Department of Cultural Studies, University of Oslo 
P. A. Munchs House, P.O. Box 1010 Blindem, N-0315 Oslo, Norway
Abstract: People’s beliefs, whether they fall within the teachings of the church or not, belong to 
the folk religion. The studies of folk religion comprise all social classes, peasant culture and middle 
class as well as workers. Investigations of folk religion do not only focus on the pre-industrial era, 
but also on religiously oriented beliefs and customs among people in the secularised modern society.
In our days it is important to examine how the many immigrants and their churches adjust to 
completely new conditions, for example in the way of dressing and concerning food prohibitions.
One field of research which is suited for international comparisons concerns the significance of 
religion in cultural meetings across borders of different kinds, and those conflicts and forms of co-
operation that may arise.
Religion and politics do not have to be opposed, but may also be linked to each other. What 
looks like religious antagonisms may in fact have a political motivation. The main interest for the 
folklorist is the role religion plays for common people within different groupings and not just within 
the political or religious elite.
Keywords: Religious belief, religious adaptation, immigrants, cultural meetings, religion and politics
At first I will say something about folk religion. What is that? People’s beliefs, 
whether they fall within the teachings of the church or not, belong to the folk relig-
ion. This is true irrespective of if people believe in and put their trust in divine be-
ings, or relate to evil beings like the devil or other supernatural beings. Popular vi-
sions, as well as experiences of miracles and religious healing, are included in the 
field of study. When talking about folk religiosity it is not relevant to separate 
popular belief and other kinds of belief that would be labelled religious belief. What 
people believe in must be possible to view as belonging to the field of folk religion, 
even though earlier folkloristic researchers often separated the religious dimension 
from the popular belief. The latter was seen as belonging to the folkloristic field of 
study, while the religious belief was placed within the realm of religious studies. 
Folklorists were not supposed to concern themselves with folk religion, but a shift in 
this respect came about when a new generation of folklorists started to establish 
themselves during the 1970s.
The studies of folk religion comprise all social classes, peasant culture and mid-
dle class as well as workers. Religion is evident both in ordinary people and in mem-
bers of revival movements or in immigrants belonging to another religion than 
Christianity. Folk religion, in the form of specific conduct and rituals, is not exer-
cised only in public places of worship like the churches, but also to a large extent in 
the homes, both in the everyday life and on Sundays and other holidays.
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Investigations of folk religion do not only focus on the pre-industrial era, when 
Christianity had a stronger position, but also on religiously oriented beliefs and cus-
toms among people in the secularized modern society. Also the New Age and Satan-
ism of our time become interesting objects of study.
Studies of folk religiosity have come to attract more and more attention in sev-
eral countries. In 1989 in Graz, Austria, an Ethnology congress was held around the 
theme “Folk piety”. The lectures have been published in the form of an anthology 
(Volksfrömmigkeit 1990). In Germany and Austria, an anthology with the title 
“Religion und Alltag” was published in 1990, in which the authors analyse autobiog-
raphies from Catholic areas (Religion 1990). At the international congress, which 
SIEF (Society International for Ethnology and Folklore) organized in Bergen in 
Norway in 1990, it was decided that a special commission within the SIEF, for the 
study of “Folk Religion” should be established. I was given the task of conducting 
this commission.
A first symposium was held in Stockholm in 1993, in close cooperation with The 
Swedish Royal Academy of Letters, History and Antiquities which paid the ex-
penses. The topic was “Religion in Everyday Life Then and Now”. The lecturers 
came from the whole of Europe, and their contributions have been published by 
Nils-Arvid BRINGÉUS in 1994 (Religion 1994). The focus was on how religion mani-
fests itself in lifestyle, beliefs, upbringing and norms.
The theme for the following SIEF symposium in Portugal 1996 was “Folk Relig-
ion, Continuity and Change”. Within this wide topic one can illustrate to what extent 
folk religion forms a force of change or plays a preserving role in a changeable 
world. Folk religion may, from a modernity perspective, be studied with respect to 
the development from a farmers’ society to an industrial society. What is old may be 
preserved, at the same time as it is exposed to changes. It is important to illuminate 
the stability as well as the change, and the forces behind such processes. Changes 
may also mean a return to earlier conditions, customs and beliefs. How and why 
does this happen in a modem society? How is it that the old becomes filled with a 
new content, and thereby gets a new life in a new social context? What influence 
does the media have as a force of change? We returned to such issues in lectures and 
discussions during the symposium. The empirical data was collected from different 
parts of Europe, and ranged from past to present times, but problems and perspec-
tives constituted a common base for discussion. The contributions have been pub-
lished in a book edited by me and Maria Santa  MONTEZ in Lisboa (Folk Religion 
1999).
I also want to introduce a few general issues which are suited for research and 
network cooperation on a European basis as well. In the Nordic countries we have 
discussed a cooperation consisting of a network around the theme “The Adaptation 
of the Nordic Churches and Revival movements/Free Churches to the Mod-
ern/Industrial Society”. The network wants to examine how the State churches and 
the revival movements adjusted to the changing conditions of society, when the 
modern industrial society developed, in the middle of the 19th century, and the pro-
gress until today. In that connection we can ask: What happens if the adjustment to
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the surrounding world becomes too complete? In what way does that prepare the 
ground for the formation of new religious movements. Such movements may on the 
one hand have fundamentalist traits, in contrast to too much adjustment within other 
churches and denominations. The movements may on the other hand be signs of an 
adaptation to the needs of the modern people, e.g. self-regard and self-realization, 
happiness in this earthly life.
In what way is the development of new movements related to the social en-
gagement or lack of engagement of the established churches? What does it mean if 
the churches become too centred around this world and neglect or diminish the trans-
cendent perspective on faith, life as a journey towards eternity? What about the view 
on good and bad? Why has Satanism won attention in later days? Is it a reaction 
against the churches’ moderation and denial of the evil forces in the existence, com-
pared to before.
What has ecumenism meant for the processes of adjustment to the surrounding 
society? How have the religious perspectives come to show in politics? Comparisons 
of the work within the Christian parties in Europe can be done, with reference to 
discussions and actions concerning religious and ethical issues etc.
How do you regard technical inventions as radio, film and television or sports, 
which might become competitors for people’s interest? They might contribute to 
changing people’s norms and beliefs. In our days one can consider the opinions 
about homosexuality. How have the churches and revival movements regarded 
the discussions about membership in the European Union, the EU? Threat 
or possibility? In this context one can look at the reactions concerning different 
alcohol customs and alcohol legislation, which is a sensitive topic in the Nordic 
countries.
What about the differences between generations? What kind of renewal is 
coming from the young people and why do they leave earlier ingrained perspectives 
and ways of life? What are the changes a manifestation of? It is of great importance 
to look at what part the women have played, in renewing or preserving older per-
spectives and ways of life.
In our days it is also important to examine how the many immigrants and their 
churches, Islam for instance, adjust to completely new conditions, for example in the 
way of dressing and concerning food prohibitions. What about alcohol, drugs etc.? 
How are the new religions, such as Islam, regarded and received by the established 
churches and by the man in the street, for example in connection with the building of 
Mosques which has been topical in Sweden? The Nordic countries and Europe are 
on their way to become multicultural on the religious level as well, in a completely 
different way than before.
One field of research which is suited for international comparisons through the 
SIEF, concerns the significance of religion in cultural meetings across borders of 
different kinds, and those conflicts and forms of cooperation that may arise. One can 
consider open conflicts in countries like the former Yugoslavia, or Northern Ireland. 
What role does religion have in that kind of contexts, alongside with for example 
ethnical and national factors?
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Religion and politics do not have to be opposed as during the Soviet era, but 
may also be linked to each other. Christian political parties have on the one hand 
played an important part in both local politics and national politics in the western 
world, concerning presenting and realizing religiously founded convictions, and they 
still do. What does it mean that they also have, and have had governmental respon-
sibility as in Norway at the end of the 1990s?
How is, on the other hand, the religion used as a tool in the struggle for political 
power between different population groups? One does only have to think about the 
antagonisms on Northern Ireland or in the Balkans. The ethnologist and folklorist 
Haus ROTH from Munich has shown the negative political effect that the defeat of 
the Christian Serbs in Kosovo in 1389 against the Muslim ottomans has had concern-
ing the political development and war situation in the former Yugoslavia in the 
1990s. The oral tradition about the war defeat in the 14th century has contributed to 
strengthening the will to war and conflict between the population groups several 
hundreds of years after the occurred events (ROTH 1994). What looks like religious 
antagonisms may in fact have a political motivation. The main interest for the folk-
lorist is the role religion plays for common people within different groupings and not 
just within the political or religious elite.
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Abstract: The paper deals basically with the mutual interference of politics and religion. It 
gives a short historical overview based on European and Hungarian examples and tries to shape the 
dominance of them in different ages and fields (heretic movements, Reformation, Counter-Refor-
mation, spiritual movements, Christian politics, political Catholicism, etc.). It describes how relig-
ious symbols or quasi-religious symbols can be/are used in politics as expressions for social and 
power efforts. It is dealing with the role of religion in nation-building in the past and present, with 
the role and formation of religious parties, of national and political myths. Politics has an important 
role in the re-christianization of Europe in the last decades, which can be observed not only in the 
post-communist countries, but elsewhere in Europe, too. Politics, political movements and ideolo-
gies (e.g. feminism) influence the everyday life of churches, causing debates and conflicts in govern-
ing church institutions. Religious movements can express and symbolise new ambitions and interests 
of given social strata and they can institutionalize, handle and conduct social conflicts (e.g. venera-
tion of Jesus Heart). Religions and churches play an important role in the post-revolutional transi-
tion of Eastern Europe. Religion can legitimize social effort, can express national(istic) thoughts, 
conflicts (e.g. former Yugoslavia, Armenia, today Romania, Northern Ireland, Scotland) or social 
tolerance (Switzerland, today Hungary, etc.). Religion has played an important role in colonializa- 
tion, having built new traditions, protecting given efforts and interest. But religion played an impor-
tant role also in decolonialization. Religion can be a basis of social pillarization also in the age of 
secularization. Secularization processes in the late 20th century politics are no de-sacralization 
processes at the same time. Secular movements, because they need legitimation, use signs, symbols 
which often can be found in religious symbolism (communist movements and parties, neo-pagan 
movements, etc.). The paper tries to interpret the secularization process. In my interpretation it is a 
privatization process of religion(s) and as result of the process emerges an individual/invisible religi-
osity.
Keywords: politics, religion, folk religion, religious movements, religious symbols, religion and 
society, secularization, individual religiosity, Eastern Europe, Europe
Politics and religion. Phenomena seemingly very remote from each other.
Politics and folk religion. The difference between these appears to be even 
greater since ‘folk religion’ is generally much more weakly institutionalized than 
‘religion’ in general, which, through its institutions, may have links to the institutions 
of politics and through the movement of the social structure may also be part of the 
processes of social change.
I would like to give a general overview in the light of our Conference of the links 
between these two areas, their problems and concepts as a possible approach to the 
topic.





What is politics? According to a synthesis of the various interpretations, politics, 
is the sum of actions and institutions aimed at obtaining the decisive, leading roles 
(dominance) within small and large communities and between communities, in other 
words, at winning power, and at retaining it, and expressing and representing inter-
ests. The views on the methods for obtaining, using and retaining power are ex-
pressed in ideology (GEERTZ 1994a; Zent ai  1997: 26-29). Politics is thus a special 
area of social relations and is specifically characterized by the manifestation of 
power and prestige. Politics needs, or may need, religious legitimation (Mol  n.d.: 
117). Behavioural constraints operate in the actions of homo politicus and abstract 
words, views, opinions and convictions, myths, fears, desires and aggressions, wills, 
role expectations and social norms are also present. All this represents a scheme of 
interpretation on which people base their actions (Edel man  1972: 31 cited in Szab ó  
1998:113; Zent ai  1997:11).
This symbolic interpretation of politics appears relevant for the problem chosen 
as the theme of our Conference, rather than other possible interpretations (seman-
tic, pragmatic, rhetorical, and communicative-discursive). Putting this in the simplest 
terms, everyday phenomena, events, expressions and things not only mean some-
thing but also acquire ‘significance’. That is, they become special vehicles of mean-
ing. The use of symbols is a widespread phenomenon at all levels of political life. It is 
sufficient to think of the material symbols (badges, coats-of-arms, buildings, posters, 
etc.), the actions (demonstrations, elections, political celebrations, conflicts and their 
management, etc.), and the conceptual language used, all of which are condensed 
signs, always referring to something else as well. The symbols also contain emotions 
and wills. Their main function is to integrate and orientate (Szab ó  1998: 95). Their 
use is very strongly linked to culture (Szab ó  1998: 96). Politics must provide an an-
swer on the nature of the world order (good - bad, self images and other-images), 
the legitimacy of power, the resolution of conflicts and shaping the future image of 
groups affecting the whole of society or forming part of the society. (Zent ai  1997: 
12).
This is similar in content to the religious scheme of interpretation of the world. Im-
portant features of political myths include simplification, personification and the bipo-
lar attitude. Practically the same determinants are found in religious interpretation 
too (Szabó  1998: 111 ff.). However, phenomena can only be interpreted in the given 
cultural context. They have a strong emotional charge.
What is religion? Most definitions of religion are based on the distinction be-
tween the supernatural and the natural. In other words, on a distinction between the 
sacred and the profane. But the texts, objects, persons, actions, institutions, etc. of 
religion(s) operate within a social structure.
Religion deals with sin, death and the fragility of public life. It pulls towards 
principles, virtues, ideals, and perfection. Politics, on the other hand, demands com-
promise, civility, secularity, and plurality. How then, are religion and politics to be 
related? They are not to be separated, as classical liberal theory implies, nor are they 
to be collapsed into each other, as theocratic or civil religion models propose. 
Rather, they are to interact at their overlapping and moving borders.
иPolitics and Folk Religion
And what is the folk religion that figures in the title of our Conference? The 
definitions of folk religion found in the history of science can be divided into several 
groups. 1. “Folk religion is the totality of all those views and practices of religion that 
exist among the people apart from and alongside the strictly theological and liturgi-
cal forms of the official religion.” (YODER 1974: 14). This definition is largely fol-
lowed in the Hungarian literature too by Sándor BÁLINT. (BÁLINT 1987: 10). 2. Ac-
cording to others, the religion of the ‘people’ is the religion of social groups far re-
moved from the mainstream of official church and social processes (BRUNVAND 
1996: 620). 3. The concept of folk religion as opposed to the culture of the elite is 
especially popular among a group of social historians and historical anthropologists. 
(Burke  1985; for a critique of this see: Freit ag  1991). 4. Leonard Norman Primi- 
ano calls folk religion ‘vernacular religion’ and, like the first group of definitions, 
defines its content quite broadly. “Vernacular religion draws attention to religious 
beliefs, practices, and experiences as they are understood, undertaken, and ex-
pressed by all people, modern and traditional, urban and rural” (Brunv and  1996: 
620). The opposition that appears in this definition is between an ideal of religion - 
the institutional, codified, set form of religion - and religion as experienced 
(Brunvand  1996: 620-621).
Seen in historical perspective, there is a wide range of countries where the reli-
gious phenomenon plays an important role (e.g. Israel, tribal states). The papers 
dealing with India at our Conference (Hiriyanna, Korom) show the important organ-
izing role of religion in the life of tribes and castes, the leading role of the priesthood 
in directing particular tribes, the use of local cults in everyday life, or the conscious 
use made of religious and quasi-religious symbols in the political activity around 
elections in regions with many different religions and many different cultures. In 
other countries religion played or plays a relatively small role (former USSR, social-
ist countries). This has also been the case historically. According to Huntington , 
the tensions are found along the differences between civilizations that are also de-
termined by religion (Huntington  1998; also cited by Kallscheuer  1996: 23; 
Barna  1998). This view also lies behind the history of philosophy conceptions on 
Central Europe (Barna  1998; Lendvai  1997). Multiethnic co-existence based on 
religious tolerance is less popular, less accepted today. (Kalls cheue r  1996: 18). 
Besides, this could only be achieved where there was a relative balance of peoples 
and denominations, that is, where none was in a position of dominance over the 
others.
The appearance of religion and the supernatural in politics can be observed in 
three areas: 1. government may be based directly on religion, as in a theocracy, 2. 
religion may give legitimacy to the power of the ruling elite, 3. religion may support 
the structures, formations and traditions that can be manipulated by those in power 
(Lewellen  1983: 66). The papers presented at our Conference are about this too, 
particularly the latter area.
According to researchers of religion one of the characteristics of social happen-
ings of the past two centuries and the present time is that religion and its institutions 
are occupying an ever smaller and more marginal place in the social structure. This
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is the process of secularization. It seems to me that one possible approach to the link 
between ‘politics’ and ‘folk religion’ is in essence the interpretation of the process of 
secularization.
One basic question in connection with the secularization of recent centuries is: 
what is the role of religion in today’s western society and what cultural forms has it 
assumed? While in the modern world religion has gradually become a ‘private af-
fair’, withdrawing to the area of the private sphere, globalization as an important 
cultural and economic process has transformed the whole society into practically a 
‘global village’. What role has been played and can be played by religion in this? 
Does it act within the process or remain outside it? Is it really true that religion basi-
cally operates outside the social structure? Is this why researchers on society and 
culture in Hungary, for example, devote little attention to religion?
It does in fact seem that religion and its institutions are in a marginal position in 
the structure of today’s society compared to the dominantly secularized institutions.
It can be said that the concept of individualization appearing in secularization, 
and the concomitant values of human rights, freedom, participation in the economic 
and political processes, and social justice all expressed in the concept of democracy 
coincide with the basic Christian notions of sacrality and human values and have 
been incorporated into the general European religious culture. On the other hand, 
while proclaiming the moral autonomy of secular political activity, politics recog-
nizes that political culture has religious links (KOKOSALAKIS 1993: 135). The process 
supported by European Christianity shaped the demand and right to the private 
sphere (Casa no va  1996: 188). Examining the religious changes in Hungarian soci-
ety of the 1980s, Miklós TOMKA, sociologist of religion, was able to describe two 
related processes: 1. secularization, and 2. a process of de-secularization, that is, 
when religion emerges from the state of repression and rebuilds its institutions, per-
meating a part of social/political life (TOMKA 1988: 76). In the former socialist 
countries behind the Iron Curtain, the churches were practically the only stable 
ideological and organizational institutions during and after the political change. This 
is why their significance grew in the course of the political changes. As a result, a 
religious revival could also be observed in Hungary and elsewhere (KALLSCHEUER 
1996: 19). In the world freed from the domination of totalitarian ideologies and 
marked by increasing individualization and privatization, the pluralism of values and 
interests was also manifested in the adoption and/or creation of numerous new relig-
ious communities and movements (see: Barna  1999).
These findings can also be regarded as my paper’s points of departure.
In modern societies religion is present in the social structure to a far less extent 
than it was in earlier societies. At the same time, it is an increasingly accepted opin-
ion that religion cannot be considered only in its institutionalized forms. We know 
from practical experience that the ‘religious’ is present even without social institu-
tionalization, as folk religion, as new religious movements, as individual religiosity or 
desacralized rites, etc. In short, religion cannot be restricted to its institutionalized 
forms. Examining German politics and the religious dimensions of political culture 
in the 1980s, Rolf SCHIEDER wrote that religious symbolism was returning to politi-
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cal life and the world of political discourse (SCH1EDER 1987: 294 ff.). The same thing 
can be seen in Hungarian politics in the 1990s. In 1990-1994 our first democratically 
elected government consciously built on this language of religious symbolism, while 
in 1994-1998 the socialist (in reality returned communist) and extreme left-wing 
liberal coalition rejected this at the level of social discourse, although it supported its 
own power with quasi-religious symbols. The present bourgeois liberal and conser-
vative parties which have been in power since 1998 consciously accept - although 
with differing emphases - both religious legitimation and the use of ‘political relig-
ion’ drawing on Christian traditions.
What then is religion? Religion can be conceived in general (and from the an-
thropological and perhaps also sociological viewpoint) as a dynamic cultural phe-
nomenon, the embodiment of values, contents, feelings and symbols (Marti n  1978: 
13, - cited in Kokos alaki s  1993: 136). In this symbolical cultural interpretation, 
religion is directly linked to the fundamental existential interpretation of human 
conditions, to the notions people form of justice, freedom, good and bad. 
(Kokosalakis  1993:136; Geertz  1994b). The values accepted by society are often 
personified. The saints, individuals practising Christian virtue to a heroic degree, 
offered in the past and present life models that should or could be followed. In poli-
tics, too, there is a kind of secularized ‘cult of saints’ directed at political leaders, 
founders of parties, etc., which bears many of the external signs of religious cults. 
Various ‘values’ and interests are manifested in this, becoming patterns to be fol-
lowed or simply ideal types. This can be seen very strikingly in the 19th-20th century 
workers’ movement and in the 20th century totalitarian ideologies (celebrations, 
portrayals, ‘cult of relics’ - mausoleums, etc.) (See KORFF 1976). A similar cult 
emerged after the death of Princess Diana (see Marion Bowmans’ paper in this vol-
ume), and appears on the anniversary of her death. The different sets of values are 
present in everyday life as alternatives and people are attracted or repelled by them. 
In essence, such debating (religious and profane) sets of values are reflected in the 
political rhetoric of the Norwegian home mission (see Amundsen’s paper in this 
volume).
According to Dürkheim and Weber, the causes of changes in religions must be 
sought in changes in the structure of society. In this view, the marginalization of 
religious institutions reflects the decline of religion in society. But is this really true?
In the western world the magical conception of the world and the power of 
priests/churches have, in fact, declined in significance. But ideologies, including here 
the 18th century Enlightenment as well as those related to democracy in general, 
have never lost their metaphysical underpinnings. For they are based on faith and 
hope. Rationalism itself can never be purely rationalist (KOKOSALAKIS 1993: 137). 
In other words: besides a rationality of purpose (Zweckrationalität) there also exists a 
rationality of value (Wertrationalität). According to the Weberian conception, even 
behind the entirely rationally interpreted, governable conception of the world, there 
must be a unique quasi-religious logic and characteristic. And even if ideology and 
religion are not the same thing, they are very closely related. The organization of 
modern economic life, the system of political institutions and social life is not based
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only on rationality and rationalization. These processes cannot dispense with the 
essence of religion either. In this way modern society shapes its own religious pro-
cesses and forms. (KOKOSALAKIS 1993: 138).
The question is: if religion remains in today’s society, what is its social 
form/manifestation, and how are these forms related to the system/structure of so-
ciety? Despite the existence of a .process of . secularization, it can be said that.in re-
cent decades religion has not ceased to exist, it has not yet disappeared even in the 
developed western states and democracies. Indeed, we can observe a kind of revival 
of popular religion, as well as various forms of new religious movements, charismatic 
religions (see Barna  1999), occultism and New Age phenomena (Kok os al ak is  
1993: 139) which are being further strengthened by the mood of waiting for the end 
of the world that surrounds the millennium. A distinctive religious transformation is 
taking place at subjective level (KOKOSALAKIS 1993: 139).
At the end of the 1960s (1967) Thomas Luckmann  wrote his book titled 
‘Invisible Religion’, in which he regards religion as a comprehensive anthropological 
category. He concludes that in modern societies religion has shifted from the collec-
tive level and consciousness, to the subjective and private sphere. In other words, 
Luckmann noticed that religion in the modern age has broken away and escaped 
from the social system (KOKOSALAKIS 1993: 139). But this detachment is only one of 
appearance. Just as there is no personal language, so we cannot speak of a strictly 
only private/individual religiosity. Or another example, individual liberty can only be 
a product of collective work - in other words: can only be collectively secured and 
guaranteed (BAUMAN 1997: 7). Luckmann’s theory of ‘invisible religion’ is based on 
the assumption of a crisis of the institutional apparatus, [but] seems to be applicable 
only in certain cases, and does not destroy so-called church religion (Ciprian i 1984: 
30).
Church religion was able to strengthen beside individual religion.
In the 1980s and 1990s there has been an increase in the political significance of 
religion and religious fundamentalism. It became a decisive factor in conflicts in the 
Middle East, in the contradiction between Jews and Islam, and in the strengthening 
of fundamentalism in Iran, Afghanistan, Algeria and Dagestan. It is continuously 
present in Europe, in the Yugoslav conflict, and also in Transylvania where the Ro-
manian Orthodox Church does not wish to relinquish its dominance as the state 
religion. The ‘democratic’ government is still not willing to return the properties 
confiscated at the beginning of the communist period from the western Christian 
churches (Greek Catholic, Roman Catholic, Calvinist, Unitarian), but continues to 
support Orthodoxy. Another dimension lies behind this: the structuring and 
strengthening of the national identity.
All this indicates that the individualization and privatization of religion has not 
taken place, or not in the way that certain theoreticians believed they could see in 
the past decades, even though the theory of the privatization of religion is in line 
with the essence of western cultural development which gave the individual sover-
eign status. But this sovereign individualism became general and generally institu-
tionalized in the western societies. One of the stimulants of modern individualism
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was Christianity itself (KOKOSALAKIS 1993: 140). At the level of community politics, 
personal religion is much more closely related to the feeling of democracy itself, and 
to the demand for individual and community autonomy and identity. Consequently, 
religion was able to return to the community arena at the level of both liberal and 
conservative politics. This can be seen in the political activity based on Christian 
values, and in the vigorous spread of new Christian movements from the USA to 
Europe and the whole world. This process can be strengthened by the growing 
dominance of Islam present in European societies to a growing extent, generating 
some kind of collective Christian response (KOKOSALAKIS 1993: 141). This can be 
seen in the democratic political life being reorganized after the world-wide collapse 
of totalitarian atheistic regimes (from Russia through Albania to Cuba). This is why 
Cipri ani , on the basis of the Italian example, proposes introduction of the concept 
of ‘diffused religion’ (CIPRIANI 1984).
The privatization of religion is definitely related to the question of collective 
cultural and political rights and permeates society (CIPRIANI 1989, also cited in 
KOKOSALAKIS 1993: 141). In practice this means the spread of various forms of 
popular religion. The generally prevailing view is that modernity and popular relig-
ion are incompatible concepts and mutually exclusive aspects of social reality. There 
can be no doubt and it can be observed everywhere that the mediaeval magical 
thinking has basically lost its significance, but below the surface, there has always 
been a great variety of popular religion which was either tolerated or rejected by the 
institutionalized church and the state. An example in Hungary is the movement of 
Marian priests, the charismatic movement.
To a certain extent these social phenomena have in turn influenced theological 
thinking. While in the 1960s and 1970s the church wanted to modernize and 
‘demythologize’ religion, from the 1980s the aim was to stress the link between moral 
and religious values. The efforts of the church and religion for modernization and 
rationalization in a way resembled the similar efforts made in the 19th century, that 
is, to suppress popular religion, strengthen ecumenism and curb the cult of Mary and 
the saints that was weakening it. A striking example of this is the practice observed 
in the 1990s in organization of the church feast in Szeged Lower Town (See Puszt ai  
1999). Here, on the feast of the Blessed Lady of the Snows, in 1997 for example, 
there was no mention of the veneration of Mary, of the feast of the Blessed Lady of 
the Snows and its symbolical content, the organizers did not allow the small groups 
representing popular religion still present sporadically to have a say, but instead ~ 
involved them immediately in the organized and official liturgy (mass, adoration, 
litany). This obvious tension led to a shrinking of the previously wide region from 
which this place of pilgrimage had attracted pilgrims and it became of local signifi-
cance only.
The strong feminist movements that emerged parallel with the growth in the 
role of the individual brought the application of feminist viewpoints in all areas. 
While this is not yet the case for Hungary, in most countries of Western Europe 
feminist theology, a feminist interpretation of the Bible, etc. are no longer unaccus-
tomed phenomena. The social/political movement has in turn influenced religious
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thinking and theology. One sign of this was the strengthening of the veneration of 
Mary and the female principle that could be observed in the Swedish Church. I saw 
that portrayals of Mary are appearing in more and more Protestant churches, a sign 
that women want to play a role in the church, too. Another sign is the ordination of 
women as ministers in a number of Protestant churches (England, Germany, Hun-
gary, etc.), giving rise to many debates and splits within the churches concerned. The 
paper presented by Katarina Lewis deals with women’s roles and presence, with the 
confrontation between the Christian and modern conceptions of society in the 
Swedish Lutheran Church, the conflict between traditional female social roles and 
modern self-fulfilment. Under different social circumstances, for example in former 
Soviet Karelia, the role of women increased and it became their task to defend and 
pass on the faith, and to spread anti-communist, anti-atheist and anti-technology 
propaganda in their own families. This increased role of women declined after the 
political change and the male-centric church image strengthened again. Leonard 
Primiano writes about the religious practice of homosexual and lesbian believers, 
people the church previously did not know where to place.
The rapid changes that have occurred in the lives of individuals and small and 
large communities (emigration, changes of political regime = changes in the set of 
values), or the recurring economic crises of our times can also cause psychological 
insecurities. These demand a kind of religious security. Margaret Mackay speaks in 
her paper of the role played in the past and present by Calvinist hymns as a vehicle 
and expression of values. This psychological insecurity is probably also a factor be-
hind the strengthening of religious fundamentalism. The growth of religiosity in the 
various forms of popular religion can certainly also be of political significance at 
different levels, even if these forms are not part of the political structure of society. 
A number of papers deal with these aspects: the institution of monarchy, the link 
between civil religion and folk religion (Rowbottom), a distinctive religious practice 
and way of life developed under the totalitarian atheist autocracy (Küllős). Thus, 
despite the marginalization of religious institutions and the obvious autonomy of the 
basic institutions, religion and popular religiosity also appear in socio-economic and 
political contexts (Koko sal aki s  1993: 142).
It seems to me that the introduction of the concepts of ‘civil religion’ and 
‘political religion’ and the interpretation of their phenomena is a relevant formula-
tion of this duality. The idea of civil religion reaching back to Rousseau is also re-
flected in the opinion of many of today’s researchers. Although BELLAH’s book on 
the USA contains no definition of religion, J. A. Colem an  gives one, namely that 
civil religion is “a set of beliefs, rites and symbols which relates a man’s role as citi-
zen and his society’s place in space, time and history to the conditions of ultimate 
existence and meaning” (cited by Bryan t  1995: 149). Bryant  adds to this that civil 
religions must set out the proper relationship between (civil) society and the state in 
securing a society’s place in space, time and history.
The concept of ‘political religion’ arose in the context of the policy of moderni-
zation and nation-building, especially with regard to Africa and the Soviet Union. 
Christel Lane  sees differences between the two kinds of religion. While ‘civil reli-
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gion’ connects the political order to a transcendent power such as God, ‘political 
religion’ simply presents a sacralization of the political order. ‘Civil religion’ confines 
itself to the political order, whereas ‘political religion’ claims authority over all social 
life (Bryan t  1995: 150). Among other differences, it can be mentioned that in con-
trast with the historical roots of civil religion, the phenomena of political religion 
often belong to the area of invented tradition. One can generally agree with the 
statements of Lane  that civil religion is celebrated in societies where the individual 
is dominant, and political religion where the (party-)state seeks to impose itself 
(LANE 1981: 44; Brya nt  1995: 150). Civil and political religions include political 
rituals, ‘the rites of rulers’.
RELIGION AND IDENTITY
Globalization, the general development of the market economy and the collapse 
of the socialist systems have revived not only the private sphere, but also the ques-
tion of individual and communal identity, as a contrary process and one occurring 
principally in a religious and cultural context (Kokosalakis  1993: 136). The uneven 
secularization of the European societies resulted in a culturally dialectic process 
between politics and religion, and in the continuous restructuring of religion and 
the social structure, ethnic and religious identities. There is a tension between the 
particular and the universal in this process. This is also a central problem of Christi-
anity.
In the wake of Dürkheim we can regard the link between religion and identity as 
axiomatic. Due to the close intertwining of religion and ethnic identity, seculariza-
tion is less strong in a number of European countries, such as Ireland, Poland, 
Greece and Malta, than elsewhere in Europe. In multicultural and multireligious 
regions, religious and ethnic identity may become intertwined. One such region is 
Ireland where the Catholic religion distinguishes the Irish (Cecil  1993; Mac -
dona ld  1993), or in Moldova, Romania where a section of the Hungarians have 
become Romanianized in their language but have not abandoned their Catholic 
religion.
The close intertwining of ethnic and religious identity on the one hand, and 
ethnic separation on the basis of religion on the other hand can be seen in the 
Yugoslav conflict. Where those speaking the same language can be distinguished 
on the basis of religion, they have their own culture and consciousness. Sa§a 
Nedeu kovió  speaks in his paper of the link between religious and national identity. 
He analyses the conflicts in the attitudes towards cosmopolitanization, individuali-
zation and the religious/historical traditions present in university life. However, 
people following the same religion but living in different language communities may 
differ because of the different cultural background, historical and social factors, or a 
different interpretation of history. (For example, the differences between Italian and 
Ukrainian Catholics living in Australia. - Lewins  1978).
In this way religious and national identity can become intertwined. In certain
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cases religion can help in shaping the nation (e.g. the Rusyns discussed by Bertalan 
Pusztai in his paper), or in the symbolic expression of a separate ethnic/cultural 
identity, as in the case of the Roman Catholic Hungarians living in Moldova. Reli-
gion is also intertwined with Europeanness. It seems to me that in political life today 
the political idea of the European Community is in a way a reformulation of the 
unity constructed (also) on a religious basis in mediaeval Europe. And while the 
European world is strongly secularized, even if to differing extents in the individual 
countries, Christianity can nevertheless be found as an ideological support behind 
the aspirations for European union. But there are debates over whether European-
ness extends to Eastern Christianity, to Orthodoxy, or remains within the confines 
of Latin Christianity, Roman Catholicism and the Protestant churches which grew 
out of it, excluding Eastern Christianity from the union. In my opinion there are not 
only differences of ecclesiastical administration, history, rule, liturgy, etc. between 
Eastern and Western Christianity but also a different cultural and civilizational 
background and it would be difficult to bring the two into line. Current official Ro-
man Catholic aspirations stress the overall Europeanness of the two trends. As a 
symbolical expression of this, in 1981 Pope John Paul II made Cyril and Methodius, 
too, joint collective patron saints of Europe (ROBERTS 1998: 195-198). This di-
lemma also finds expression in the proposed process of expansion of the European 
Union.
Others see in supranational Christianity accepted as the foundation of the 
European cultures, a force extinguishing and ending national and ethnic specific 
features. For this reason, in structuring their present national identity and providing 
it with an ideological underpinning they reach back to reinterpreted and recon-
structed forms of pre-Christian local religions and symbols. The use of archaic reli-
gious and historical symbols is one of the main ideological tools of the various forms 
of nationalism. I agree with the study of Agita Misäne and Torunn Selberg: in 
Europe (Baltic and Scandinavian countries) neo-paganism assumes mainly its Prot-
estant form. I am not able to see clearly why this should be so, since such movements 
are also present, among others, in Poland and Hungary (WlENCH 1998).
Today’s attitude towards life and everyday religious feelings are strongly influ-
enced by the approaching end of the millennium, something experienced by only a 
few generations in the history of mankind. Opinions and notions in this connection 
are largely built on religious symbols and ideas of past ages related to the end of the 
world, the thousand-year reign of Christ and the Last Judgement. People experience 
a general deterioration of the world in their everyday lives: wars, natural catastro-
phes, crime, corruption, hostility to the future (=refusal to have children), sexual 
licentiousness. They see all this as the result of globalization and the individualism 
that is strengthening parallel with it. Religious and ethnic fundamentalism is appear-
ing as a counteraction. This attitude is often the basis of disillusionment with Chris-
tianity and the turning towards pre-Christian cults already mentioned.
v
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In the opening paper I tried to outline some theoretical questions of the chosen 
topic of our Conference and its timeliness. What is politics? What is religion? Are 
there tensions, separation, or interdependence, interference, mutual influence, or 
co-operation between the two phenomena?
How can the questions raised be answered from the angle of the relations be-
tween politics and folk religion? The papers to be presented in the coming days will 
throw light on many details. However, we can say in general that the similar, sym-
bolical expression of interests and values makes the spheres of politics and religion 
related fields, and the forms of symbolical expression/behaviour are to a large extent 
similar or identical. Precisely because of the more or less overlapping fields of inter-
est and values, the forms of symbolical behaviour and the ritualization of actions can 
also be similar. Moreover, the secular authorities often gain or believe they have 
gained transcendent legitimation from religion, from the different forms in which 
religiosity is manifested and, in the final analysis, from reference to God.
On the other hand, examples of the links between national identity and religion 
show that religion, the religiosity of everyday life, the system of religious symbols, 
the values represented by religion/denomination have the symbolical power to shape 
communities, that is, they can join and strengthen people in their self-identities, self- 
awareness and their sense of communal belonging. In other words, in its operation 
religion also acquires immediate social/political significance. This is true in everyday 
religious practice, in the shaping of historical consciousness, and in the interpreta-
tion of religious and national conflicts. In both past and present politics and folk 
religion are interrelated phenomena that permeate and influence each other.
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STRATEGIES FOR RECHRISTIANIZATION. 
POLITICAL RHETORIC OF THE NORWEGIAN 
HOME MISSION IN THE 1920’s1
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Postbooks 1010, Blindem, N-0315, Oslo, Norway
Abstract: The paper discusses the strategies and the rhetorical elements of the Norwegian In-
ner Mission during a period of political and cultural conflict - the 1920’s and 1930’s. Special atten-
tion is paid to understanding the ambivalence between premodern values and modern strategies as 
they were expressed by one of the leaders of one of the inner mission organisations, professor of 
theology Ole Hallesby (1879-1961). In his thinking, the explicit aim of the inner mission activities 
was the rechristianization of Norway, the means were actions organised according to the modern 
society, but the cultural and social ideal was the non-secularized, premodem Norway - as opposed 
to urban pluralism. Probably, this ambivalence made the inner mission strategy a political failure.
Keywords: pietism, religious organisations, inner mission, national revival, secularization, 
modernity and premodernity
Norway has never been dominated by strong, aggressive free churches. Instead, 
the Norwegian Lutheran State Church - established in its present shape by the 
Constitution of 1814 - became the fundament for most strategies in order to expli-
cate religious values, formulate religious protest or secularize the civil society. Even 
today, most Norwegians belong to the Lutheran State Church.2
However, during the 19th century, several autonomous religious organisations 
were established within the State Church. These organisations for the most part 
were dominated by different kinds of pietist ideology and puritan models for reli-
gious life. Their aims could be multiple, and cover for instance both foreign mission, 
home mission and social work. A national Foreign Mission Society was established in 
1842, and in 1868 a parallel society aiming at national home mission was organised, 
the so-called Luther Foundation.
During most of the 19th century, these religious organisations within the State 
Church were interesting combinations of working strategies and social structures 
that were both modern and premodern. Evidently, the very fact that the two national
1 This article is based on my paper “Vennene og vekkelsen. Hallesbys Signalement av indremisjons- 
kulturen” (1999, in press).
2 There are, unfortunately, very few general presentations of the Norwegian church and religious 
history in foreign languages. Information of a certain relevance and value for the period described in this 
article is, however, to be found in GJESSING 1911, Die Kirche von Norwegen 1936, and HASS1NG 1980 
(on Methodism and popular revivals in the 19th century). Certain aspects are also dealt with in 
THORKJLDSEN 1996. A short survey is presented in MOLLAND 1957.
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Fig 1. This picture shows what is called “Christian Youth” marching for an out-door meeting - probably 
in the late 1930’s. Not all the participants look specially young, but they are correctly marching - under 
the slogan “The Norwegian People for Christ” (Repro: Arthur Sand, Oslo)
societies were organisations, was a modern phenomenon. So was the fact that they 
were founded by non-experts, laymen and laywomen as opposed to the ministers and 
formally educated religious experts. But at the same time they settled in local socie-
ties, and were restrictive as to the participation of women preachers, and this made 
clear that the organisations also referred to premodern values and standards.3
THE NORWEGIAN HOME MISSION OF THE 1850’s
This rather strange combination of modern and premodern elements also in 
several ways was decisive when the leaders of the Norwegian home mission, the 
Luther Foundation, formulated their views on contemporary society and the aims of
3 A recent and very broad investigation on the religious movements in Norway c. 1780-1920 is 
FURSETH 1999.
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Fig 2. This is actually the cover of the book presenting the official reports from the important meeting in 
1920, when Ole Flallesby was among the spokesmen for a non-cooperation policy against the liberal 
among the Norwegian clergy. The picture shows the dimensions of the meeting. Hallesby’s portrait is in 
the upper left corner (Repro: Arthur Sand, Oslo)
A V X
the inner mission as such. The explicit argument put in favour of establishing a for-
mal home mission organisation was that a religious crisis had developed. During the 
1850’s and 1860’s, Norway was dominated by several religious revivals, and it was the 
leaders of these revivals who actually became the leaders of the new organisation. 
But what was the content of this alleged religious crisis? It seems that many of the 
religious leaders thought that the effect of the growing Norwegian industrialism, 
capitalism and migration was that the moral and religious standards of the old soci-
ety were seriously threatened. The obedience to God, to the Ten Commandments, to 
the authority of the Bible, so established in previous times, no longer was a com-
monly accepted fact in society. And why was that so? The spokesmen of the early 
home mission argued that one main point simply was that modern people did not 
accept authority as such, they wanted to decide for themselves, to make more 
money, have better lives and personal freedom. This was the cultural and social 
content of the postulated religious crisis. And how could this crisis be overcome
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according to this critical religious view? The assumption of the inner mission leaders 
was that a crisis like this only could be neutralized by using the weapons of the mod-
ern society itself. One had to use modern media like newspapers and public discus-
sions, it was necessary to organise the Inner Mission activities, and to do it just like 
the expanding workers and burghers did when they expanded or sought to have sup-
port in favour of their demands and interests. The problem was, of course, that the 
use of modern strategies in order to establish the moral and religious codes of the 
premodern society could easily turn out to be both ambiguous and arbitrary. This 
was fully understood by the Norwegian home mission leaders of the 1850’s and 
1860’s, and they tried to establish their society as some sort of an ad interim organi-
sation. We need this organisation just now, they said, but it is not meant as any kind 
of a permanent structure. Let us use The Luther Foundation, the inner mission soci-
ety as an instrument for distributing bibles and new testaments, let us also use it for 
administration of lay preachers all around the country, for collecting money and for 
controlling and centralizing public discussion - as long as it is needed. But when we 
have reached our aims and the Norwegian people has once again returned to the old 
standards of moral and religion, this organisation actually will no longer be needed.
Of course, neither as a strategy nor as an ideology this was acceptable and real-
istic. But I find it very interesting as a starting point for the organisation: The organ-
ised Norwegian inner mission was from its beginning in the 1850’s and 1860’s identi-
fied by what one perhaps might call an intrinsic ambivalence: It was aiming at re-
establishing old, premodern values by using modern strategies, and was left with 
some kind of a scepticism towards its own methods.
A REORGANISED SOCIETY IN 1891
The Norwegian society changed dramatically during the second half of the 19th 
century.4 Industrialism, capitalism and migration had come to stay. The cities were 
rapidly growing, the social differences between the classes became more clear, and 
political conflicts threatened the stability of the society. In 1884, parliamentarism 
was introduced as the only way of stabilising the growing political conflicts. As seen 
by the home mission leaders, however, the religious crisis became more of a perma-
nent crisis than could have been foreseen twenty years earlier. So, in 1891, the Lu-
ther Foundation was reorganised and made a permanent, modern, nationwide or-
ganisation under the name of The Norwegian Home Mission Society and with the aim 
of making Norway a Christian society. The instruments of this reorganised society 
were as follows: A national network of professional lay preachers was established, 
and the new organisation was installed with three levels - the central committee in 
the capital, the regional boards, and the local boards. The fundament of the whole 
organisation, however, still was the local assemblies of what usually was called “the
4 A survey on 19th century Norway could be found in HUBBARD et al. 1995, esp. Chs. 6-7.
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friends” or “the spiritual friends”. These small groups were formally organised, and 
many of them built their own houses, usually called “houses of prayer” (in Norwe-
gian: “bedehus”), where the meetings and assemblies of the friends were situated 
two, three or more days of the week.
And the work went on. There were quite a few revivals on local, regional and 
national level, but the Norwegian society kept changing. Even more people moved to 
the cities, the rehgious movements did not grow as fast as planned, while other 
popular movements expanded - both socialists, unions and teetotalists established 
themselves as central political forces.
A NEW GENERATION OF HOME MISSION LEADERS
In this situation a new generation of leaders took over the Home Mission Soci-
ety. Both were theologians, and one of them was also a minister. In 1912, the minis-
ter Johan Martin Wisl0jf (1873-1944) was appointed secretary general, or executing 
leader of the organisation, while dr. Ole Hallesby (1879-1961), professor of theology 
at the recently (1907) established Free Faculty of Theology in Oslo, was appointed 
head of the board. In cooperation, the two new leaders immediately started to point 
out new directions for the organisation.
In a series of articles in the Home Mission’s periodical, professor Hallesby dur-
ing the autumn of 1912 made some main statements of his policy. We have one cen-
tral aim, he declared, and that is to rechristianize whole Norway. Secularisation, athe-
ism, godless propaganda and modern heathendom are all threatening to make our 
country a new spiritual wilderness, and our people a people without culture and 
values. In a situation like this we cannot just sit down and observe or regret what is 
happening; we have to act, and act according to an explicit and conscious strategy. 
What is, then, the hope of Norway? How is Norway to be rechristianized? Our aims 
can only be achieved by means of a total renewal, a national revival. And how could a 
national revival be organized? Professor Hallesby here launched a slogan that was to 
be heard for several years to come, at that was: “Fill the institutions!” By this, he 
meant that the best way to open up for a national revival, a full rechristianization of 
the Norwegian society, was to place severe Christian believers in central positions all 
over the society.
But this was not all. Professor Hallesby also thought that the Home Mission had 
to show the way, by establishing its own institutions, especially schools, for young 
people, for teachers, for lay preachers, for craftsmen, for farmers. Furthermore, 
Hallesby suggested that the new times were in need of Christian hospitals, charity 
institutions, educated and full-time lay preachers employed by the Inner Mission and 
new “houses of prayer” where different kinds of activities could take place. During 
the following years, the Home Mission spent a lot of money founding and funding 
these kinds of schools, institutions and houses all over the country. Another point 
was, according to Hallesby, that the internal strategies had to be refined. The local 
Home Mission groups, “the friends”, had to modernize, to become more effective
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Fig 3. Professor Ole Hallesby in his later years, probably the 1940’s or 1950’s. Beware of the golden 
cross hanging on a chain: The cross as sign of victory - and repentance (Repro: Arthur Sand, Oslo)
and expansive. He invited the local “friends” to establish Sunday schools, clubs and 
choirs for young boys and girls, family groups for the young, Christian couples and so 
on. Within a few years, the Home Mission organisation had become highly differen-
tiated both on central and on local level.
This very expansive strategy was in fact not stopped until the Second World 
War. And the success was remarkable and astonishing. There is no doubt that the 
Inner Mission became a vital and central cultural, social and political power in the 
Norwegian society, a position clearly demonstrated by the rebuilding of its head-
quarters in the Norwegian Capital. In the 1930’s, the Home Mission built a modern 
complex of hotel, offices, administration centre and assembly hall close to the Royal 
Castle in Oslo.
POLITICAL AIMS WITHOUT POLITICS?
How is this to be characterized, this far? Beyond doubt, the new Inner Mission 
strategy conceived by professor Ole Hallesby represented a further modernization 
not only of the organisation but of the strategical thinking. Provoked and threatened 
by the emerging political and moral popular organisations of socialist and teetotalist
Strategies for Rechristianization 29
origin, and obviously inspired by their effectivity and success, the Home Mission 
leaders both wanted to stand up against these godless tendencies and tried to imitate 
their strategy and ways of working. While the socialist organisations tried to take 
over the established social organisations and to win national and local elections, 
Hallesby tried to establish alternative, Christian institutions. Only by publicly dem-
onstrating that the Home Mission organisation was capable of competing with rival-
ling, non-Christian organisations, there would be possibilities of the great national 
awakening or revival to come. Hence, it is not hard to see that Hallesby’s strategy 
was a political strategy and a strategy of competition: The fight was over the souls of 
all Norwegians, and the fight had to be won by either godless political parties or by a 
Christian organisation.
It is, however, interesting to observe that professor Hallesby and the home mis-
sion leaders very seldom were talking about politics in direct terms. On the contrary, 
Hallesby most often speaks about politics and politicians in terms of contempt or 
marginalization. There is, he often says, a safe way to go if one is to destroy the in-
nocence and deeper culture of a people, and that is the way of politics. Politics is 
conflict, hatred and destruction put into system. On the other hand, Christian faith - 
as expressed through the inner mission ideals - puts together what a degenerated, 
godless and restless society has taken apart. Christian faith makes the individual free 
and restores the god-willed institutions in society based on the authority of God’s 
own word. As a consequence, Hallesby is very sceptical about true Christians being 
politicians or engaging for instance in workers unions. There is, he says, only one 
important thing in life, and that is the struggle for The Kingdom of God to come, to 
make the old and well tested values of Christianity accepted as the fundamentals of 
society - in short: The struggle for full rechristianization, not political parties or 
higher wages, is the first and only obligation for true Christians.
THE REVIVAL OF IDEOLOGIES
Hallesby’s and the Home Mission’s great era, in fact, became the mid-war 
period, the 1920’s and 1930’s. This was a period, even in Norway, of extensive politi-
cal rhetoric. It is, then, very tempting to underline only this dimension of what was 
said and what was done. Indirectly, the Inner Mission made puritan and pietist 
Christian culture a question of political alternatives or exclusive choices, and - for 
instance - created effective barriers between religion and socialism, or a rather 
negative attitude among Home Mission members to political activity. And further, it 
is quite easy to understand why the Home Mission strategy had to turn problemati-
cal: It was - after all - not linked to distinct and common social or cultural values 
that could be accepted by others than the Home Mission’s own members. Therefore, 
the rechristianization rhetoric created a dividing line between believers and non-
believers. Only Home Mission members themselves dreamed about The Great 
National Awakening; to others, this awakening seemed the purest night-mare. 
Second, compared with for instance the Socialist Party, the workers’ unions or the
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Teetotalist Movement, the Inner Mission Society was of limited force both economi-
cally, socially and rhetorically. The public competition - if there ever was one at all - 
was between David and Goliat, and the point here is that David might have had a 
just case and all heavens blessings, but he still was the youngster and Goliat stayed a 
giant.
- OR THE IDEOLOGY OF REVIVALS?
But this is not all. Until this point, I have mostly been concerned with leader-
ship, public strategy, official rhetoric and direct political implications of the work of 
the Inner Mission and professor Hallesby in the 1920’s. But since this is a Confer-
ence on ethnology of religion, there should of course also be a question of culture 
and people here. Professor Hallesby was not the only member of the Home Mission, 
although he was conceived as - and indeed he understood himself as - the eloquent 
and undisputed leader and chief of the organisation. Hallesby, however, was in many 
ways a wise and experienced man. Since early in the century, he had himself been 
travelling as a lay preacher (he was in fact never ordained as a minister), hoping for 
revival and awakening. He knew his supporters, and he was a very intelligent inter-
preter of their culture and ways of thinking. In a very interesting book from 1928 - 
published as a celebration of the Inner Mission’s 60th anniversary - professor 
Hallesby addresses the ordinary members of his organisation. The book is called 
From the Working Fields. A Few Words to the Friends of the Inner Mission.5
Of course, Hallesby has to make statements of his ambitious strategy here, too. 
But in a strange way, these ambitions seem to fade away, and instead, he starts to 
talk about the individual soul, the local communities of “spiritual friends” - without 
money, with no eloquence or strong organisation, left only with confusion, despair, 
and a small hope of the grace of God. The book as such is less a selfsufficient pre-
sentation of the rechristianization program than a modest and sympathetic sermon 
to troubled individuals.6
What “the friends” actually long for, Hallesby says, is not necessarily obvious 
success or external accept, but a local revival and a warm, friendly acceptance at the 
local “house of prayers”. And he gives lengthy descriptions not only of how nice and 
fruitful these close and warm religious communities could be, but also of the simple 
and severe religious communities of former days, at the countryside, when the pre-
modern innocence still dominated people’s bodies and minds.7 The warmth of the 
friends and the fire of the revival is also the fire and the warmth of the past. Why do 
we need all these organisations, educated preachers and effective administrators? 
Hallesby asks. In fact, he continues, the strength and the center of genuine religious
5 The Norwegian title of the book is Fra arbeidsmarken. Et ord til indremissionsvenner.
6 It is possible to get at least a certain impression of Hallesby’s way of thinking on these matters 
through some of his translated books, e.g. Hall esby  1934 and Hall esby  1996.
7 On central traits in 19th century conservative Norwegian pietism, cf. AMUNDSEN 1997 (a).
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Fig 4. The headquarters of the Norwegian Inner Mission Society as it was presented after a major re-
building in 1935 - in the center of the Norwegian capital, Oslo (Repro: Arthur Sand, Oslo)
life is the local community of friends. If this community is well-functioning, pure and 
without conflicts, a mild and quiet revival will come. How it starts, will be unknown 
to us, and whereto it will take us, is impossible to guess, Hallesby further says. In 
these passages, Hallesby’s rhetoric is of another kind than in the public speeches and 
debates. Actually, it almost seems as if the “friend”-rhetoric is contra-factual to the 
modernized “Great-National-Awakening”-rhetoric. The “friend”-rhetoric is both 
nostalgic and, partly pre-modern, but it is hardly occupied with the new movement 
strategy at all.8
THE PROBLEM OF THE ‘REMOVED CANDLESTICK’
And there is even more to it. Having placed the centre of all religious life in 
Norway among the local group of friends, who actually needed no organisation to 
experience revival, Hallesby goes even further. Why does this quiet, serious, local 
awakening still not appear? he asks his readers. Is it perhaps because you have not 
repented - every one of you? Does the community of friends, the “house of prayer”, 
house hidden sins? In this central passage he is kind enough to quote a very impor-
On the nostalgic character of the Church’s view on its own history, cf. AMUNDSEN 1997 (b).
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tant verse from the New Testament, a verse that belongs to the central topoi in the 
revivalist culture, i.e. The Book of Revelation, chapter 2, verse 5: “Remember there-
fore from whence thou art fallen, and repent, and do the first works; or else I will 
come unto thee quickly, and will remove thy candlestick out of this place, except you 
repent.”
This, I think, is the ultimate, inner box, the rhetoric of the rhetoric in the inner 
mission culture. Still in the process of building up an effective and powerful religious 
organisation, professor Hallesby also reveals the weakest - and perhaps also the 
most sympathetic - element of this culture: its almost immense introspection and 
individualism.
As seen from outside, this is the weakest point of the whole project in the 1920’s 
and 1930’s: not the lack of funds, members or political support, but the religious ide-
ology itself. What Hallesby actually was saying - and I think that this was a point 
shared by most of his home mission “friends” - was that there will be no rechristiani- 
zation, no common success, no Great National Awakening - unless every one of you 
show up a clean heart, a pure mind, a warm hand. Inner Mission may not need for-
mal organisation or educated preachers, but it cannot do without every single 
“friend” - “repenting, and doing the first works”. If there were no “friends” with 
these genuine qualities, God himself may “remove the candlestick from this place”. 
Perhaps Norway was condemned? Perhaps the darkness of godlessness, politics and 
conflicts was the actual future - because of the “friends” themselves?
THE IRONY OF THE ‘SECULARIZED CANDLESTICK’
If I am right in interpreting professor Ole Hallesby like this - and, in fact, I think 
I am right here - I would like to point out that this is a conclusion of a certain rele-
vance to the main theme of this Conference, “Politics and Folk Religion”.
I have tried briefly to describe the historical and rhetorical conditions and tradi-
tions in a specific European country in the inter-war period. It was a period when in 
many countries political and religious movements were in serious conflict over social 
values, political power and control of public institutions. In a Lutheran and even 
pietist tradition as the Norwegian, there seem to have been made strong efforts to 
make local, popular religion a fundament for strong revival movements aiming at 
taking spiritual control over the whole country. In one perspective, professor Ole 
Hallesby is a significant case here. Local pietism and communities of “friends” were 
parts of a strong popular religiosity almost all over Norway at the time, and Hallesby 
and the Home Mission leaders tried to make them stand up against socialism, politi-
cal conflicts and godlessness.
On the other hand, there are central elements in the very pietistic and revivalis- 
tic ideology that make such political and cultural efforts difficult to sustain. Pietism 
is, indeed, expansive and authoritarian, but it is also extremely individualistic and 
self-critical. Professor Ole Hallesby was well aware of this, and he explicates it quite 
clearly in dialogue with all his inner mission “friends”. Thus, he also openly shows
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that pietistic strategies for rechristianization in a pluralistic community have to fail, 
at least when compared with uni-linear, power-seeking movements of a more distinct 
secular origin. While the pietistic “spiritual friends” of the 20th century always have 
feared that “the candlestick” might be taken away from them, the secular, political 
movements have grasped the “candlestick” and taken it to their place.
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VERNACULAR RELIGION AND POLITICS 
IN THE MOURNING FOR DIANA
Marion BOWMAN
Religious Studies Department, Faculty of Arts, The Open University 
Walton Hall, Milton Keynes, MK7 6AA, United Kingdom
Abstract: The death of Diana, Princess of Wales, on August 31st 1997, led to extraordinary ac-
tivity by millions of people as they reacted to the news in unexpected and seemingly unprecedented 
ways. Among the most fascinating phenomena were the many notes which were left for, about and 
to Diana, at the many ‘shrines’ which sprang up around Britain.
This paper will explore the multivalent nature of these notes - the extent to which they re-
flected folk belief about sainthood, heaven and divinity; the extent to which they were political 
comment veiled in the conventions of mourning; the extent to which they were either magnifications 
of common vernacular practice or a new development within it.
These remarkable documents were both personal and communal, public and private; it could 
be argued that they give a unique insight into popular religiosity in Britain at the turn of the Mil-
lennium.
Keywords: vernacular religion, death of Diana, Princess of Wales, folk belief about sainthood, 
letters to Diana
The scenes in Britain in the days after the death in a car accident of Diana, 
Princess of Wales, on 31 August 1997 were extraordinary. It was a ‘liminal’ period 
when republicans mourned a princess, royal behaviour was both criticised and dic-
tated by the people, profane space was made sacred; and tradition was evoked, 
adapted and invented. The purpose of this paper is to explore the ways in which 
popular belief, practice and politics intermingled and found expression at this time, 
and to contextualise some of the religious and spiritual activity reported on and ob-
served then.
Many magazine and newspaper columns, and numerous books, popular and 
scholarly, have been written on ‘the Diana event’. However there was not one ‘Diana 
event’, there were many complex inter-related ‘Diana events’. These Diana events 
were multivalent; they had different meanings for different people, both actors and 
observers. While it is not possible here to describe all the events in detail and review 
all the commentary,11 want to draw attention to certain incidents to see what can be 
learned from them about popular politics, folk religion and contemporary spirituality 
in Britain.
1 See WALTER, ed. (1999) for a broad-ranging collection of academic papers on the events following 
Diana’s death.
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THE PEOPLE’S PRINCESS
Lady Diana Spencer, a descendant of the poet Edmund Spenser who wrote ‘The 
Faerie Queen’, had been the late twentieth century’s fairytale princess - beautiful, 
kind and caring. As sociologist Tony Walt er  points out, in an era of constitutional 
monarchy, ‘every royal personage must appear both royal and yet ordinary, almost 
divine yet almost human’ (Walt er  1999: 26). This Diana managed extremely well. 
Her glamour and beauty underlined her difference from the ordinary; her medical 
and marital problems stressed her humanity but endeared her to many; her per-
ceived closeness to divinity was expressed in the readiness of mourners to declare 
her a saint or an angel on her death. In short, Diana ‘out-royaled’ the royals; she 
came to be thought of by many as the ‘real’ royal from whom other members of the 
Royal Family should learn. O’Hear  claims that what Diana stood for was ‘the ele-
vation of feeling, image and spontaneity over reason, reality and restraint’ (The 
Week, 25/4/1998: 12).
The death of Diana was announced early on Sunday 31 August 1998. At break-
fast time the recently elected Labour Prime Minister, Tony Blair, was interviewed. In 
this interview he used the phrase ‘the people’s Princess’ which was to become an 
important motif throughout the Diana events.
At the time of the accident, which occurred in Paris, the Royal Family including 
the Queen, Prince Charles and the two young princes William and Harry were on 
holiday at Balmoral, the Royal Family’s remote country estate in Scotland. There 
was therefore to some extent a lack of focus; Diana’s body was in France, and the 
Royal Family were in Scotland. In the absence of personal contact, people turned to 
two empty buildings associated with and to some extent symbolising Diana and the 
Royal Family respectively, Kensington Palace and Buckingham Palace (see Davies  
1999).
Among the most remarkable (and photogenic) scenes after Diana’s death were 
the sheer numbers of flowers deposited in London outside Kensington Palace and 
Buckingham Palace, outside cathedrals and churches, and at war memorials and 
other public places throughout England.2 Messages and tributes to Diana, photo-
graphs of Diana, candles, balloons, toys and assorted personal belongings were also 
left at such sites. Books of Condolences appeared at Kensington Palace and Buck-
ingham Palace, at civic buildings such as town halls, in cathedrals and churches, in 
Harrods (the prestigious London store owned by Mohammed A1 Fayed, the father 
of Dodi AI Fayed who also died in the accident), in supermarkets and elsewhere.3 
Technological innovation enabled ‘virtual’ books of condolences to proliferate on 
the Internet.
2 I should make clear at the outset that I am a Scot (Scottish father, English mother) living in Bath, 
England; my personal experiences of and research into the Diana events were therefore based in Eng-
land.
3 One noticeable change of ‘custom’ in the aftermath of Diana’s death seems to be the use of the 
book of condolence. When a young woman was murdered in the Bristol area, for example, a book of 
condolence was immediately set up in the Methodist church with which her family was connected.
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There were extraordinary scenes on the day of the funeral. Crowds lined the 
route of the funeral procession, many having spent the previous night on the pave-
ment to ensure a prime position. The funeral service was broadcast to the masses 
outside the Abbey and an estimated audience of 31 million throughout the UK. Af-
ter the service, people gathered to watch and throw flowers onto the car that trans-
ported Diana’s body to her final resting place on an island in the grounds of her 
ancestral home.
PEOPLE POWER
It is important to remember that the Labour Party had fought an election in 
May 1997 against a Conservative government that had increasingly been seen as out 
of touch, hard-hearted and hypocritical. Much of the rhetoric of the election cam-
paign had been phrased in terms of the ‘the will of the people’, the need for the 
‘voice of the people’ to be heard, and the desire to create a more caring, inclusive 
society. After the election, Labour could present its victory as a victory of the people.
So, there was an awareness of and a taste for ‘people power’ in the summer of 
’97. And what happened was that ‘the people’, or to be more accurate, some people, 
those who became ‘Diana’s people’ wanted to show respect and they wanted others 
to show respect too. Many have commented on the fact that there was a sort of co-
ercion into a show of mourning more appropriate to the Victorian era than 1990’s 
‘cool Britannia’. Britons who were not caught up in what was being portrayed as 
‘national grief felt alienated and spoke of a ‘fascism of grief’, or ‘the touchy-feely 
fascists’. Popular notions of appropriate behaviour in relation to the dead, to the 
Royal Family and to the nation were expressed and to some extent enforced. What 
happened was both an appeal to and revival of tradition, as well as the adaptation 
and in some cases the overturning of tradition.
THE STATE OF THE NATION
Another important aspect of the Labour victory was its election promise to pur-
sue devolution for Scotland and Wales. Many, Labour supporters included, felt this 
might irreversibly change the nation and possibly lead to the break up of the United 
Kingdom as we know it. So we must also be aware that there was already an agenda 
of reflection on the nature of Britain and the state of the nation. Moreover, the 
changing face of Britain, which is now a multi-cultural and religiously plural society, 
was apparent in the Diana events. Messages and flowers were left and condolence 
books were signed by Britons of all descriptions. However, for all the newspaper talk 
of ‘the nation united in grief’, a number of events were curiously under-reported: the 
fact that many people, Muslim and non-Muslim, flocked to Dodi AI Fayed’s grave; 
the fact that a London Muslim group distributed food to those camped outside 
Westminster Abbey on the night before the funeral; the fact that a multi-faith re-




Fig. 1. Shop-window shrine in Bath
membrance service was held in Bradford. Different understandings of what consti-
tutes ‘the nation’ were articulated (consciously or unconsciously) and although the 
language of inclusivity was often invoked this was not always demonstrated in the 
reporting. The title ‘England’s Rose’ for Diana, for example, is demonstrative of that 
ambiguity; some would read there England meaning Britain, others would not!
THE ROYALS DIDN’T DESERVE YOU’
Both the Royal Family and the capital city, London, are considered national 
symbols (I need hardly add that this is a particularly English perspective). The ab-
sence of the Royal Family from London, as they continued their holiday, became an 
increasing source of comment and criticism in the tabloid press that claimed to re-
flect the views of the people. Being out of London was equated with being out of 
touch with the people.
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At the heart of the matter was the fact that the Royal Family was seen to be be-
having unlike the people. There was a great irony in the fact that whereas in the past 
the Royal Family, exemplified by Queen Victoria, had set the standards for elabo-
rate mourning, the people were now dictating how the Royal Family should express 
their grief. The continued presence of the Royals at Balmoral and their apparent 
aloofness from the extraordinary scenes of public mourning became the focus of 
increasingly negative comment. Tabloid newspapers called on the Queen to come 
back to London to ‘lead the nation’s grief’ and ‘show us you care’ (Davies  1999: 8). 
The Royal Family was being judged by the standards of the people, and also by the 
standards they felt had been set by Diana - the people’s princess, the caring princess.
A variety of traditional methods were employed to show public disapproval of 
the Royal Family’s behaviour in relation to Diana’s death, and also of their treat-
ment of her during her lifetime. There was the use of humour, as in the following 
examples:
Prince Charles was out walking the dog the other day. A pas-
ser-by said ‘Morning’, Prince Charles said ‘No, just walking the 
dog’.4
Why was Elton John invited to the funeral? So at least one old 
queen would be seen crying in public.
The messages with the flowers, though mainly expressing affection for Diana 
and sorrow over her death, were also used as vehicles for criticism of the Royal 
Family:
The Royals didn’t deserve you. You showed the world what 
‘Royalty’ is all about (MONGER and CHANDLER, 1998: 107).
While most messages were addressed to Diana, some were actually directed at the 
Queen: ‘Why did you treat Diana so badly? You should be ashamed.’ (MONGER and 
Chandle r , 1998:107).
A good example of ‘people power’ in relation to appropriate behaviour con-
cerned the flying of the Royal Standard over Buckingham palace. It is the practice 
that the Royal Standard flies over Buckingham Palace when the monarch is in resi-
dence there; when the monarch is not there no flag is flown. At the time of a royal 
death, the Royal Standard still flies, as a sign of the continuity of the crown. Mean-
while, in ordinary society, it is common practice to fly a flag at half-mast as a sign of 
respect when any national figure dies or there is an occasion of local or national 
mourning. Thus, after Diana’s death, what is considered Britain’s national flag, the 
Union Jack,5 was flown at half-mast on public buildings - but not, of course, at 
Buckingham Palace. The absence of any flag on Buckingham Palace, and particu-
4 This is a play on the words ‘morning’ and ‘mourning’, which sound very similar.
5 It should be noted that the Union Jack contains symbols of England, Scotland and Ireland, but not
Wales.
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larly the absence of the Union Jack at half-mast became the focus of increas-
ing comment and irritation in the popular press. The explanation of the royal tradi-
tion concerning the Royal Standard was not deemed good enough. Ultimately, the 
people ‘won’. On the day of the funeral, the Union Jack flew over Buckingham 
Palace at half-mast; the palace had to conform to the wishes of the people. Royal 
tradition was overthrown, and the people’s view of appropriate behaviour was rein-
forced.
What some people did was to tap into the civil religious behaviour of what Anne 
Rowbottom  (1998) calls ‘the real royalists’. As Rowbottom  has pointed out, 
when people flocked to London bearing gifts (primarily flowers but also photographs 
and other hand-made items), when they queued patiently, when they waited for 
hours to be in a good position to see the funeral procession pass, they were acting 
in the ways ‘traditional’ for civic visits by Royalty and other Royal occasions (some 
of the people who spent the night on the pavement in order to get a good view of 
the funeral procession had done the same for Diana’s wedding 16 years earlier). 
The need to do something resulted in part in doing the done thing in relation to 
monarchy.
As Rowbottom  has also pointed out, the study of civil religion and constitu-
tional monarchy has been comparatively neglected, and many academics and jour-
nalists of republican persuasion tend to regard royalists as cranks and fanatics (this 
undoubtedly came through in the surprise and distaste expressed by some academics 
and journalists at the time). However, the confused and confusing nature of the 
relationship between the British and the monarchy (and perhaps particularly the 
English and the monarchy) needs further examination as it plays a vital role in Brit-
ain’s ‘folk politics’ and notions of nationality.
OFFICIAL AND FOLK RELIGION
Religion and politics are interlinked in a situation where there is a state Church, 
with the monarch as its head. The Queen’s role as Head of the Church of England 
came under some scrutiny in the light of some of the negative comments being made 
about the Royal Family’s treatment of Diana. A message taped to the railings of 
Hyde Park read
‘Dear Diana,
My dear you have been treated very badly by a family con-
nected with my church’ (MONGER and CHANDLER, 1998: 107).
One vicar wrote to Church Times, the newspaper of the Church of England:
Sir, - I suspect that I am not alone in being thoroughly 
ashamed that the name of the Princess of Wales was dropped from 
the State Prayers a year ago. Presumably it is too late for an apol-
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ogy to be made, but a lesson can be learnt: Lambeth should not 
automatically bow the knee to the commands of Buckingham Pal-
ace. (12/9/1997, No 7022:9).
The role of the Anglican churches and cathedrals in the aftermath of Diana’s 
death and the fact that she was given ‘what was effectively a state funeral in the 
Church of England’ (Davie  and Marti n , 1999: 188) highlighted the ambivalent 
relationship between the people and the state church at a time when Anglican 
church attendance in England is said to have fallen below 1 million on an average 
Sunday. One writer to the Church Times felt that the church could learn from Diana:
The Church is now at a crossroads: either she can become 
more isolated and out of touch with ordinary people, or she can 
take the message Princess Diana brought to the people, which is 
one of acceptance, love, forgiveness, and understanding.
The fact that many who do not usually attend church came to 
mourn and to worship this weekend shows that people still identify 
with the Anglican Church at such times. It is not too late for the 
Anglican Church to accept the people of this new generation gladly 
(12/9/1997, No 7022: 9).
If folk religion is ‘the totality of all those views and practices of religion that exist 
among the people apart from and alongside the strictly theological and liturgical 
forms of the official religion’ (YODER 1974: 14), there can be no doubt that folk 
religiosity was enacted and displayed in myriad forms after Diana’s death. In a 1998 
survey of Anglican clergy in Somerset, replies in answer to the question ‘What as-
pects of Folk Religion do you encounter?’ included ‘Cult of Diana’.6 The messages 
left with the bunches of flowers tell us much about popular ideas of good and bad, of 
sainthood and of the afterlife. Many messages declared Diana instantly a ‘saint’ or 
an ‘angel’ and implied that she would continue to be in touch with people 
(particularly her sons) from beyond the grave. (It has been reported that one four 
year old whose mother died was told by his aunt that ‘his mother has gone to Heaven 
to see Princess Di’.7) There was also the assumption that Diana and Dodi AI Fayed 
would in some way be reunited: ‘May you have as much fun in heaven as you did in 
St Tropez’ (Monger  and Chandl er  1998: 107). Though neither was overtly reli-
gious in conventional terms, it was assumed that both Diana and Dodi would find a 
place in Heaven, Diana because of her compassion and Dodi because he had made 
Diana happy.
61 am indebted to Geoffrey Walker, for this information, taken from his doctoral research on clergy 
attitudes.
7 Personal communication from Gillian Bennett
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SHOWING RESPECT
While many commentators at the time stressed the uniqueness of the Diana 
events, scholars have pointed out comparisons such as the outpourings of public 
grief at the death of Queen Elizabeth I, Princess Charlotte (aged only 21 at her 
death in 1817), Queen Charlotte (the estranged wife of George IV) and Prince Al-
bert (Wolff e , 1999). Moreover, in the addition to the growth of roadside memori-
als in Britain, there had also been scenes of mass public mourning after such events 
as the Hillsborough tragedy and the King’s Cross disaster, when public spaces had 
become communal sites of respect and remembrance (MONGER 1997). There was 
thus an historical tradition as well as a newly developing repertoire of how to behave 
in the face of tragedy, individual and communal, to draw on. Above all, two strong 
popular impulses emerged after the death of Diana - the need to do something and 
the desire to show respect.
Although the formal mourning dress and rituals of the Victorian era are long 
gone, folk ideas of appropriate behaviour in relation to death came to the fore. 
Some revived the largely defunct tradition of wearing a black armband. Many 
adapted this and reflected the recent use of the red ribbon loop to commemorate 
AIDS victims by wearing a loop of black ribbon. A particularly subtle show of re-
spect was made by the proprietor of a rather elegant clothes shop in Bath, who for 
the day of the funeral changed her window display so that only black clothes were 
featured, in sharp contrast to the colourful, summery arrangement of the previous 
week. When ‘proper’ behaviour was neglected, ‘the people’ (i.e. Diana’s people) 
were quick to admonish. In Bath, for example, there was criticism when blue pens 
were initially provided for people to sign the Condolence Book at the Guildhall. 
Black pens were deemed proper and were swiftly provided.
Many shops were closed on the day of the funeral, and notices appeared in their 
windows which were variations on the theme ‘Out of respect for Diana Princess of 
Wales, this store will not open until 2.00 pm on Saturday 6 September’. It was inter-
esting that this was thought a fitting way of showing respect, in an age when older 
conventions of shop closure have increasingly been challenged by commercial pres-
sures. This was commented upon by a cartoon in the satirical magazine Private Eye 
(12 September 1997) which featured two drawings of the same shop, the left-hand 
one with a sign in the window which read ‘Closed out of respect for Princess Diana’, 
the right-hand one bearing the sign ‘Good Friday - Open as Usual’.
Many commentators remarked on how ‘un-British’ it all was. What clearly came 
as a surprise to many was the apparent outpouring of emotion from the nation that 
perfected ‘the stiff upper lip’. However, although the media tended to concentrate 
on and project images of emotion, the overwhelming impression of many who were 
in the places where crowds gathered (such as Kensington Gardens) was of subdued 
quiet, calmness and respect. Indeed, Douglas Davies  has pointed out that far from 
being un-British
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Fig. 2. Flowers and messages for Diana in Bath
The British habit of forming a queue ... came into its own as 
people made very long queues over many hours to sign books of 
remembrance. It was a kind of sacralizing of queuing (Dav ie s , 
1999:13).
SHRINES
One of the best demonstrations of continuity and change in relation to folk reli-
gion, I felt, was provided by the ‘shop window shrines’ (Bow man  1999). These were 
window displays that typically included a picture of Diana, flowers, candles or any 
combination thereof. In Bath, one upmarket shop had arranged a small table cov-
ered in a white cloth in its window in a shrine-like fashion. Raised up at the back of 
the table was a large frame containing a very informal photograph of Diana and 
below it printed in white on black the words from the Elton John song Candle in the 
Wind: ‘It seems to me that you lived your life like a candle in the wind, never know-
ing who to cling to when the rain set in’. To the left and right in front of the frame 
were unlit white candles in elegant glass candlesticks with two tiny birds on the edge, 
and covering the table a large formal flower arrangement of white flowers and green 
foliage, white lilies predominating. (See illustration). Propped up in the window of a 
Bath cafe was the cover of a magazine, featuring a very happy, informal picture of
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Diana with her hands clasped as if in prayer, alongside which was a large blue glass 
jug of white and pale yellow flowers on the right, and a flowering pot plant on 
the left. A small city-centre flower shop window had a photograph of Diana wearing 
a tiara, placed between two formal white flower arrangements. There seemed to 
be some consensus about what flowers were most appropriate for such public 
display. One florist reported that several people had bought flowers to put in their 
shop windows:
“We’ve been selling a lot of white lilies,” said Kit Pace, of 
Pulteney Bridge Flowers.
“Traditionally, lilies are a mourning flower that is associated 
with church” (Bath Chronicle 6/9/97: 15).
My local newsagent and video shop had in its window a glass vase of white lilies, 
with a lighted white candle to its right, and on the window a word processed ‘poem’ 
to/ about Diana. The manageress of the shop had come in at 5.00 am on the day of 
the funeral to set up the arrangement, as a show of ‘personal, private respect’ from 
the staff who ‘never had time to go off and say a prayer or sign a condolence book’. 
The manageress said ‘We all wanted to do something. When someone dies, you want 
to show your sorrow in some ways, don’t you?’. When I asked about the candle , she 
responded that everyone lights candles for someone who has died. As a florist’s 
daughter, she knew that lilies were the ‘right flower’ but she also added that lilies are 
simple and uncomplicated and whatever people say about Diana ‘she was a simple 
flower that blossomed into something fantastic’.
Among the most artistic of the shop window shrines was that of Jacaranda, a lo-
cal flower shop. Soft white material was draped down and across the left side of the 
window and lined the base of the display. The centrepiece was a large glass vase of 
white lilies, and on the vase handwritten in capital letters, green ink on white A4 
paper DIANA OUR THOUGHTS ARE WITH YOU. To the left of the central 
vase was another white urn shaped vase with small white flowers, in front some 
green foliage, to the right a small pot with a spray of white flowers, and behind that a 
tall green foliage plant in a pot. It looked as if considerable care and attention had 
gone into this display. The owner had done the display on the Sunday that Diana’s 
death was announced. It was, he said, ‘my tribute in my taste, my way of showing 
condolences’. He thought of the candle ‘like you go into a church and put a candle 
for someone, it was like that.’ People had come into Jacaranda and thanked him for 
doing the display.
The shrines for the most part appeared in shops that were privately owned and/ 
or small scale businesses. Those involved were able to do something publicly to ex-
press respect through the medium of their shop windows - although they all de-
scribed their acts as ‘personal’ or ‘private’. These shrines were created more formally 
than the outdoor shrines and tended to draw more on what was perceived as 
‘traditional’, with for example the use of flowers and candles being self-conscious 
echoes of what would be expected in church. However, these shrines were not in
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church. Profane space - the shop window on the busy street - was transformed 
into sacred space, by the people, for the people, to show respect for the people’s 
princess.8
VERNACULAR RELIGION AND CONTEMPORARY 
SPIRITUALITY
While much of the Diana activity drew on traditional notions of appropriate 
and/or respectful behaviour, largely derived from Christian folk tradition, Britain’s 
increasing religious pluralism and the growth of individualised spirituality needs to 
be taken into account. It is here perhaps more helpful to talk in terms of vernacular 
religion, defined by PRIMIANO as ‘religion as it is lived: as human beings encounter, 
understand, interpret and practice it’ (1995: 44). Away from the photogenic piles of 
flowers, there was a considerable amount of vernacular religiosity being articulated, 
at least some of which can be related to developments in contemporary spirituality in 
Britain which include the growth of pilgrimage, both the revival of old (pre-Christian 
and Celtic and/or medieval Christian) pilgrimages and the creation of new ones; the 
revival of customs, Christian and pagan (such as rag wells and well-dressing); the 
increasingly diverse use of what are regarded as sacred sites; the ritual creation of 
sacred space; a blurring of religious boundaries; and ‘believing without belonging’ 
(BOWMAN 1993, 2000).
I have already referred to the influence on the Diana events of conventional 
popular behaviour in relation to royalty, the growth of wayside shrines and the 
scenes of public mourning after the Hillsborough tragedy. However, much of the 
behaviour in connection with outdoor shrines was reminiscent of pilgrimage 
(Chandler , 1999), with prized possessions (e.g. a favourite record, items of cloth-
ing) being ‘offered’ to Diana. Notes were addressed directly to Diana, candles were 
lit, all-night vigils undertaken. As one reporter commented, ‘It came as little surprise 
that some of those mourners, waiting through the night, believed they saw visions’ 
(iCountry Life 11/9/1997, Vol CXCI, No 37: 82). There was undoubtedly a sense of 
‘liminality’ and ‘communitas’, to use Victor Turner’s terms, among mourners. Some 
of the shrines created around trees, with scarves and other items hanging from the 
branches were very reminiscent of rag wells, such as one recently ‘revived’ at Glas-
tonbury (Bowman  2000). The ‘collage’ or ‘mix and match’ approach of contempo-
rary spirituality was very much in evidence.
It is worth noting that while public space - such as Kensington Gardens - was 
converted to sacred space, large numbers of people flocked to the nation’s cathe-
drals to light candles, regardless of denominational or religious affiliation. Religious 
buildings were taken over to some extent not just by laity, but by those whom the
8 It should be noted that a shop window shrine appeared in the window of Harrods both immediately 
after the deaths of Diana and Dodi in 1997, and on the anniversary of their deaths in 1998.
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custodians would normally regard as non-believers. Although thousands of candles 
were lit at Wells Cathedral, for example, one cleric there felt that while the act of 
lighting a candle to some extent ‘exorcised’ or gave expression to people’s grief, it 
frequently arose from a generalised sense of ‘spirituality’ which observably did not 
signal any renewed commitment to the church. People were often simply regarding 
the Cathedral as ‘a place where the numinous or spirituality resides’. I was struck by 
that fact that two pagans of my acquaintance, women used to creating and officiating 
over their own rituals, felt it appropriate to go and light candles in Winchester Ca-
thedral.
PAGAN AND NEW AGE PERSPECTIVES
There were distinctive perspectives on the Diana events in Pagan and New Age 
circles. One ingenious explanation of Diana’s popularity, which both explained her 
appeal and the extent to which the Royal Family were out of touch and out of favour 
with the public was expounded to me by a Druid within 24 hours of Diana’s death 
(BOWMAN 1998). He claimed that Diana Spencer was of the ancient British royal 
bloodline, and that her ‘arranged marriage’ to Prince Charles had been engineered 
to reintroduce this ancient bloodline and legitimise the House of Windsor. The 
British people had warmed to Diana so much because they instinctively recognised 
that she was truly royal, their ‘real’ monarch. He claimed that one reason that so 
much had been made of her touching people was that Diana had the gift of healing, 
the Royal Touch.9 Moreover, he pointed out that if Prince William christened Wil-
liam Arthur and born on the summer solstice, was to follow the ancient custom of 
the king using his second name, he would become King Arthur. Thus, through Di-
ana, the ancient British royal bloodline would be restored to power, with a new King 
Arthur for the new millennium.
Just as many had identified with Diana through their own medical or marital ex-
periences, an editorial in the Samhain 1997 issue of Pagan Dawn (the magazine of 
the Pagan Federation in Britain) referred to ‘the way in which Diana was hounded 
and vilified by the media’, adding
‘As Pagans we have become used to seeing a similar denigration 
of Paganism in its many forms by contemptible editors who play 
with the public’s fear of what they do not understand’. (No. 125: 3).
The editorial also said of Diana’s death:
‘It was an event which seemed to many of us to evoke some 
deeply buried spirit in the people of the United Kingdom, and per-
9 The ‘Royal Touch’ was the tradition that English and French monarchs were able to cure disease, 
particularly Scrofula, by touching the diseased person.
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haps even the world. ... As Pagans, many may see parallels with 
stories of the goddess Diana, or perhaps the Arthurian mythos.’
(1997 No 125: 3).
Meanwhile, Kindred Spirit (‘The UK’s Leading Guide for Body Mind and Spirit’) 
considered it ‘fitting’ to devote five pages of the Winter 1997/98 issue to readers’ 
‘tributes to the People’s Princess’, ‘especially as Diana was a strong proponent of 
complementary therapies’ (41: 53). One self-identified ‘spiritual teacher’ wrote
In recent weeks I have been privileged to experience what I feel 
may have been the most profound and significant event for human-
ity, and its future, in my lifetime.
The event was not, as most commentators believe, the death of 
Diana, but the incredible aftermath which captivated the world and 
brought us to what I believe is a new sense of understanding and 
awareness (41:53).
This writer explained how he and his wife had felt ‘drawn’ to go to the funeral, 
and to lay a floral tribute at Kensington Palace. As they mixed with the millions in 
London, there were
Peoples of all colours, races, ages and religions, united, possibly 
for the first time, by way of a feeling. This was not about Diana. 
People were grieving for what they felt they had lost within them-
selves: compassion, love and understanding for others (41:53).
The lowering of the Union Jack over Buckingham Palace was interpreted thus:
The monarchy, strong and immovable, had been moved: this 
silent peaceful revolution had started to demand and create the 
wishes of the whole, not the few (41:53).
The entire event was seen in terms of the ascent of humanity, ‘laboriously mov-
ing through the charkas towards a spiritual union with the God-force, or ‘Samadhi’ 
(41: 54). Following the deaths of Diana and Mother Teresa, humanity shifted ‘from 
the heart Chakra to the communication Chakra’, ‘verified’ by Israel negotiating ‘a 
more lasting peace in Lebanon’ and Sinn Fein in Northern Ireland ‘denouncing vio-
lence’ and entering negotiations for an Irish solution (41: 54). The writer concluded
I believe the greatest gift that Diana left to us was to show us 
our potential to restore the universal understanding and compas-
sion for each other that can unite our world in love not hate. If we 
can remember how incredibly powerful we all were, and how in a 
week, the world was changed forever, we may just have a chance 
(41:54).
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The ‘folk political’ events and the mourning following Diana’s death were also 
analysed from a global, spiritual perspective by another Kindred Spirit reader:
If her death shakes the Royal Family into the modern age and 
they learn from her example and incorporate universal love, as well 
as service, into the way they live their lives, then surely this will be a 
wonderful legacy for the royal children ...
We can see how Diana’s funeral helped many people on planet 
Earth to purge themselves of suppressed emotional wounds and 
this may be why they went ‘overboard’ with the floral tributes 
(41:57).
Drawing on the New Age rhetoric of karma, reincarnation and spiritual pro-
gression, this writer declared
I believe Diana was an old soul; she may well have elected to 
die when she did - at the height of her popularity and at a time of 
immense personal happiness - in order for her death to have the 
greatest impact on us.
I feel Diana’s death signifies the Piscean Age rapidly coming to 
a close, for, as I see it, we took a quantum leap towards the Age of 
Aquarius when we mourned Diana’s passing (41:57).
CONCLUSION
Two years after Diana’s death, in August 1999, a number of newspapers were re-
ferring to Diana as the ‘Forgotten Princess’ and the lack of a permanent, public me-
morial seemed to reinforce this perception. The early euphoria of Labour’s victory 
was perhaps wearing off and the people were possibly not feeling quite so powerful 
as they were in the heady days of the summer of ‘97. Devolution for Scotland and 
Wales had begun, and the future of the peace process in Ireland was uncertain.
Many of the issues raised and articulated around the death of Diana remain un-
resolved - the need for a more caring, inclusive society; the need for the Royal Fam-
ily to both uphold and embody national tradition while remaining ready to change; 
the need for the British to address issues of national identity.
However, the public reaction to the death of Diana has taught us many things. 
As a former lecturer in a Study of Religions department that drew upon Ninian 
Smart’s model of religion as a living organism of seven interacting dimensions 
(mythical, ritual, doctrinal, ethical, social, symbolic and experiential), for example, I 
found that the Diana events provided my students with a greater understanding of 
the dimensions, concrete means of articulating them from their own experience, and 
an appreciation of their complex inter-relationship. The Diana events also demon-
strated the extent of religious pluralism in Britain, and the ways in which people who
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were superficially doing or observing the same things could have quite different 
interpretations of what was going on. Above all, the Diana events served as a timely 
reminder that while the British both retain a strong degree of vernacular and civic 
religious beliefs and practices, new spiritual ideas and expressions are moving from 
marginal to mainstream. The people know how to adapt, manipulate and create 
tradition in the realms of both folk religion and politics.
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Abstract: The fact of Christianity’s negative attitude toward homosexual relations has not 
stopped a large number of gay and lesbian Christian believers from continuing to think of them-
selves as members of their respective denominations. In many American metropolitan settings, 
groups of homosexual Roman Catholics have formed a religious organisation named ‘Dignity’ to 
fulfill a need for worship and socializing.
Focusing on the Philadelphia branch of Dignity, this paper examines the reasons for the con-
tinued involvement by homosexual American Catholics in religion in general and in such an an-
tagonistic religious institution in particular. The study of the sexual politics of this Dignity congre-
gation has generated a new perspective which underscores the insufficiency of the conventional 
terminology of “sectarian,” “popular,” or even “official,” religion for describing the vitality of lived 
religion. In response, I offer the term “vernacular religion” which will be explained and assessed as a 
new approach in the search for understanding of any given community of believers and their various 
categories of religious belief. The relation of the study of vernacular religion to the Philadelphia 
Dignity community will be discussed through an examination of its history and developments; of the 
negotiated beliefs of its members; and its reactions to the institutional church, and to the AIDS cri-
Keywords: Christianity, homosexuals, homosexual organizations, ‘Dignity community,’ ver-
nacular religion
sis.
At the 1999 SIEF Symposium and in this published text considering the topic, 
“Folk Religion and Politics,” it was my desire to broaden the scope of consideration 
beyond the relationship of vernacular religion to the science of governmental/na-
tional politics. I wished to include as a part of our discourse the politics of religious 
institutions, the politics of creating theology, and the politics of sexual morality 
within a religious tradition like Roman Catholicism.1
Although the documents of the Second Vatican Council emphasize the need to 
understand Catholicism in much broader terms, many contemporary leaders of the 
Church themselves tend to reify the institution’s authoritarian nature as the dichot-
1 William WESTERMAN has delineated in a useful encyclopedia article “seven distinct but interrelated 
areas of folklore and folklife research” associated with the study of politics and folklore (WESTERMAN 
1996: 570-574). Particularly relevant to the study of vernacular religion and its multitude of expressions is 
his sixth category: folk political organization and alternative social institutions. WESTERMAN argues that 
the ideologies of religious settlements and cooperative communities “are commentaries on existing in the 
face of a larger dominant culture and are creative ways to dispense with aspects of the dominant culture 
that are unacceptable to adherents” (1996: 574).
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omy between a clerical elite maintaining rules and a practicing laity absorbing them. 
Of course, the hierarchy even in the process of the performance of their sacerdotal 
functions are also creatively negotiating their understanding of Catholicism, making 
it the normative understanding because of the roles they occupy as “specialists” in 
the religious institution. This kind of creative negotiating, it should be noted, takes 
place throughout the Church.
One example of negotiation within the Church that I have researched is Dignity 
(PRIMIANO 1993a; 1993b), the Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, chapter of the “national 
lay movement of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgendered [Roman] Catholics, their 
families and their friends” (Helm inia k  1996). The men and women who have 
banded together to form this community share with all other Catholics the intrinsic 
action of negotiating their religious lives. I have identified this activity of people 
creating their own religion as “vernacular religion.” Vernacular religion, as I have 
categorized it, is religion as it is encountered, understood, interpreted, and practiced 
(PRIMIANO 1995: 44), and the members of Dignity that I have studied particularly 
exemplify its basic principles. For in their process of learning and sustaining their 
religion, these Catholics have negotiated their institutions, their beliefs, their public 
ritual activities, their private devotions and practices, their interactions with other 
believers, and their material lives including clothing, food, domestic space, religious 
objects, and the life of the body.
While there are many gay and lesbian Roman Catholics who continue as faithful 
members in traditional parish settings, some have banded together for this national 
organization which is composed of a number of independent regions and communi-
ties throughout the United States and Canada. Dignity/Philadelphia described itself 
in their 1987 Information Sheet with the following statement:
DIGNITY/PHILADELPHIA is a chartered Chapter of DIG-
NITY, INC., an international movement of gay and lesbian Catho-
lics and their friends, working within the Church for the develop-
ment of its sexual theology, for the acceptance of gay and lesbian 
persons as full and equal members, and to elicit responsive ap-
proaches both inside and outside the entire Roman Catholic 
Church. (Dignity/Philadelphia Information Sheet: 1987)
Dignity has played a unique role in the history of post-Vatican II American Ca-
tholicism as one of the most successful gay/lesbian affinity groups of any Christian 
denomination in the United States.2 The organization provides spiritual, educa-
2 Dignity literature gives membership rates of 125 in 1977 and 122 in 1982. 167 members was the 
number stated at the Philadelphia group’s Quarterly Business Meeting (16 February 1986) and 152 mem-
bers was stated at the Quarterly Business Meetings (10 August and 9 November 1986). In 1989, the 
Philadelphia membership numbered 225 men and women, with the proportion of women in the chapter 
remaining ten percent or less. The Chapter reached its highest membership in 1990-1991 with 250 mem-
bers. Most recent memberships rates have been lower: 190 individuals paid dues with about 11% of those 
belonging to women (1996).
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tional, and social goals, as well as counseling services for its members. The first 
Dignity chapter was established in San Diego, California, in 1969. Dignity/Philadel-
phia traces its origins back to a series of home liturgies that began in 1973. Its exis-
tence has never been sanctioned by the Archdiocese of Philadelphia, and Dignity’s 
liturgical or business activities have never been permitted to take place on Church 
property. For most of its existence, the chapter has rented space in Episcopal Church 
halls and sanctuaries.
While keeping the issue of Catholic hierarchical treatment of and concern for 
homosexual persons before the institutional Church and the general public, Dignity 
has never broken from the institutional Church. It has retained an allegiance to Ro-
man Catholic dogma and tradition while, at the same time, maintaining the central 
principle that it is not immoral for a gay or lesbian Catholic to live an actively homo-
sexual life. Though not recognized by the institutional Church, Dignity as a lay-run 
Catholic community has achieved sufficient notoriety to prompt responses to their 
activities from both the Vatican and American Church hierarchy.3
Given their situation as homosexual Catholics battling with most members of 
the hierarchy of their Church and certainly with Vatican authorities, these Catholics 
have been challenged to interpret their religion to make it relevant to their lives. 
They consciously added to or subtracted from the Catholic faith as they understood 
it, and to their satisfaction. One Dignity member described this action, what he 
called “rationalizing” the diverse elements of his “lived experience,” as the “the 
gymnastics of faith.” Others described this practice in the same manner as did non-
gay Catholics of the post-Vatican II period as being “a la carte,” “cafeteria,” “peri-
patetic,” and “pick-and-choose” Catholics. Father Jake, the undesignated chaplain 
of Philadelphia/Dignity, highlighted this vernacular process of negotiation when he 
employed a dining theme to explain to me how he made decisions about his religious 
life:
LNP: Now, what would you say if someone said to you that 
you’re involved in a theological cafeteria?
CHAP: That may be true, [but] what is theology? Maybe that’s 
where it needs to be done [in] some cafeteria. Because we are talk-
ing about food and drink, whether it be intellectual or spiritual or 
pastoral. We’re talking about feeding: take and eat, feed my sheep 
... the food of life, the source of life. OK, I am [choosing] food in a 
cafeteria.
LNP: At the same time, you’re deciding that sometimes what 
the chef serves, you don’t have to take.
CHAP: And I don’t have to.
3 The most prominent statement reaffirming the Church’s critical moral stance on homosexual genital 
activity was the “Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Per-
sons.” This letter was promulgated in 1986 by the Vatican’s Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 
(See Gramick  and Furey  1988). See Hel mi ni ak  (1998) and STONE (1998) for a discussion of other 
late twentieth-century statements by the Vatican and American bishops on homosexuality as well as the 
role of Dignity in contemporary Catholic discourse on same-sex relationships.
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LNP: Because you’re very perfectly nourished by the foods that 
you’re able to choose from the line yourself?
CHAP: Yes, because they have all been produced by the chef. I 
don’t have to eat everything that the chef puts out. Nor do I have to 
be goggle-eyed over his special dish, I might get sick. Yes, since the 
chef brought this out, if I was present when he produced this fan-
tastic thing and I said could I...really have the recipe for that? And 
he said: oh sure, here. And then next week he decides that never 
ever will this food be served again, and I’m over here with the re-
cipe saying: Tough, I liked it. And I have a good reason [for this 
thinking] and that is theology. We must make a distinction between 
theology and authority, and maintain the authority of theology.
The vernacular religious life is influenced by any number of available resources, 
and for Catholics the multitude of beliefs and practices represented within institu-
tionalized and non-institutionalized Catholicism form a rich source of inspiration 
within the process of believing. Dignity Catholics such as its de facto chaplain were 
aided in their re-creation of their religion by the institutional Church itself which 
underscored for the faithful the importance of the primacy of conscience in the 
documents of the Second Vatican Council. Dignity members, like many other 
American Catholics who disagreed, for example, with the Church’s stances on sexual 
morality (from artificial contraception to divorce to abortion) traced the importance 
of conscience down through the centuries affirming the chaplain’s perspective that 
“the ultimate right of the individual’s conscience has really been maintained by the 
Church throughout the ages.” The authority of theology that he referred to in our 
conversation was the primacy of his own reflections and conscience in achieving a 
satisfying religious life. He felt a sense of creative control over his own religious 
destiny, and he had no intention of relinquishing that personal responsibility. His 
keen understanding and interpretation of how Catholic theology worked allowed 
him to use the hierarchy’s own instruments of doctrinal order and control to em-
power his religious life. This man’s theological sensitivity is an outstanding example 
of his personal transformation of an “official” concept of Church into an experiential 
model suited to his spiritual, psychological, and social needs.
Dignity members like other Roman Catholics found the inspiration for their re-
ligious lives in the sacred sources, traditions, and history of the Church, as well as 
their personal reflections on their lived experiences. They saw their identities as 
religious men and women, and homosexual men and women, fulfilled in their own 
understanding of the Catholic faith and Catholic community. This is why they could 
remain within a religious tradition when the public representatives of that tradition 
treated them so negatively. For the same reason, both extreme traditionalists and 
extreme liberals, all actively gay, all Roman Catholic, all vernacularly Catholic, could 
be found worshipping together at Dignity.
The term, “vernacular Catholicism,” is the final synthesis of my understanding 
of the vernacular religious process and its particular expression within the Catholi-
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cism of actual believers. Vernacular Catholicism is the uniquely Catholic formula-
tion of the vernacular religious impulse shared by all religious people. It is the way a 
Catholic individually expresses his or her understanding of the Catholic tradition 
which is the history, structures, laws, customs, beliefs, and practices of its people. 
Vernacular Catholicism involves absorbing, learning, accepting, changing, denying, 
embellishing, and appreciating the spiritual and cultural parameters of Catholicism 
in one’s life. It is manifested by Catholic believers and evidenced within the widest 
range of Catholic institutions:4 the Vatican hierarchy; the vast system of clerical 
functionaries throughout the universal Church; sacred environments and objects; 
scripture and interpretation; dogmatic pronouncements and doctrinal explanations; 
liturgy and paraliturgical practices including the Mass, the sacraments, pilgrimage, 
and devotions; the monastic communal and religious life; educational organizations 
including seminaries, the parochial school system, and the missions; the parish sys-
tem; Christian base communities; lay social and spiritual organizations; religious 
festivals and public celebrations; private belief, devotionalism and religious prac-
tices; and the individual uses of sacramentalism.
Expressions of vernacular Catholicism can be observed within Dignity as within 
the Catholic community at large through two specific contexts: the religious beliefs 
and practices of the individual Catholic and the vernacular religion of the group. 
Although there is much that can be analyzed about the vernacular religion of the 
group, I mainly concentrate in this article on the vernacular religion of the individual 
because it is there that vernacular religious creativity can be seen most vividly.
At the individual level, Dignity members manifested the same kind of traditional 
piety, creative devotionalism, individual behaviors and opinions as could be seen at 
any other Catholic home, parish, or gathering. Such expressions could be observed in 
specific ways: gestures (for example, at a Dignity Mass in New York City, I recall 
seeing a man holding the hand of the statue of the dead Jesus as he placed the 
Communion wafer in his mouth); narratives (for example, an informant related to 
me a complex memorate and spiritual insight about Jesus’ Sacred Heart and the 
Real Presence); attention to religious material culture (for example, mass-produced 
religious ephemera, such as holy cards and inexpensive prayer books, were often 
found at the Dignity information table before and after Sunday liturgy); paraliturgi-
cal gatherings (for example, a Dignity prayer group met weekly for the recitation of 
the rosary); cultural habits (for example, like many American Catholics some mem-
bers of Dignity rushed to exit the Mass immediately after the distribution of Com-
munion); personal opinions (for example, feelings of anticlericalism such as those 
directed at the local archbishop); or personal decisions about religion (for example, 
decisions to attend Mass at local archdiocesan parishes on occasion as well as the 
evening Dignity service).
4 By institutions, I mean not only social entities, but also the individual formulation, creation, and 
sustaining of ongoing structure within people’s lives exemplified by the term “uniculture” (See Primian o  
1995: 49-50).
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Of course, such expressions of traditional piety, personal experience narrative, 
personal decisions, etc. had the additional quality for Dignity members of being 
filtered and negotiated through their unique perspective within the Church. The 
weekly prayer service and recitation of the rosary by more conservatively minded 
members was specifically intended as a prayer for those suffering from AIDS within 
the gay community. The anticlerical feelings regarding.the Church’s.hierarchy were 
directed against their refusal to acknowledge or support their gay flock. This is not 
to say that Dignity members could never relate to their religion without a gay refer-
ence, but they did possess a strong sense of themselves as gay people. Their time at 
Dignity insured an exposure to gay concerns and a gay male culture that comforted 
some, bothered others, but seemed to instill in most a sense of community (see 
PRIMIANO 1993b).
When these Catholics meditated on Christ, they were thinking of him as a single 
man among other men, and for some as the man who had a special friendship with 
his apostle, John. When they thought of the Virgin Mary, they personalized that 
devotion thinking of her as their own mother, the mother of a son who never mar-
ried, and who did not fulfill the heterosexual expectations of his day. My informant, 
who told me of his supernatural insight about the mysteries of the Sacred Heart of 
Jesus, experienced in his daily reception of the Eucharist at a local parish an intense 
understanding of his relationship with Jesus, one which richly detailed a personal 
meshing of both Catholic and gay sensibilities. He noted:
Communion kept me together, and every day I felt like this un-
conditional love had loved me and then I’d go off to my dark night 
of confusion and misery [as a gay man]. But I always felt that for 
this early morning hour this love had come and really loved me, and 
that was really great, and I felt the Sacred Heart of Jesus was for 
me all the intensity of love I could have ever wanted to experience 
from a human person. It was like this man came to me everyday 
and he loved me everyday, and Jesus was his name.
The process of negotiation emerging from the interpretations of religion in the 
individual Catholic’s life has been in evidence throughout the history of the Roman 
Catholic tradition influencing everything from personal practice to the codification 
of belief within institutions. From the rise of the cult of the saints to post-industrial 
Marian pilgrimage and from the formation of Dignity Masses to the writings of 
Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger about homosexual people from the Congregation For 
The Doctrine of the Faith - all these expressions involve believers in personal acts of 
interpretation of religious belief and practice. The vernacular process begins with 
the synthesis of an original vernacular religious insight with the social interaction of 
family, community, and tradition. The original vernacular creations of individuals 
most certainly will be lost over time, but a rich process of vernacular interpretation 
continues whether it involves a believer in acts of preservation, innovation, or radical 
change. Through the agreement of a community of like-minded individuals, inter-
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pretations can be preserved and concertized as religious institutions. While the ver-
nacular religious voices of the original individuals may be obscured, the creative 
action of the constant negotiation of religion remains a consistent quality within 
those institutions.
At the community level, Dignity, in 1985, embarked on an ambitious plan to 
present its own statement on sexual ethics “to our brothers and sisters in the lesbian 
and gay community, and to the wider Church” (1989:2). It was the desire of its lead-
ers in both Philadelphia and throughout the country that this document would com-
plement Dignity’s mission as a support group and community of resistance. These 
functions needed to continue because the constant flow of people passing through 
the chapter, and the long time members, needed varying levels of support due to 
their different stages of acceptance of their homosexuality. Dignity’s core members, 
however, wanted to do more than simply be a movement on the defensive. What 
individuals desired was for Dignity to behave like the institutional Church and the-
ologize, but using the membership’s own perspectives on sexuality shaped from their 
own individual lives as the foundation. As I was told by a chapter President: 
“Because up until now Dignity has been trying to, as it were, defend its existence, 
once we get beyond that point of no longer having to fight for survival, then we can 
begin to discuss principles like genital activity, and promiscuity, etc.”
This idea of incorporating the voices of the faithful into theological statements 
concerning them was felt to be the style of theologizing in the spirit and letter of the 
documents of the Second Vatican Council. The preparation of a statement on sexual 
ethics represented a challenge to the authority of the Catholic hierarchy to be the 
sole providers of theological direction and policy about sexual ethics in general, and 
about the sexual morality of gays and lesbians in particular. Jake, who was a member 
of the Sexual Ethics Task Force, noted: “We are beginning to move into that area of 
a self-reflection or a self-examination in light of Gospel values as they apply to our 
lifestyle rather than to justify our lifestyle in light of Gospel principles for somebody 
else.” Dignity as an organized group wished to represent the lived experiences and 
personal negotiations of its members in its own statement of sexual theology. This 
action formally completed in 1989 and published as “Sexual Ethics: Experience, 
Growth, Challenge,” was a formal attempt at theologizing by a community of North 
American Catholics about themselves and a challenge to the traditional structure of 
Roman Catholic authority on statements of morals.
Dignity Catholics are in many ways interpreting institutionalized religious be-
liefs, attitudes, images, and rituals to suit the way they want to express their personal 
relation to the sacred. Their expressions of personal faith reflect the dual nature of 
their experience of religion which both disempowers and empowers them. Their 
empowering expressions of faith reflect a creativity, an artistry, if you will, of relig-
ious expression and self-interpretation integral to the negotiations of vernacular 
religion.
Dignity members have brought what they have felt and learned as gay people to 
their experience as Roman Catholics. The amazing fact of Dignity Philadelphia’s 
faith is vernacular Catholicism. Their ability to sustain and even nurture religious
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belief and association with the Church in the face of rejection and exclusion points 
to religious motivations related to their intrinsically Catholic lives. Their integration 
of gay and Catholic identities, validated both by individual and communal experi-
ence, is exemplary of the influence of vernacular Catholicism and the omnipresence 
of vernacular religion which represents the practiced religion of all believers.
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“OBEYING GOD RATHER THAN MAN” (ACTS 5:29): 
CHRISTIAN FAITH IN CONFRONTATION 
WITH POLITICAL CORRECTNESS IN SWEDEN
Katarina Lew is
Department of Ethnology, University of Uppsala 
Uppsala, Sweden
Abstract: At present Sweden is, like other industrialized countries, a highly secularized society. 
The Church of Sweden, divorced from the state in the year 2000, has lost most of its influence and 
has become more or less a service institution to lend solemnity to the rites-de-passage of life: bap-
tism, weddings and funerals. Since the 1930s there has been a politically oriented change in the view 
of the family. The core family as the foundation of society has gradually been dissolved. The system 
in which the housewife takes care of her family and home with the husband as the sole provider has 
changed. Both husband and wife pay tax on their own incomes, rather than each paying tax on half 
of the family’s total income. This has made it virtually impossible to manage with only one provider. 
The political ideal for women was to become independent economically. With the social “revolu-
tion” of 1968, everybody was led to believe that the only way of “realizing oneself’ was to get a job 
outside the home. The children should be taken care of in public day centers. With both man and 
wife fully occupied outside the home little time was left for family life. Within this completely secu-
larized society there exist small, struggling groups whose lives are dominated by Christian ideals. I 
have studied one such group consisting of pietistic believers within the Church of Sweden: a rem-
nant of the great revival that swept the west coast of Sweden in the last century and the beginning of 
the 1900s. They maintain a different way of life in confrontation with what is today considered as 
politically correct. Until the first decades of 20th century their way of life and their ideals were in 
great part in keeping with what was accepted in society. Now their way of life is very different. Be-
side their economical hardship due to the tax system, they suffer ideologically. They do not believe 
in priesthood for women. Recent political decisions declare that only men who fully accept female 
priesthood are to be ordained in the Church of Sweden, so they might soon find themselves lacking 
ordained male preachers. They might be faced with the idea hateful to them of forming a free 
church. A comparable group with comparable ideas are the very Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem and in 
Brooklyn or even the Amish people in Pennsylvania. While the Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem take 
political action to change their secular society, the west Swedish pietists in no way act to convince 
others to adapt to their life style. Their only way of influencing others is by their way of living “in the 
world” as Christian examples. Although they are now fully conscious that they stand out from their 
background and that their persistence in keeping to their faith means hardships, they do not plan to 
adapt themselves to the surrounding society. Instead they work so that the surrounding society will 
gradually adapt to their ideals of life. My question is: will they leave the Church of Sweden or will they 
persist in finding unobtrusive ways to find “a right sermon” within the church they love?
Keywords: Sweden, secularization, society, Christian ideals, politics
Sweden is, like many other industrialized countries, a highly secularized society. 
The Church of Sweden has been an established State Church for centuries, but on 
January 1, 2000, it is separated from the State. It will then stand on its own and al-
though it will gain some freedom from political decisions, it will lose its well organ-
ized economy, but will keep some of its privileges and duties. During the 1900s it has 
gradually lost most of its influence on society and has become more or less a service
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institution to lend solemnity to the rites-de-passage of life: baptisms, weddings and 
funerals. Faced with a great change, the church employees and the church politicians 
are struggling to increase the small numbers of people who attend different kinds of 
services. There is, too, a very large body of church administrators that will have to 
look for new work.
Since the 1930s there has been a politically oriented change in the view of the 
family. The core family as the foundation of society has gradually been dissolved. 
The system in which the housewife takes care of her family and home with the hus-
band as the sole provider has changed, especially since the 1960s. Both husband and 
wife pay tax on their own incomes, rather than the breadwinner paying tax on the 
family’s total income with deduction for wife and children. This has made it virtually 
impossible to manage with only one provider. The political ideal for women was to 
become independent economically. With the social “revolution” of 1968, everybody 
was led to believe that the only way of “realizing oneself” was to get a job outside the 
home. The children should be taken care of in public day centers. With both man 
and wife fully occupied outside the home and the children in different kinds of day 
care centers according to age, little time is left for family life. An important change is 
that sit-down meals for the whole family are becoming rare. Instead there are quick 
individual meals when you are on the run. Among other effects there is a noticeable 
change in people’s table manners, ability to engage in ordered conversation, and 
perhaps more important: much less change of passing on family traditions and hu-
man know-how.
Within this otherwise completely secularized society there exist small struggling 
groups whose life is dominated by Christian ideals and who try to keep the core 
family together and pass their traditions and their faith on to coming generations. I 
have studied one such group consisting of pietistic believers within the Church of 
Sweden: a remnant of the great revival that swept the west coast of Sweden in the 
last century and the beginning of the 1900s (LEWIS 1997). They maintain a different 
way of life in confrontation with what is today considered as politically correct. Until 
the first decades of the 20th century their way of life and their ideals were in great 
part in keeping with what was accepted in society. Now their way of life is very dif-
ferent and they are more or less a marginalized group. I am now in the process of 
analysing how they react to the coming of the third millennium.
Beside their economical hardship due to the tax system that “punishes” families 
with only one parent on the labour market, they suffer ideologically. Most noticeable 
politically is that they do not believe in priesthood for women, a belief founded on 
biblical grounds. Recent political decisions in Sweden declare that only men who 
fully accept female priesthood are to be ordained in the Church of Sweden. Men, 
already ordained, cannot be promoted to vicars. In the public eye this has become an 
inflamed question of equality, rather than of Christian belief. Thus these pietistic 
believers might soon find themselves at a loss for ordained male preachers they can 
accept. Another threat is that they might find themselves without a church where 
they can celebrate the service in the way they are accustomed to. They might be 
faced with the idea hateful to them of forming a free church. Hateful since they
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consider the Church of Sweden their spiritual home, where they find the confession 
they embrace and the “Gemeinschaft” (ASPLUND 1983,1987,1991) they belong to.
Another danger to this way of life is a beginning sectarianism. Hurt and rather 
disappointed at two front wars from both society and the established Church they 
are born into, they have started to withdraw from their secularized surroundings 
when they have a choice in private life. The younger generation with many children 
are showing a growing tendency to socialize within the circle of “sibblings of grace”. 
Since this lay people’s chosen way of evangelization is to live and work “in the 
world” and socialize with workmates and neighbours as examples of how their 
Christian beliefs form them, this indicates a serious change.
According to this pietistic way of life parents should not meddle in the choice of 
life partner; this should be a question for the contrahents and God. That way women 
might have an important task: to bring a secularized husband, who is the choice of 
her heart, to Christ (l.Peter 3:1) by prayers and by being a good example in daily 
life. Quite contrary to this tradition, I have noticed an active effort of parents to 
bring “suitable” young people together and a tendency to early marriages within the
group.
Another leading idea is the individual responsibility for your own life. You 
should not trust to a collective but rely on your own resources. This ideal has led to 
independence and self assurance in all earthly affairs coupled with a deep humility 
and submission to the will of God. Sectarianism, on the other hand, allows you to 
hide in a group. It might lead to endogamy both spiritually and biologically and then 
another important factor will be lost: to stand on your own, to be visible as an indi-
vidual, to be a unique being with unique qualities, endowed by God with an unique 
mission on earth.
Outsiders note rather critically that Swedish people and especially Swedish 
people as represented by the media, favour one idea at a time. The raging public 
discussion (1998-99) has concerned sexually deviating groups: homosexuals, lesbians, 
transvestites and their rights in society. The Archbishop of Sweden has been instru-
mental in allowing and encouraging an exhibition consisting of photographies of a 
figure presented as Christ among such sexually inclined human beings and depicted 
as being one of them. This led to the Pope withdrawing an invitation to the Arch-
bishop to visit the Vatican. More important it led to an enlarging clift between many 
Christians and the established Church as represented by the Archbishop, other bish-
ops and priests adhering to this politically correct notion. Quite a few immigrant 
churches arranged demonstrations against what they considered as blasphemy. Mus-
lims and Jews pronounced their surprise at a clergy who approved of Christ being 
shown this way and who chose to point to homosexuals as a specially suffering group 
foregoing less spectacular sufferers as the unemployed, the homeless, the old, the 
growing number of crime victims, war victims, etc.
In accordance with many other Christians the pietists I discuss here took a 
definite stand on this exhibition: it should not be shown. Showing it in churches was 
to them an act of blasphemy and an attempt to lessen the importance of Christ and 
degrade him to be a sinner amongst sinners.
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Most of them seem to consider homosexual practice sinful the same way or even 
stronger as they look upon heterosexual promiscuity. Their point is, too, that Christ, 
although fully human, chose not to practice his sexuality. The public discussion went 
on and on and led to actual, mostly verbal, abuse of people who criticized this exhi-
bition and what it brought about. It became gradually obvious that there was only 
one politically correct view on this problem and even normally outspoken people 
became wary of expressing contradictory notions at the risk of being put down as 
loveless fundamentalists and, strangely, racists. I have followed this discussions in 
three daily newspapers of different political colours and it has been strange reading.
In an article in Svenska Dagbladet in July 1999 a philosopher (?) argued that this 
entire discussion had been brought about by representatives of the established 
Church, since the question of the homosexuals and their place in Church and society 
was the last question left, where the Church as a body could show broadmindedness. 
Everything else as abortions, promiscuity, the rights of criminals and civil servants as 
embezzlers, etc. had already been used up as arguments to show what the Church 
was prepared to accept and embrace in its quest to be seen and heard and to avoid 
more difficult problems like the survival of the Church of Sweden, according to 
Olsson. The most surprising factor was that nobody representing the Church, thus 
addressed, took up this argument.
The discussion in the media about the advent of the new millennium mostly 
concerns what will happen to our computer-directed society, purely mechanically. 
Will all the lights go out, will all the iceboxes turn warm, the stoves turn cold? Will 
the trains stand still, will the aeroplanes fall down?
Similar questions in a spiritual dress concern the pietists: Will God finally tire of 
his creation? Will He stop the world? Will New Age with all its magnetisms, crystals, 
horoscopes, and magic manipulations win over people from a decadent Church? It 
seems obvious to them that the evil force is at large. The wars on the Balkan, the 
senseless shooting of civilians in the U.S., the bombing of innocent people in Russia 
are all his manifest doings to create disorder and to make people lose all hope, they 
claim. All in all, on the Eve of the new millennium they feel a great trepidation as to 
what will happen to the world.
A comparable group with comparable ideas are the very Orthodox Jews in Jeru-
salem and in Brooklyn or even the Amish people in Pennsylvania. The Orthodox 
Jews in Jerusalem take political action to change their secular society, not hesitating 
to use violence. The Amish people remain steadfastly within their communities, 
keeping to their ways, seeming not to worry about the world outside. The west 
Swedish pietists, so far, have in no way acted to convince others to adapt to their life 
style. Their only given way of influencing others is by their way of living “in the 
world” as Christian examples. Although they are now fully conscious that they stand 
out from their background and that their persistence in keeping to their faith means 
hardships, they do not plan to adapt themselves to the surrounding society. Instead 
they hope that the surrounding society will gradually adapt to their ideals of life.
In the midst of all this , they do not seem to fear for themselves: As long as they 
listen very carefully to “the voice of Christ”, put their trust in him and remain in
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their given task, God will keep his promises to take care of them. One of God’s 
foremost promises, according to them, is that “the inner church, the Body of Christ” 
will remain as long as the world stands. One of their beliefs is, that they are building- 
stones in “this inner church” where Christ is the head. But their burning question is: 
how will they best obey God in this time of great change? Will He demand of them 
that they go out as active witnesses?
My question is: will they be forced out of the Church of Sweden for political reasons 
or will they persist in their unobtrusive ways to find “a right sermon” within the church 
they love?
SOURCES
This paper rests largely on my structured reading of three daily newspapers 
during the autumn of 1998 and still going on, with the perspective how politics influ-
ence the practice of a Christian faith.
A continuing source is the many lectures I have been asked to give in connection 
with my thesis. This “reciprocal ethnography” (Law less  1992), enables me to follow 
from the inside the discussion among scientists and, more importantly, among lay 
people concerning questions of interest for this article.
NEWSPAPERS USED
Svenska Dagbladet, the leading conservative newspaper in Sweden. 
Östgöta-Correspondenten, a large local liberal newspaper, often cited in other press. 
Bohusläningen, a small, independent liberal daily of long standing, used here because 
it has a very lively coverage of the opinions of ordinary people, not least the 
Christians of the west coast.
Unfortunaly I have not been able to find a socialistic newspaper that discusses any-
thing but the politically correct, which, I suppose, is a result in itself.
LITERATURE
Asplun d , Johan
1983: Tid, rum, individ och kollektiv, Stockholm.
1987: Det sociala livet elementära former, Göteborg.
1991: Essä от Gemeinschaft och Gesellschaft, Göteborg.
Lawl ess , Elaine J.
1992: I was afraid someone like you... an outsider... would misunderstand: Negotiating Interpretive 
Differences between Ethnographers and Subjects, Journal of American Folklore, p. 105.
Schartuansk kvinnofromhet i tjugonde seklet: En religionsetnologisk Studie. (Schartauan Female 
Piety in the 20th Century: An ethnological study of religion). Written in Swedish with an English 
summary. Skrifter utgivna av Bohusläns museum och Bohusläns hembygdsförbund Nr 59, 215 
pp. ISBN 91-7686-155-4, ISSN 0280-4174.
Lew is , k . 
1997:

IDEAS ABOUT THE PAST AND TRADITION 
IN THE DISCOURSE ABOUT NEO-SHAMANISM 
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Abstract: This paper concerns the idea of neo-shamanism within modem popular religion. 
Within new religious movements, new religiosity or New Age, the interest in what has been per-
ceived of as old religions is growing steadily. One of these old religions is shamanism, often called 
neo-shamanism in its modern shaping. This interest in shamanism has been met with considerable 
ciriticism from without, using arguments that says that new shamanism has nothing to do with “real” 
shamanism, it is being misunderstood, distorted, etc. This criticism has been met with the “tradition” 
as an argument, and the “new” shamanism is from “within” being understood in terms of unbroken 
traditions in certain places in the world. The value of tradition and traditional thoughts are being 
highlighted in these arguments.
Keywords: shamanism, neo-shamanism, neo-paganism, tradition, New Age, modem popular
religions
In this paper I will discuss expressions, or utterances, about modern shamanism, 
often referred to as neo-shamanism. The utterances are arguments in a discourse 
about modern shamanism, a discourse that also relates to different narratives of the 
past.
By using the term “utterance” I indicate that these expressions are not seen as 
narratives, as representations of experiences or occurrences in the “real” world, but 
rather as representations of other narratives about similar things. The utterances 
enter in relation with past utterances that had the same object, and with those of the 
future, which it foresees as answers.1
MODERN POPULAR RELIGION
Neo-shamanism can be seen as part of modern popular religion, that which is 
defined as New Age. New Age is neither a specific religion nor a distinct movement, 
but rather a loose designation for certain clusters of ideas, values, and activities. It is 
an umbrella term, covering modern Western developments in for instance occultism, 
shamanism, Eastern spirituality, reincarnation, healing, astrology, tarot, crystals, 
channeling, strategies for personal transformation, thoughts about a new age, etc.
1 M. BAHKTIN in: TODOROV 1984: 53.
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Contemporary interest in New Age ideas indicates important religious changes 
in modern society, a change that implies a decline of institutionally specialized reli-
gion, the dominant social form of religion in the Western world for many centuries, 
and historically a particularly important social form of religion which has been es-
tablished in the Christian West and which was represented by churches, sects and 
denominations. It was marked by monopolies in the production, distribution and 
maintenance of sacralized, transcendent universes. The New Age represents a new, 
institutionally less visible social form of religion which seems to become dominant at 
the expense of the older form.2 To the extent that New Age appears as unorganized, 
non-authoritarian and non-dogmatic, it can be perceived as modern popular reli-
gion. The Swedish historian of religions, Olaf HAMMER, in his book about New Age, 
even asks if New Age is the new folk belief.3
One of the consequences of the diminished influence of religious institutions is 
that religious expressions appear in new and unexpected contexts - in markets or 
cafés, in the mass media, bookshops, book clubs or weekly magazines. The expres-
sions discussed in this paper are drawn from different contexts, perhaps more pro-
fane than religious, which also demonstrates another underlying aspect within New 
Age; it is to be found in intersections between the religious and the profane.
One of the traits of New Age is that major subjects of interest seem to vary from 
time to time, New Age is steadily changing. Particularly characteristic of the seven-
ties was the prominence of Eastern spiritual teachers; the eighties was characterized 
by an emphasis on channeled entities; and now in the nineties the interest in chan-
neling seems to be waning and the new emphasis is on shamanism, Native American 
spirituality or neo-paganism.4 Neo-paganism implies a religion based on the worship 
of nature and of ancient indigenous traditions, and it has been claimed to be the 
new religion fast developing as The new religion of the twenty-first century.5 Neo-
paganism covers all those modern movements based on the conviction that firstly all 
that Christianity has traditionally denounced as idolatry and superstition actually 
represents a profound and meaningful religious worldview, and secondly that a reli-
gious practice based on this worldview can and should be revitalized in our modern 
world.6
DETRADITIONALIZATION AND TRADITIONALIZATION
Within New Age, current ideas are not necessarily considered as new, but rather 
as revitalizations of old wisdom traditions. However, various religious traditions and 
ideas are being used in new and unexpected ways, rather than with faithfulness to-
2 Luckm ann  1996.
3 Hammer  1997.
4 Lewis -Melton  1992.
5 Hard man  1995.
6 Hanegraaf f  1998.
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wards the right dogma, a trait that has been met with considerable criticism. Many 
people react towards the New Age interpretations of the differing ideas, postulating 
that reincarnation or shamanism for instance, are being both misunderstood and 
misinterpreted.
The English historian of religions Paul HEELAS uses the concept detraditionali- 
zation when describing New Age; because New Age is, in his words, “rejecting voices 
of authority associated with established orders.”7 Detraditionalization is in his ap- 
prenhension connected to the anti-authoritarian aspect of the New Age. A religious 
market, is also a description of New Age, a market, where the individual is given the 
freedom - and authority - to choose from a variety of sacred universes.8
In his article Tradition in the post-traditional world, Zygmunt Bauman  argues 
that one should not conceive of modern society as one where “tradition is losing its 
authority, or us losing our respect for it, or our demand for ‘heritage’ and ‘historical 
memory’ running short, or us no more believing ‘the old’ to be ‘beautiful’. [...] The 
idea of the ‘post-traditional society’ is better understood as referring to the surplus of 
traditions ... too many competitive traditions for any one of them to secure a mo-
nopolistic authority.”9 The idea of a religious market is a depiction of such a surplus 
of traditions.
At the same time as New Age can be seen as a detraditionalized religion, the 
idea of tradition and the past play an important role in discussions, interpretations, 
choices and legitimations within, and connected to, New Age. In the utterances 
that will be discussed here, the past and tradition are present in various ways, not 
as context, but rather as interpretation and argument to stress certain points. Tradi- 
tionalization - by which I mean tying present ideas and values to the past in mean-
ingful ways, is an important point in these four expressions. The choices made in 
the religious market - among the surplus of traditions - are given authority by 
tying personal choices to chosen pasts. The utterances are articulations from dif-
ferent positions in a discourse about whether neo-shamanism is genuine or spu-
rious.
New Age is a controversial religion. Many critical voices have risen against this 
fast developing popular religion. The first utterance to be discussed is an extract 
from a critical book about New Age called Spiritual Tourism, by the Norwegian jour-
nalist Bjprg ViNDSETMO. The second story was told to me in an interview with a 
female shaman and relates about how and why the woman interviewed chose the 
way of the shaman. The third story is taken from a Norwegian newspaper Dagbladet 
about a female shaman in a small Sami village in Finnmark; the most Northern part 
of Norway.
7 HEELAS 1996: 22.
8 LUCKMANN 1996: 73.
9 Baum ann  1998:14.
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THE BREAK WITH TRADITION
In the book Spiritual tourism, with the subtitle: About religion, therapy and magic, 
the writer Bj0rg ViNDSETMO throws critical light on the innumerable forms of 
worldviews and therapies we find within modern religious movements. The writer’s 
position is catholic and culture-critical, and her style is ironical. Her opinion about 
the new religious movements is that they represent a mixture of religion and therapy, 
of which she is very critical, and writes about in an ironical way. “Most typical of the 
new religiosity of our times is its therapeutic essence. Therapy has become a religion, 
and even worse, religion has become therapy. Therapy does no longer imply the 
healing of illness. Therapy has become a way of life, an attitude towards life”10, she 
states. Her way of characterizing the New Age religion implies ideas of spiritual 
decline.
One chapter in the book relates neo-shamanism, in the writer’s view one of the 
four most important therapies within modern “alternative therapies”. The title of the 
chapter asks: “Are shamanistic journeys therapy”? It starts with a description of a 
female Swedish shaman whom she nick-names Little Hiawatha”. Little Hiawatha is a 
figure from the Disney universe, a cartoon figure. By using a name referring to the 
Disney universe she uses a word filled with a voice that invokes ideas about a super-
ficial, trivial, commercial and not genuine world.
Little Hiawatha - the shaman, not the Disney figure, is described as super ele-
gant - as a “wandering fashion show for indigenous people” as she ironically puts 
it, and we are being told that little Hiawatha is teaching modern businessmen crea-
tivity and self development besides her praxis as shaman. At a lunch-break at the 
meeting where she met “little Hiawatha” the writer was sitting at the same table as 
two women in their forties and she tells: “Little Hiawatha had invited people on a 
shamanistic journey the same evening. One of the women at the table asks, a bit 
confused: ‘Are shamanistic journeys therapy’? No, the other woman answers: ‘It 
comes from India’. An atmosphere of insecurity spread round the table”, the writer 
tells us.
The following vision is inspired by this episode: “Before me, I could see them, 
well educated, seemingly successful women sitting in a circle on the floor the same 
evening. Little Hiawatha’s drumming, echoing dense jungle or barren tundra, were 
accompanying them on a shamanistic journey - before they each, at the end of the 
evening, went home to their urban, rather lonely women’s lives.”11
In this description New Age is being perceived as a religion for frustrated, lonely 
women at a certain period of their life, ignorant women, easy to fool. This vision, 
confirms certain wide-spread ideas - perhaps prejudices - about New Age. 
VlNDSETMO’s description and partly ridicule express resistance against new spiritual-
ism and neo-shamanism. The way she contextualizes her story provides the reader
10 VINDSETMO 1995: 15.
11 VINDSETMO 1995:18-19.
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with certain associations. We get the impression that shamanism is for exhibitionis- 
tic, frustrated and ignorant women of a certain age.
After this introduction Bjprg VlNDSETMO discusses “real” shamanism. She re-
fers to shamanism as the world’s oldest religion and asks: “how can our earliest fore-
fathers’ religious life become something that in a modern woman’s worldview is a 
new form of therapy she perhaps might be trying? And what makes Little Hiawatha 
believe that she is a shaman?”
VlNDSETMO’s perception of shamanism as our earliest forefathers’ religion is 
being used to create distance between the shamans of to-day and our forefathers. 
She is of the opinion that parts of the shamanistic universe are falling out in the 
modem version. In her opinion neo-shamanism is not a genuine form of shamanism. 
VlNDSETMO describes the neo-shamanism as a break with tradition; a remnant or a 
bleak shade of the authentic version. In her opinion this is an argument that neo-
shamanism is spurious religion. By referring to shamans of the past, she creates a 
picture of shamanism of the past as genuine and modern shamanism as a bleak for- 
gery.
One of the traits of postmodern culture is the disembedding of ideas, images 
and signs, which means that ideas and meanings have been disconnected from their 
original context, old collective standards or constraints, and are free to be connected 
to any new context. Within New Age this means among other things, that religious 
elements from older, or culturally strange religious traditions are being interpreted 
in, and related to new and unorthodox ways.12
The “free use” of religious traditions, so to speak, is in critical interpretations of 
New Age described in concepts of genuine and spurious. Religious traditions are 
said to be distorted, misrepresented or corrupted, a view implying the idea about a 
religious tradition being coherent, where the scriptures, ideas and rituals constitute 
united entities. If components are broken away or detached from the original tradi-
tion, the elements are said to lose its authenticity.
A PERSONAL CONNECTION TO THE PAST
Let me now introduce one female shaman I interviewed some years ago. Her 
name is Anne Lise, and I will let her tell the story about how and why she became a 
shaman.
When I met her she had started on the long, hard way of the shaman, she told 
me. And why was she - a journalist and mother of a five-year-old son - on this way? 
“I just fell over a course in shamanism”, she said and went on: “And during the 
course, it appeared that I already knew about the things we were being taught. And I 
could not understand where I had learned this. So it appeared that I also knew how 
to go further and to do things we had not yet talked about. I became more and more
12 FEATHERSTONE 1995: 4.
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conscious that I knew and remembered many things, but that I did not know from 
where I had this knowledge.”
After a while Anne Lise understood why she already knew things they were to 
learn at the course, that she was advanced in the shamanistic learnings so to speak. 
She understood that she had been a shaman in native Indian tribes in several of her 
earlier lives. She had lived many earlier lives as an indigenous human or native In-
dian, and one of the first lives she can remember is a shaman in Sibiria. Her duty in 
her life here and now is to collect the knowledge from her shamanistic lives, things 
related to indigenous people, to nature and to food. Collecting knowledge from 
earlier lives, imply to do things and live one’s life in ways resembling your former 
lives, was her explanation.
Anne Lise went to Arizona because she wanted to be in touch with native 
American Indians, first of all the Hopi tribe, because they are, as she said, the cul-
tural source of neo-shamanism. She also feels sure that she has been Hopi in earlier 
lives. The Hopi are the last authentic Native Indians in the sense that they have kept 
their old religion, she said. Anne Lise feels a strong attraction to the Hopi, and in 
her opinion she looks like a Hopi, to her a further proof of her former lives. She also 
got a message that it was her duty to go to Arizona. One morning when she woke she 
just knew that she had to go. This was her first real message, she tells.
Anne Lise relates about her choice to become a shaman in terms of experiences, 
certain knowledge and messages. She experienced that she knew shamanism - she 
suddenly received a message that it was her duty to go to Arizona. These occur-
rences led her on the way of the shaman. Anne Lise’s history illustrates that experi-
ences of intuition, alignment or an inner voice - serve to inform religious judge-
ments, decisions and choices.
Re-incarnation - in Anne Lise’s interpretation and use of these ideas - creates 
for her a personal connection to the past. This past is above all related to the wisdom 
of indigenous people, a wisdom that it is her duty in her present life to collect and 
share with others. When Anne Lise identifies herself with the Hopi, it connects her 
to a past that in some ways seems better. At the same time, in Anne Lise’s universe, 
this past is possible to reach in the here and now, because it in fact exists in another 
place, in this case in Arizona USA. “The model of human excellence and happiness 
can thus be sought in the present, in the mode of life of existing primitive, or so- 
called ‘savage’ peoples”, Marion BOWMAN says in her article The Noble Savage and 
the Global village.13
Anne Lise’s choice of both a past and a future as an Indian shaman is individual 
and personal, but can also be seen as part of a narrative about wisdoms from the 
past, and our common roots in pre-Christian tradition. The book The wisdom of the 
Native Indians, for instance is promoted by the headline: “The ecological way of 
life”, and the text states: “What was the source for the Indians’ wisdom and respect 
for the unity of all things? Where did they collect their well informed overall view
13 Bow man  1995.
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from? Why was it that natives from different areas of the American continent all 
followed the way of peace and walked it in beauty? Only a civilized, consuming fool 
would ask such questions, and if you are interested in the answers, we warmly rec-
ommend the books about the Hopi-Navaho and Lakota-Indians. In these books 
their history, their philosophy of life, their words of wisdom, the rituals, the customs, 
and the people - a colourful and magical texture so unlike the Hollywood myth 
we are being told. The rich traditions and culture of the Indians, the myth and the 
magic appeal to us all”.14 By using words and concepts like wisdom, rituals, rich 
traditions, myth and magic, words and concepts with an attractive flavour, attractive 
pasts are also created about Indian native cultures, pasts modern man wants to re-
late himself to.
Anne Lise connects parts of particular value in her present life, to a chosen past, 
far away in time and in space, but still possible to experience. By traditionalizing her 
new life she creates continuity, and emphasizes certain aspects of her identity.
HIDDEN TRADITIONS
The Norwegian national newspaper, Dagbladet, published a year ago a story 
about a female shaman. Her name is Biret Marét Kallio. She lives in a small village 
in Finnmark, the traditional Sami area in Norway. Besides her work as a shaman she 
also works as a teacher. The background for the newspaper’s interest in Biret was 
the fact that her shamanistic work had caused a lot of antagonism in the village. She 
had followers, but also enemies, and the enemies were mostly represented by the 
very pietistic Christians in the village. The headline in the newspaper states: “Fight 
over drums in the Sami village.” The introduction to the story goes: “She believes 
in the drum’s power and is accused of being the Devil’s delegate. - But Biret states: 
‘It was the Christian people who brought God and the Devil to the Sami people. 
Not me’.”
The theme in this newspaper story is the antagonism between the Christian 
Church and alternative religions. The Christian people in the village accused Biret of 
being the Devil’s delegate, but Biret turns the Christian redemption towards her 
Christian enemies when stating that the Devil was of Christian origin, and belongs to 
a Christian universe brought to the Sami from outside. By this statement, she refers 
to the past, and demonstrates that her religion represents the religious tradition of 
the Sami people.
The newspaper relates how Biret’s actions as shaman together with a group 
calling themselves Noaide, the old Sami name for shaman, invoke the Christians’ 
anger. It is stated in the story: “They are fighting about the souls in the Sami village. 
Therefore it is highly controversial when Biret now gathers her group and sacrifices 
to the old gods.”
14 Energica 1996/3.
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In the newspaper it is said: “Most people think that Christianity gained victory 
over paganism once and for all.” But what the story is indicating is that an unbroken 
tradition has been kept alive in the shadow of Christian religion. Biret herself in-
vokes an unbroken tradition when she got the last word in the story saying: “My 
work has nothing to do with New Age, this is Old Age. The drum is a vehicle for 
contact with one’s inner self, with nature, with the forefathers, and the spirits.”
When Biret dissociates herself from the term New Age and elegantly says that 
her beliefs and doings are about Old Age, she refers to her own activity as being 
from the olden times, and indicates that her own religion is older than Christianity. 
She traditionalizes her shamanistic activity by tying her activities to the past, a past 
that is more in accordance with the Sami culture.
The story about Biret invokes ideas about an old tradition, that has continuously 
been kept alive in the hidden, in the shadow of a dominant ideology. Two years ago, 
a book by a Russian psychiatrist Olga Kharitidi was published in Norwegian and was 
book of the month in a book club called Energica aimed at people with spiritual 
interests. The book is a personal narrative about the writer’s experiences when 
meeting a Siberian shaman and her initiation to shamanism. She collected the mate-
rial for the book in a far away and isolated area - the Altaj mountains in Siberia 
which the indigenous people up to modern times have dominated alone, it is stated 
in the book review. The writer is initiated to shamanism, and this knowledge be-
comes of great use to her in her work as psychiatrist.
Both the newspaper story about Biret and Olga’s story from Siberia indicate that 
ancient traditions have been preserved in remote places in the world, more or less 
under-ground. In communities, untouched by modem times, wisdom and knowledge 
are being preserved that exceeds modern knowledge.
MODERN MAN’S RELATION TO THE PAST
The narratives discussed here tell about modern man’s relation to Shamanism, 
often described as man’s oldest religion. Various positions in a discourse about 
modern shamanism are being expressed. The question discussed in the narratives is 
whether neo-shamanism is genuine or spurious, the arguments used are related to 
various ideas about tradition and the past.
In VlNDSETMO’s story neo-shamanism represents a break with the shamanism of 
the past, and is described as a bleak echo of the real and genuine tradition. By refer-
ring to the past, she regards present religious ideas as a spiritual decline.
The story about the shaman in a Sami village in Norway, or the book about the 
Russian psychiatrist’s encounter with Siberian shamanism, invoke ideas about a re-
ligious tradition kept alive in the hidden, and Biret in the Sami village seems to rep-
resent a continuation of this tradition. The Altaj mountains in Siberia represent 
surroundings untouched by modern conditions, where wisdom from a more or less 
mythical past has been concealed and kept alive in an unbroken continuity. The 
stories communicate that revelation of this tradition and with that the wisdoms of
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the past can help modern people to a better life. Also Anne Lise talks about her 
choice of the shamanistic road in this way. Important to her is that the knowledge 
she has brought with her from her past lives as shaman, is a knowledge our own so-
ciety needs.
VlNDSETMO describes contemporary ideas about shamanism as spiritual decline, 
the other narratives describe ways of using the ideas from the past to the best for the 
present. Common in the stories is the idea that the past represents more consistent 
traditions and greater wisdoms. Common in the stories is also that the past is not a 
context for the matters told about, but is interwoven in the stories as interpretation 
and argument. The various voices take different positions demanding their own in-
terpretation of reality, about what is true or false.
The idea that the unity and continuity of the world is lost can be seen as part of 
modern mentality. The Norwegian anthropologist Thomas Hylland Eriks en  talks 
about the fight over the past as an important part of modern societies all over the 
world.15 His opinion is that everybody uses the past to create collective identities. 
The past is vague and versatile, he says, it can be described in selective and subjec-
tive ways, whether the description comes from a history book or from oral tradition.
What I have discussed here is how the past is being used in popular interpreta-
tion within a New Age context. The past and tradition are arguments for the signifi-
cation and value of various beliefs and ideas, and are being sacralized when seen as 
containing wisdom and spirituality that are of much larger dimensions than that of 
contemporary society. When the past is tied to the here and now the symbolic power 
of the past creates an enchantment which will affect the present.
The use of the past within New Age is one example on how modern man estab-
lishes continuities, authenticizes the past, and authorizes particular representations 
in images and stories.16 The past and tradition are being used to legitimize, authen- 
ticize and control ideologies and cultural identities both in a New Age discourse and 
in contemporary society in general.
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Abstract: The article discusses the different religious affiliations of three inter-war right-wing 
movements in the Baltic States. The Lithuanian Iron Wolf remained indifferent to the religious is-
sues, the Estonian Veterans’ League stressed the value of the Christian faith and formed links with 
the Lutheran Church, while the Latvian Thundercross favoured the ideas of the pre-Christian re-
vivalism and closely collaborated with the Dievturi movement. The difference in religious choice is 
explained by (1) the different character of the Estonian (radical right) and the Latvian (extreme 
right) movements and (2) the formalisation of the pre-Christian revivalism ideology according to the 
Protestant pattern. Although the doctrine differed greatly, the style of thought and manner of pres-
entation made the Latvian pre-Christian revivalism more open to the right-wing political thought - a 
feature commonly found with the Protestant Churches of Europe.
Keywords: religion, nationalism, pre-Christian revivalism, radical politics, Neo-Paganism, 
Protestantism, Dievturiba, “The Iron Wolf’, “Thundercross”, “Estonian Veterans’ League”
Foreigners usually see the Baltic States as a unitary space. This is probably due 
both to their geographical location and their shared historical experience. Lithuania, 
Latvia and Estonia emerged as parliamentary republics at the end of the First World 
War in place of the Western provinces of the Russian Empire. Later on, authoritar-
ian regimes of Antanas Smetona (1926-40), Kärlis Ulmanis (1934—40) and Konstan-
tin Päts (1934-40) were imposed on Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, respectively. All 
three Baltic States were occupied by Soviet troops in 1940 and by Nazi Germany in 
1941-45, and were re-incorporated into the Soviet Union. The Baltic States regained 
independence in 1991.
The religious histories of the Baltic peoples were, however, rather disparate. 
Lithuania was and still remains, a Roman Catholic country with close, though not 
formally recognised, ties between the Church and the state. It is undoubtedly the 
least secularised of all Baltic States. In contrast, Estonia today is a secular country 
where the largest religious organisation is the Estonian Evangelic Lutheran Church. 
By the 1934 Census, 78% of the entire population were Lutheran and 19% Ortho-
dox.1 The Latvian case is probably the most complex. At present, the Roman Catho-
lic and Lutheran Churches have - at least nominally - about the same numbers of 
the adherents and there is also a considerable Russian Orthodox population. Ac-
RAUN 1991: 135.
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cording to the 1935 Census, 55.2% of the 1 950 502 population were Lutheran, 
24.4% Roman Catholic, 8.9% Orthodox; other denominations were represented by 
smaller numbers.2
This chapter will analyse one particular aspect of Baltic religious history, 
namely, the religious affiliations of right-wing movements. I would not agree that 
“movements focused on the direct political action do tend to compete with religious 
movements, especially sects, for adherents. People who find satisfaction in religious 
compensators tend not to be moved to embrace political movement [...] people tend to 
support either one or another, not both.,>3 Though some political ideologies possess 
certain facets of religion and are sometimes viewed as religions in themselves - Fas-
cism and Nazism, for example - yet the links between political and religious organi-
sations deserve to be explored in detail.
Specifically, I will focus on the relationship between the Latvian extreme right 
and pre-Christian revivalism. The appeal of the latter to right wing politicians is well 
known. Such ideas as of the “spirit of the nation and/or race” and military valour 
often evoked by the right together with the racial and cultural exclusiveness and 
supremacy fit perfectly with the commonly held - and mostly incorrect - vision of the 
early European religions with their pantheons of austere warrior gods. The symbol-
ism of festivals and of signs like swastika had proved equally attractive.
Although the relationship between particular Christian Churches and the Right 
has been at times ambiguous, as far as doctrine is concerned, Christianity is a prob-
lem for the right-wing political thought. One reason is the strong awareness of the 
weakness of the human nature that the majority of the Christian Churches share - a 
very different anthropological perspective from the emphasis on youth, health and 
masculinity, carried in its extreme to ruthlessness, found within the right ideology. 
Another reason is the fact that the Christian doctrine raises the human being - in 
terms of axiology - above environment, both nature and social and/or national 
group. Man is first and foremost valued as an individual and not as a member of a 
particular nation or social class. According to the Christian doctrine, a person is also 
individually and not collectively answerable to God. Ideology of the radical and ex-
treme right movements, in contrast, called for subordination of the individual needs 
and values to the needs of the nation. The established Churches were often seen as 
ideological rivals challenging the authority of the political elite. It is not surprising 
then, for example, that Nazi state officials either sought to build the bridge between 
the German Evangelic Church and National Socialism by modifying Christian doc-
trine and supporting the so called German Christianity, or called for the abandon-
ment of Christianity entirely - as Alfred Rosenberg did.4 Recently, concerns have 
been expressed as to links between the Neo-Pagan thought and the extreme right- 
wing movements in Russia.5 V. YEMELIANOV, one of the founders of the ill-famed
2 Krumin a -Konk ova -Gill s  1998:430.
3 Stark -Bai nbri dg e  1985: 524.
4 See Cecil  1972.
5 See Shnire lman  1998a.
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Russian nationalist organisation Pamyat recalled that Pamyat was originally intended 
to be an anti-Christian movement with strong neo-pagan emphasis.6 Pamyat changed 
its religious orientation to Orthodox in the late eighties - presumably understanding 
that this would secure a wider mass support.
At this point it is appropriate to say something about the terminology. The pres-
ent day Neo-Pagans who aspire to reinstate the religions of Celtic Britain, Germany 
or the Classical Antiquity are, in the words of Stark  and Bainbr idge , “cousins of 
the magic and witchcraft family".1 The modern Neo-Paganism, which originated in 
the sixties - the Wiccans, Great Goddess worshippers and the like - in all its diver-
sity is generally oriented towards nature and sometimes also the occult.8 Therefore 
the word “Pagan” i.e. nature-worshipper, seems to be appropriate. In the majority of 
cases, it is how adherents identify themselves. Margot Adle r ’s survey showed that 
96.4% of the respondents during her research on Neo-Paganism considered them-
selves “Pagans” and “most agreed that Pagans were members of pantheistic, tribal, 
shamanistic nature religions and that modem Neo-Paganism embodied a respect for the 
earth and the nature's laws and a conception of deity as immanent".9 The Pagan edu-
cation Network web page defines their religion as follows:
Paganism is a broad, eclectic contemporary religious movement 
that encompasses shamanistic, ecstatic, polytheistic, and magical 
religions. Most of the religions termed Pagan are characterised by 
nature-centred spirituality, honouring of pre-Christian deities, dy-
namic, personal belief systems, lack of institualization, a quest to 
develop the self, and acceptance and encouragement of diversity. 
Paganism is sometimes referred to as Neo-Paganism to emphasise 
its connections to as well as difference from pre-Christian Reli-
gions.10
Thus the Western Neo-Paganism today could be seen in line with the New Age 
as part of a wider syncretic movement which promotes religious subculture with 
particular references to feminism, environmental protection, body awareness (“feel
6 YEMELIANOV in Russkaia Pravda Nr. 3,1994, quoted in SuNIRELMAN 1998b: 6.
7 Stark -Bain bri dge  1985: 199.
8 Yet, it is interesting that the gathering originally announced as the World Congress of Pagan Religions 
and held in Vilnius, Lithuania, from 20 to 24 June 1998, changed its name to World Congress of Ethnic 
Religions. The declaration released by the delegates promoted religious diversity and emphasised both 
environmental and ethnic aspects. It said: All cultures and all native religions and faiths should be equally 
valued and respected. Each region and each people have their distinctive local traditions (native faith, world 
outlook, mythology, folklore etc.) which articulate their love of their land and history, and cultivate a regard of 
sacredness of all life and divinity of Nature. We believe that the dawn of a new era of individual and intellec-
tual freedom and global exchange of views and information gives us an opportunity to start again to return to 
our own native spiritual roots in order to re-claim our religious heritage. We are worshippers of Nature just as 
whole mankind was, for the last 96% of its history.
9 ADLER 1985: 459.
10 http://www.bloomington.in.us/~pen/mpagan.html. As on 29.02.00.
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good” religion), alternative healing, benevolent.(“white”) magic and the like. They 
may have links with the Green movement, but are otherwise politically passive.
Inter-war pre-Christian revivalism was a very different religious phenomenon. 
Neither adherents in Germany, nor the groups in the Baltic States, who tried to re-
vive what they considered to be the authentic religions of their nations, considered 
themselves Pagans. The basis for the reanimation of the lost gods was usually found 
in either mythological texts or medieval chronicles or - as in the Latvian case - in 
folklore. The ethnic (sometimes racial) and cultural aspects were emphasised, but 
nature was an issue of considerably less, if any, importance. Present day Neo-Pagans 
are usually at ease with the fact that the rituals they practice are of their own crea-
tion. In the case of the inter-war period revivalists we are dealing with so called 
“invented tradition” - seemingly ancient, but in reality recent, deliberately con-
structed and formally introduced procedures and ethnic markers appearing within a 
brief period of time and conditioned, in E. Hobsbawm ’s  words, “to inculcate certain 
values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity 
with the past. "n Hence, for the purpose of the present analysis I will use the term 
“pre-Christian revivalism” as preferable to “Neo-Paganism”.
The right-wing movements that were politically active in the Baltic States during 
the inter-war period were related in terms of their nationalist zeal and criticism of 
the weaknesses of the parliamentary democracy. Before the authoritarian regimes 
were imposed in their respective countries they attacked the corruptive nature of the 
political parties and promoted the idea of an integrated nation-state under the lead-
ership of a directly-elected president; afterwards, they attacked the leaders of their 
countries for being too moderate, i.e. “soft” on what they saw as enemies of their 
nations. Although the Baltic right had their vision of the economic development of 
their countries, they still did not focus on economic policy.
The Lithuanian political organisation which would qualify as a right-wing 
movement, Gelezinis Vilkas (the Iron Wolf) was initiated in 1927 by the authoritarian 
government which had in its turn been formed after a coup d’état in the previous 
year. Formally, the Lithuanian president Smetona was its chief while the real control 
was in the hands of the prime minister Augustinas Voldemaras. The organisation 
was officially registered as a sports club, while the government’s intention had been 
to develop it into a national guard. Gelezinis Vilkas never had a mass following and 
remained somewhat clandestine until it was reorganised into the Lithuanian Na-
tionalists’ party (Lietuviu Nacionalistu Partija) while some of its membership re-
mained loyal to Voldemaras (dismissed in 1929) and continued its activities illegally 
and on limited scale. For the purpose of this analysis it is noteworthy that neither the 
“Wolves” nor their successors had religious values or experiences high on their pri-
ority lists. The Lithuanian Nationalists’ Party supported the separation of church and 
state, while nonetheless regarding “religion as a virtue”.12 To the best of my knowl-
11 hobsba wm  1983: l.
12 MlSIUNAS 1970: 102.
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edge, the members of Gelezinis Vilkas remained indifferent to the ideas of the pre- 
Christian revivalists.13
As the name itself suggests, Eesti Vabadussőjalaste Liitu (the Estonian War of 
Independence Veteran’s League, hereafter EVL) was founded by veterans of the 
Estonian War of Independence (1918-20). The organisation appeared under the 
name Eesti Vabadussőljalaste Keskliit (The Estonian War of Independence Veterans’ 
Central League) in 1929 and changed the name to its shorter version in 1933.
Originally only individuals who had taken part in the War of Independence were 
accepted to full membership but after 1932 the membership was opened up to those 
sharing the ideas of the movement and the “spirit of the War of Independence”. The 
movement became a political party later the same year. The Veterans attempted 
several constitutional amendments by means of initiating referendums. The above 
mentioned “spirit of the War of Independence” was the bedrock of EVL’s ideology, 
meaning "patriotism, honesty and readiness to suffer”.15 One may say that EVL fol-
lowed an idea of collective salvation through political activity - the process that had 
started by the Veterans’ shared sacrifice at the battlefield.
Although EVL had no formal connection to any of the Christian Churches in 
the country, the Veterans often used Christian rhetoric and associated themselves 
with the ethic values represented by the teaching of the Christian Church.16 League’s 
newspaper Vőitlus (Struggle) stressed that "our new Estonia must tie itself to the 
church and provide it with the widest opportunity to disseminate Christ’s Gospel”.'1 The 
Veterans started their meetings with a prayer led by a Lutheran and/or Orthodox 
priest in commemoration of their fallen comrades. Generally EVL contrasted them-
selves favourably with the secularism and materialism of other political parties. The 
latter, in their turn, accused EVL of entering into some kind of conspiracy with the 
aim of according broader privileges to the Lutheran Church. This was repeatedly 
disclaimed by EVL.
Like in case of their Lithuanian counterparts, the Veterans’ ideology bore no 
reference to the activities of the Estonian pre-Christian revivalists, the movement 
identifying itself as Taara usk (Taara creed). The latter originated in 1925 and pro-
posed the worship of Old Estonian thunder-god Taara18 with an aim of laying some
13 The Lithuanian pre-Christian revivalism, the “Romuva Belief’ was inspired by the works of the 
writer and philosopher Vydunas but was still a marginal phenomenon during the inter-war period. The 
movement, revitalised in 1967, is presently much stronger. See more on it in: Ramo Ska ite - 
SVERDIOLIENE 1996.
14 The most detailed study of the movement currently available is the doctoral dissertation of Estonian 
historian Andres KASEKAMP (Kase ka mp  1996). I am also grateful to him for information and discussions 
on various aspects of EVL.
15 Vőitlus on 22 April, 1933, quoted in KASEKAMP 1996.
16 See Kase ka mp  1996:116-118.
17 Vőitlus on 1 August, 1933, quoted in KASEKAMP 1996:117.
18 “Taara, avita!" (Taara, help!) is a phrase once mentioned in the Henricus Chronicle Livonicum, a 
medieval chronicle devoted to the events in Livonia (Northeast Latvia) and Estonia. There is no other 
reference to such a deity in the Estonian sources.
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kind of new foundation to the support of the Estonian statehood.19 It is interest-
ing that Kustus Utuste, one of the leaders of the movement, was actually a mili-
tary man and a veteran of the War of Independence. However, he never joined 
EVL.
Remarkably, the ties between the Lutheran Church and the radical right in Fin-
land were even stronger. The Lapua movement (1929-32) and its successor, Isän- 
maalinen kansanliike (Patriotic People’s Movement) even described their activities 
as religious crusades. This has been attributed to the impact of the Pietist tradition in 
Ostrobothnia, the area where the Lapua movement had originated.20
The Latvian movement that bore certain similarities to EVL, Perkonkrusts 
(Thundercross), emerged in 1932, originally under the name Ugunskrusts (Fire 
cross).21 When the Prime Minister Ulmanis declared the state of siege on 15 May 
1934, all political parties were banned following the dissolution of the Parliament. 
From then on, Perkonkrusts was one of the few political organisations that continued 
their activities illegally. In fact, the members of Perkonkrusts had been on and off the 
legal political scene for all the time of its existence.22 The organisation was founded 
by the former members of several political movements, mostly Latvju Nacionälais 
Klubs (the Latvian National Club), that had been active during the twenties and then 
banned as paramilitary organisations threatening the public order. Ugunskrusts was 
banned by the Riga Regional Court in a year after its appearance and had to re- 
emerge under a different name. Not surprising then, that compared to their Esto-
nian counterparts Perkonkrusts members were to a lesser degree involved in legal 
political activity, like initiating constitutional changes or standing for the parliament 
elections. The organisation described its chief goal as “Latvia for the Latvians” and 
proposed their political principles as follows:
1. Supreme power in Latvia belongs to the Latvian people.
2. The good of the nation is of higher value than individual 
freedom.
3. The premise of the state economy is the inner colonisation of 
the nations resources.
4. A state president elected by the people for five years, a par-
liament for the representation of commerce, a government subor-
dinate to the president.23
The driving personality and the chief spokesperson of the organisation was 
Gustavs Celmiijs, a young civil servant. One of the movement’s peculiarities was its
19 See VÄSTRIK 1996: 99.
20 See KASEKAMP 1999: 593.
21 Both are Latvian names for swastika.
22 See PAEGLIS 1994.
23 G. CELMItyS’s speech of 17.09.33, published in Perkonkrusts on 24.09.33, here quoted from GRIFFIN 
1995: 217.
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strong animosity towards ethnic minorities,24 particularly the Baltic Germans and 
Jews. The Germans were a former dominant minority in Latvia and still retained a 
considerable social and economic influence, as well as an impact on the intellectual 
and cultural life. Jews were often found in medical and legal professions, arts, and 
also in trade. All problems in the country were thus blamed on minorities. 
Perkonkrusts rejected the civil definition of the Latvian nation and insisted on 
granting all political rights solely to the ethnic Latvians, Lithuanians and Estonians 
living in the country.
Another feature of Perkonkrusts was its close links with the pre-Christian revival-
ists in Latvia. The name “Thundercross” itself was reportedly coined by Ernests 
BRASTliyS,25 one of the key figures in the history of Latvian nationalism. Brasti n S 
was also the founder and leader of the Dievturi (“those who keep the God”), a pre- 
Christian revivalist movement in Latvia. It emerged as a religious community in 1926 
and originated, in Brast ins ’s  words, in response to the growing discontent of the 
Latvian intelligentsia with Christianity, secularisation and the spread of Marxist 
ideas.26 Brast ins  aimed to reconstruct what he considered to be the Old Latvian 
religion and introduce it as the official religion of the Latvian state. Christianity was, 
in his opinion, a religion created by Jews and forcibly imposed on Latvians by Ger-
mans. Therefore he considered it alien to the Latvian soul. BRASTiiys was not 
treading on entirely new grounds. An earlier attempt to revitalise the religion lost 
through the centuries of forced Christianisation was made by Juris Lecis, a teacher 
who had tried to organise a non-Christian congregation in Jelgava during the World 
War I and also published a couple of pamphlets on the Old Latvian religion. His 
efforts received little public response. The social situation was not favourable as 
Latvia had not yet gained independence and the personal qualities of Lecis were not 
of a charismatic leader. Ernests Brast ins  (1892-1942), in contrast, possessed those 
gifts in abundance. He was an artist and a military man by training, educated at the 
Stiglitz School of Design and Emperor Paul’s Military College, both in St. Peters-
burg. BRASTIiyá served briefly in the Russian army before the October Revolution of 
1917 and joined the Latvian regiments during the War of Independence (1918-20). 
After the war Brasti ns  got involved in numerous projects. He was employed by the 
Board of Monuments (an organisation in charge of the preservation of the national 
heritage) and put all then known Latvian castle-mounds on the map - BRASTINS was 
an amateur archaeologist. He was granted a scholarship from the Latvian Folklore
24 According to the Perkonkrusts ideologues, the ideal Latvian state would have no minorities at all. 
Remarkably, Thundercross did not consider the Estonians and Lithuanians minorities and generally 
supported the idea of Baltic unity.
25 It is not entirely clear whether BRASTINS was himself a member of Perkonkrusts. According to A. 
SILDÉ, an expatriate Latvian historian who had himself been a member of the organisation, he was. 
(§ILDE 1988). When interrogated by the KGB in 1941, he denied his membership in Perkonkrusts and 
stated that his only connection was two lectures on the origins of the Latvian nation and religions he had 
delivered to the members of the organisation (see PELKAUS 1992: 26). In this BRASTItyS was obviously - 
and for understandable reasons - not telling the truth.
26 Brasti n S 1936:13.
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Archives to prepare an index of the mythological names in the Latvian folk songs. 
Brasti n S painted pictures, published books and articles on fine arts and ethnogra-
phy, and tried to introduce a new style in painting, which he called “instinctivism”. 
He was briefly the director of the War Museum in Riga. And above all, he was a 
keen polemist when it came to the national issues. He was also known for his love 
affairs and uninhibited temper and tolerated no alternative opinion. Brastins ’s  
picturesque personality has been portrayed in several Latvian novels.
Although formally recognised by the Ministry of Justice as a religious organisa-
tion, the Dievturi communion was still lacking doctrine and rituals in 1926. BRASTINS 
was a man of little religious education but he grasped intuitively the necessary fea-
tures of the religion he was trying to formalise. In about five years time he provided 
the holy scriptures, the doctrine and the liturgy of the Dievturlba. Brastin S pub-
lished a three-volume selection of Latvian folk-songs - Latvju Dievadziesmas (1928), 
Latvju tikumu dziesmas (1929) and Latvju gadskärtas dziesmas (1929). Sometimes 
ironically called “The Dievturi Bible”, they contained songs about gods, virtues and 
seasonal rites. The Dievturi catechism, modelled on the Small Catechism of Martin 
Luther, came out in 1932.27 The Dievturi doctrine was highly syncretic28 and at times 
self-contradictory. It, or rather, he - as BRASTiiyS was the only creator of the doc-
trine, combined ardent denial of the Christian creed and various borrowings from it. 
Brasti n S proposed the veneration of three deities - Dievs (God), Mára (a female 
counterpart of God, in folklore - the Latvian name of St Mary) and Laima (the god-
dess of destiny), whom he interpreted as three persons of the same Ultimate Reality. 
He strongly objected to the concept of sin and, subsequently, to the notions of 
atonement and salvation. In BRASTliyS’s understanding, the Latvians were virtuous 
simply because they were Latvians and his goal of the “Latvianised Latvia” - a con-
cept very close to Perkonkrusts “Latvia for Latvians” - was therefore seen as the 
fulfilment of the sacred mission of the Dievturi community. He repeatedly empha-
sised that the Nation is of higher value than the God or individual. A great part of 
the Dievturi writings described the glorious pre-Christian past and discussed the 
Indo-European ancestry of the Latvians. BRASTINS views could also be described as 
the “flight from history”.29 Although he was fully cognisant that the new religion is 
his own brainchild, he at the same time considered the Latvian culture and religion 
to remain unchanged through the centuries of the German and Russian rule. This 
assumption was used to support the view of the Dievturlba as the only and true Indo- 
European religion. All Europe, Bra st in S claimed, had for centuries waited for its 
recovery.
The political programme of the Dievturi (and probably Brasti ns ’s personal 
political aspirations, too) was revealed by BRASTINS as follows:
27 Brastin S 1932.
28 See Beitner e  1995.
29 See MISÄNE-PRIEDITE 1997:162-3 and PR1ED1TE 1999: 242-3.
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Hence, our people’s virtues could become the basis for healthy 
national policy. Any policy, understandably, presupposes that form 
of statehood, which could fulfil its ethical ideals most successfully. 
It is immediately evident that democracy in its present form does 
not appeal to the dievturi. Under democracy many presently rule 
who do not know how to rule, are incompetent to rule and do not 
desire to rule. Those rule to whom noble ideas are alien and who 
care only for their own welfare. It is clear that in a democratic so-
ciety where decisions are taken after a secret vote of the majority, 
the laws and regulations would always be placed beneath the ulti-
mate good and desideratum. Therefore only the virtuous, godly in-
dividual should be given power in the state, one who knows, is able 
and competent to lead the Latvian people towards the higher divine 
ideals. The form of statehood where the supreme temporal as well 
as spiritual power is concentrated in the hands of the same person 
is called theocracy. The national state shaped by the ideology of 
DievturJba can be none other than theocratic. The bad and the im-
perfect will have to surrender to the good and the righteous.30
The Dievturi rituals were plain. The community gathered regularly on Sunday 
mornings for the “praise meeting”, called “daudzinäjums” in Latvian. They sang 
folksongs and listened to kokle (a Latvian traditional musical instrument, similar to 
Finnish kantele). Speeches, addressing various doctrinal aspects and/or current is-
sues, were also delivered. The Dievturi also met for outdoor seasonal festivities, like 
Midsummer Eve and other solstice celebrations. Particular rites of passage were 
introduced for child-births, weddings and funerals.
The Dievturi and Perkonkrusts thus shared similar values and approaches to so-
cial issues. A number of individuals were members of both organisations and, ac-
cording to the files of the Latvian Political Police,31 after 1934 the Dievturi also pro-
vided cover for Perkonkrusts meetings. In 1936, BRASHES denoted an impressive 
sum of 1000 Lats - hardly possible to be his personal savings - to Perkonkrusts. The 
police undercover had also witnessed Perkonkrusts’ members having meetings be-
hind closed doors at the venue where Dievturi religious services were meanwhile 
held.32
The question to ask at this point is: why the religious affiliations of the Estonian 
and Latvian right were so different? Part of the explanation might be found if we 
comprehend that those were different types of the right-wing movements. Although 
EVL and Perkonkrusts are both usually branded as the radical right,331 would argue
30 BRASTltyS 1929:11.
31 The Latvian political police had both Dievturi and Perkonkrusts under observation after 1934 and 
their archive (which was most likely the source of information when the KGB seized their files in 1940) 
holds enough evidence as to the links of both organisations (Latvian State Historical Archive 3235- 
2/5868).
32 Ibid.
33 Kase kamp  1998.
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for qualifying Perkonkrusts as the extreme rather than radical right. Roger Eatwel l  
who has analysed the styles of thought of the right describes five different types - the 
reactionary right, the moderate right, the radical right, the extreme right, and the new 
right.M The first two, he argued, developed earlier as responses to eighteen century 
thought, namely liberalism and individualism, while the radical and extreme right 
“were more developments of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; they sought 
specific response to the rise of socialist movements, in particular their more economic, 
end-state concerns. ”35 Thus the radical and extreme right understandably share cer-
tain similarities. In the case of the Baltic States, both EVL and Perkonkrusts were 
idealistic, somewhat irrational movements. They had a vision of nation as true com-
munity and did not focus on economic programmes, but sought the mass mobilisa-
tion on the national grounds cutting across the class structure of the society. Both 
movements were extremely critical of the left. However, the styles of thought and, I 
would add, the manner of their presentation varied a lot. In Eat we ll ’s view, “a 
defining characteristic of the extreme right is the paucity of its intellectual tradition. The 
reactionary, moderate and radical right have produced significant political theorists. The 
extreme right has tended more to produce propagandists, interested in telling people what 
to think rather than how to think, and lacking in originality. ”36 This description fits 
Thundercross perfectly. Further Eatwel l  referred to more features - anti-Semitism 
and drawing on the conspiracy theory - characteristic of the extreme right but not 
associated with the radical right. The above features were found with both the 
Dievturi and Perkonkrusts.
Further, EVL and Perkonkrusts had different perceptions of history, although 
the Past was crucial entity for both organisations. History is always of paramount 
importance for the nationalist movements. As Anthony Smith  has pointed out -
It is history, and history alone, which can furnish the bases of 
ethnic identity and the psychic reassurance of communal security 
that goes with it [...] it is not the amount of such history, or even its 
dramatic value, that is important; what nationalists require from 
their historical researches is the definition of an ethnic atmosphere, 
unique to that community, and the provision of moral qualities (and 
heroic embodiments) peculiar to the group.37
EVL referred mainly to the recent history. The members of the organisation 
shared a particular experience - participation in the War of Independence, which 
served as a point of departure for all their ideology and superiority claims. The War 
of Independence was still remembered by the Estonians in the thirties and probably 
that was exactly the reason why the Veterans chose to evoke it.
34 Eatwell  1985:63.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid, p. 17.
33 Smith  1976:8.
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Perkonkrusts, in their turn, bet everything on what nobody could possibly re-
member, an absolutely unrealistic ideal - Latvia without minorities. For that purpose 
they needed a pattem that could be found nowhere in modem history and had to be 
sought in the times immemorial - in the invented image of the Latvia Felix and the 
distant glorious Indo-European past. Bra st in s ’s thus provided exactly what the 
Perkonkrusts’ ideologues were missing. His anti-Christian zeal also favoured the 
myth of the unjust treatment of the Latvian nation through history as the Christiani- 
sation of Latvia in the 13th century coincided with the loss of political independence.
EVL needed nothing of this. Their discourse, in contrast, saw the deaths and 
suffering at the battlefields during the Independence War as purposeful acts. It also 
drew strongly upon the value of sacrifice. The Christian religion (in its Lutheran 
form, traditional to the country) was an understandable choice - the Veterans 
needed a religion that gives strength in suffering.
It seems that the extreme right politicians are more likely to make the choice of 
pre-Christian revivalism and the radical right would rather prefer the Protestant 
Christianity.38 It is difficult to tell, how would the relationship of the religious and 
the political right ideologies develop, had Estonia been a predominantly Catholic 
country. The radical ideologies in some European countries, Spain and Austria be-
ing examples, had formed links with the Catholic Churches.39 However, it seems that 
the Protestant Churches are more prone to develop intellectual, and sometimes also 
institutional, ties with the right-wing politics. There are few reasons for that. In his 
analysis of the encounter of Christianity and what he calls three quasi religions 
(nationalism, socialism/communism and humanism) Paul TILLICH has pointed to the 
positive evaluation of the secular realm by Protestantism:
Protestantism isimore open to and, consequently, a more easy 
pray of the quasi religions. The Roman Church has denied to all 
three types of quasi-religion all religious significance. Its positive 
evaluation of the secular makes the relationship of Protestantism to 
quasi-religion much more dialectical and even ambiguous. Protes-
tantism can receive and transform the religious elements of the 
quasi-religions..., it has also partly - though never totally - suc-
cumbed to their radicalised forms.40
The Protestant Churches came into existence together with the application of 
the vernacular languages to the intellectual discourse (services held in the national 
languages, translations of the Bible, etc.). The importance of the national issues in 
general is greater in Protestant Churches than in the Catholic Church. Protestant
381 refer here to the European developments. There were, though, the right-wing political movements 
outside the Christian world - the Japanese fascism, for example. The discussion of those is, however, 
beyond my competence.
39 See Smith , D. 1970:14-16.
<o TILLICH 1961: 48-49.
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Churches are also in many cases structured along the national lines, especially in 
smaller countries. By definition, there can be no state Catholic Church in any coun-
try. This is another reason why the Protestant Churches are easier to penetrate for 
any ideas, but particularly the nationalist ones.
At the same time, we should not pass unnoticed that the pre-Christian revival-
ism movements in many countries during the inter-war period, and definitely in Lat-
via were formalised according to the Protestant pattern. This is one more reason to 
discriminate it from the present day neo-Paganism which is doctrinally more flexible 
and does not have an idea of the “one true creed”. It was mentioned earlier that 
BRASTiiyS modelled his catechism on Luther’s seminal text. This is not surprising as 
BRASTiiyá and all other leaders of the movement came from (nominal) Lutheran 
families. The hostility of the Dievturi was considerably greater towards the Lutheran 
Church and less extended to the Catholics - the fact which is, in itself, highly sugges-
tive. The Lutheran theologians, in their turn, returned the animosity - several of 
them published articles against the Dievturiba. Cold as their relationship were, both 
groups understood what their opponents were talking about as they shared common 
terminology. At the same time there was almost no reference to the Dievturi move-
ment in the Catholic press - the pre-Christian revivalists were not taken serious. The 
style of discourse applied by the pre-Christian revivalists was in itself very Protestant. 
They understood the Truth as something that had to be recovered and purified 
(through the study of the folklore texts, in the Latvian case), rather than created. 
Such an approach could only come into being in a culture that was shaped by the 
Protestant Church. I believe that the impact of the Reformation on the origins and 
development of the European nationalism - often seen as a victorious rival of the 
Church - had been far more greater than is immediately evident.
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Abstract: The aim of this research is to find out in what degree religious identity in Serbian 
society has become a self-governed identity, a kind of an identity for itself, or, in what degree it is 
still part of national identity. Is the religious belonging (religious identity) a reliable mark of ethnic-
ity and, if so, in what measure? The research has been done on the participants of student protest 
(SP) in Belgrade in winter 1996/97. The relationship between religious belonging (religious identity) 
and national identity is observed in relation to universal processes of cosmopolitization, individuali-
zation and retraditionalization.
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There is a religious aspect concerning the distinction between the terms 
“individuality” (inseparable element of society) and “personality” (self-conscious 
and free creative subject). Paraphrasing BERDJAJEV, we can say that ethnic religion 
originates in the community of individuals, and universal religion of Christian type in 
the community of personalities.1 The concept of universal religion can be consid-
ered, according to Jung, as a more developed form than the concept of ethnic reli-
gions.2 One of the interesting, but empirically inadequately explored issues, is identi-
fying, if possible, the reflection in religion of some problems such as forming and 
development of the individuality into personality; the relation of the individual to 
collective and ethnic culture and tradition, differences in relation among mentioned 
problems between (conditionally speaking) individualities and personalities and 
disintegration within ethnic community.3
The ideal model of ethnic group implies acceptance of the same religious form - 
ethnic religion by all the members of a certain ethnic group; social and ethnic com-
munity coincide with religious community; meaning that religious identity is a part of 
ethnic identity. In many areas in the past, ethnic identity implied certain religious
1 See N. BERDJAJEV, “Ljudska licnost i marksizam” (“Human Personality and Marxism”), in “Ko- 
munizam i krscani” (Communism and Christians), Zagreb, 1937, 164-187; also see in New Testament, 
“The Epistle to Colossians III” (9-11); also see K. G. JUNG, Psihologija i alhemija (Psychology and Al-
chemy), Zagreb, 1984, 42-43; also in BAHTIJAREVIC, Religijsko pripadanje u uvjetima sekularizacije 
drustva (Religious Belonging in the Conditions of Secularity of Society), Zagreb, 1975,13.
2 See K. G. JUNG, Psiholoske rasprave (Psychological Debates), Novi Sad, 1977,132.
3 See Z. BAUMAN, “From Pilgrim to Tourist - or a Short History of Identity”, in Questions of Cul-
tural Identity, ed. S. HALL and P. DU Gay , London, 1997,18-36.
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belonging. Disintegration of ethnic identity existed, but it was within ethno-religious 
ideology. Within nations with strong ethnic features, so called ‘belated nations’, such 
as Serbia, religious disintegration and religious pluralism are weaker and they have 
narrower paths than within more developed nations. That is why the problem of 
connection between ethnic and religious belonging among the Serbs today is very 
interesting but fairly unexplored. I wanted to establish the connection between reli-
gious identity and the degree of achieved individuality, in fact the degree of achieved 
self-identity.
To achieve the goal set, we need to classify the various relations toward religion 
(to establish the existence of various layers within religious identify of Serbs), to 
measure the ethnicity of those layers, and then compare the results.
I searched for the interviewees among the members of the Student Protest 
1996/97 in Belgrade for several reasons.4 They showed with their effort to influence 
social, political and national problems that they have a certain shape of national 
identity. Recent research of this population shows that it is very open to new ideas,5 
and it is logical to presume that the sample studied is more exposed in comparison to 
the average population. I presumed that this population could give more complete 
replies than other populations, because of its educational level and of being well 
informed. By studying orientations and attitudes of the youth, the future develop-
ment of society can be foreseen in a certain way. This population is interesting be-
cause their age is often a period when durable attitudes towards religion are 
formed.6
The research was done in special surroundings, in many ways. The Serbs in the 
past were monoconfessional, and a certain form of religion (Orthodox Christianity), 
represented the core of their ethnic consciousness and their ethnic identity;7 any 
change of the religion was often followed by the change of nationality,8 after some 
time. “Orthodox Serb”, has become a concept not only referring to national and 
confessional belonging, but also to religious purity and originality. The complex 
“chosen nation” has become deeply rooted in the Serbian collective psyche.
Historical circumstances (five centuries of Turkish occupation) stopped the de-
velopment of Christian consciousness, which was evident in medieval Serbia. Bio-
4 Student Protest was a protest against irregularity in local elections in Serbia.
5 See B. Kuz manovi c , Setnjom u slobodu - vrednosne orijentacije i politicki stavovi ucesnika Stu- 
dentskog protesta 96/97, u Ajmo, ajde, svi u setnju - gradjanski i studentski protest 96/97 (Walking into 
Freedom - Value Orientations and Political Attitudes of the Members of Students’ Protest 96/97, in Let’s 
all of us go for a walk - civilian and student protest 96/97), Belgrade, 1997, 58-59.
6 V. JEROTIC, Hriscanstvo i psiholoski problemi coveka (Christianity and Psychological Problems of 
Man), Belgrade, 1997,103.
7 Foreign observers noticed a long time ago that the Serbian Orthodox Church is “the essential ex-
pression of Serb nationalism”, and “The Serb Church exercised a nationalistic rather than a religious 
leadership”. M. RlSTOVIC, “Socijalna struktúra Jugoslavije - jedna analiza britanskog Foreign Office 
Research Department-a s kraja 1944, godine” (Social Structure of Yugoslavia - a research done by Brit-
ish Foreign Office Research Department, end of 1944), in Annual of Social History, Year 2, Book 1, 
Belgrade, 1995,104-117,115.
8 See J. CviJTC, Balkansko poluostrvo (The Balkan Peninsula), Belgrade, 1987,176.
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logical survival and nourishing cultural identity were the reasons why the Christian 
Church was integrated into national culture and became the extreme intercessor of 
national interests. That was the condition, which caused the institution of the Church 
to be profane, resulting in the nationalisation of Christian symbols and revitalisation 
of pagan religion. A ritual type of worshippers was developed in Serbia as the domi-
nant type. That is the type of worshipping with a modest knowledge of religious 
studies, and showing the state of being religious by the practice of religious customs 
established by tradition. Religion was not closely connected with sacral institutions. 
The cult of ancestors9 had an important place in religious life of the type.
The formal discarding of communist pseudo Christian ideology at the end of the 
eighties, was logically followed by an emotionally charged return to traditional ethnic 
religion, wrapped in Christian symbols, and a new return to tradition. But not all the 
members of the nation participated in this; in fact not all of them accepted it with 
the same intensity. Disintegration of religious identity became evident, because of 
enlarged individuality, because of different beliefs in religious function, and because 
of the difference in the achieved degree of development of religious consciousness, 
and consciousness itself. Serbian ethnos became disintegrated not only in a religious, 
but also, in a general cultural way. The basic moments in the history of religion of 
the Serbs can be summed up as: slow forming of old Slav religion, acceptance of the 
Eastern version of Christianity in the Middle Ages, religious reaction in the form of 
the Bogomil movement in the twelfth and the thirteenth centuries, many centuries of 
exposure to Islam and Catholicism and becoming a part of them and finally the ac-
ceptance of communism as a pseudo religious ideology in the second half of the 
twentieth century.
The particularity of the group studied means that unsolved ethnic and national 
problems have been existing ever since, and that confessional belonging is often the 
key element of national belonging.
Results of recent research show that there was a dominant process of seculari-
sation10 concerning the student population in the period between 1945 and 1980. 
Since 1980, or several years before, there has been an increased number of worship-
pers (believers) and a decline in the number of atheists; that means that the process 
of theisation11 has begun. In the group of students questioned, there are 12% more
9 See PAVICEVIC, Sociologija religije sa elementima filozofije religije (Sociology of Religion with the 
Elements of Philosophy of Religion), Belgrade, 1980, 188 ff.; and V. CAJKANOVIC, О magiji i religiji, 
(About Magic and Religion), Belgrade, 1985,264.
10 According to many researches, Belgrade is the most secular area in Serbia. See D. B. DJORDJEVIC , 
Studenti i religija (Students and Religion), Nis, 1987, 29.
11 There are data for the student population in Split, in Croatia for the period 1969-1980; I believe 
that the process is much the same, it may be said that it was even stronger in Serbia. More data about the 
research in Split can be found in S. VRCAN, Studenti i religija, izmedju cvrste povezanosti za religiju i 
masovnog otudjivanja od religije (vezanost studenata Sveucilista u Splitu za religiju) (Students and Relig-
ion: between a sort of relation to religion and massive alienation from it (relation of students from the 
Split University to religion), Sociology 1-2, Belgrade, 1981. Since 1980, the number of worshippers in 
Serbia has doubled, and the number of atheists has halved. Thorough data can be found in D. B. 
DJORDJEVIC, op. cit.
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interviewees who are now more religious than those who are less religious in com-
parison to the previous part of their life.
The student population within the Serbian society is specific because it was for-
mally more non-religiously and secularly established in comparison to the average 
population. Apart from being different from the average for the Serbian nation, it is 
different according to its religious identity from populations of the same kind in 
different areas: it was, in comparison to the same population in Split in the eighties, 
non-religious and/or atheist.12
Samples were 218 students attending almost all Belgrade faculties and several 
colleges, including the Theological Faculty of the Serbian Orthodox Church. The 
ratio of women and men was 51%: 49%; according to permanent addresses, the 
interviewees are from all parts of FRY (almost two thirds from Belgrade), and sev-
eral from the Republic Srpska (in Bosnia); 95% are Serbian and 5% Montenegrin 
nationality, by objective ethnic criterion. Interviewees were chosen at random. The 
number of interviewed students, according to some estimations, represents about 
0.5% of all the participants of student protest. To give better access into the matter, 
two smaller groups were interviewed afterwards, using a modified questionnaire: one 
group had 66, and the other 78 students from different faculties. The sample was not 
representative for the whole student population: the conclusion according to re-
search upon this sample leads to tendencies and orientations.13
Interviewees see and search for an aim, comfort and help for life orientation in 
religion. They also see salvation, meaning, and the possibility to direct and control 
energy, a connection with the past. Religion means for them the possibility of observ-
ing only one aspect of reality. They believe that the Church is not the same as before 
or what it should be. According to many of them, the Serbian Orthodox Church 
changed into a solely national institution, replacing religious activity, and the clergy 
is morally corrupted. That is why a great number of interviewees, although religious, 
are against the church, church organization and the clergy: they believe that media-
tors between God and man are not needed any more, and they try to build their 
personal relation with God free from any models. Many interviewees tend to build 
their relation with God, which is based on rational beliefs and scientific facts, and 
which is not based on strict obedience and mystical getting accustomed. The term 
“God” is connected with the sphere of noumenal, and his actions in the phenomenal 
world are not distinctly defined. Individuals make a distinction between individual
12 Comparing results of research on worshipping among the students in Split (Croatia) in 1980 and 
results from Nis (Serbia) 1985, we come to the conclusion that the students in Nis were far less religious, 
in fact that they were more atheists (80% stated that they were non-religious, i.e. atheists). Research in 
Nis in 1985 shows that students were more non-religious than the rest of the population in that part of 
Serbia. See S. VRCAN, op. cit., 4 ff; also see D. B. DJORDJEVIC, op. cit., 29 and 62.
13 See about the methodology of examining religious identity in §. BAHTUAREVIC op. cit., Zagreb, 
1975; D. B. DJORDJEVIC, op. cit., V. Vratu Sa -ZUNJIC, Odnos verske pripadnosti, religiozne samoiden- 
tifikacije i medjuetnicke distance u bivsoj Jugoslaviji krajem osamdesetih, rezime priloga za IV godisnju 
konferenciju JUNIR-a (Relation of religious belonging, religious self-identification and inter-ethnic 
distances in former Yugoslavia at the end of the eighties, summary of the text for the Fourth Conference 
of JUNIR), Niska Banja, 1997.
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and collective religion; according to them, individual religion is for contemplative 
people and the collective one is for the masses. A number of students pray to God 
when it suits them or when they are in danger, and forget that when everything is all 
right. Traditional worshippers often make no distinction between these terms: 
“religion” and “the Church”, “Serbian” and “Orthodox”, “tradition” and “religious 
custom”. On the other hand, not many of them make a distinction between 
“atheism” and “agnosticism”. Atheism is often understood as a common term, which 
includes all non-Church forms of religion. Superstition and fortune telling are con-
sidered to be the lowest level of religious consciousness and Christianity the highest; 
according to them, it is not sufficient to belong to Christianity formally, and in that 
way to be called a Christian. Some of the students see a cultural barrier in Orthodox 
Christianity which stands in the way of globalism; for them, Orthodox Christianity is 
the most human, liberal and the most spiritual form of Christianity. Belief that peo-
ple from the West are spiritually inferior in comparison to the people from the East 
(the Serbs are included) is far from being uncommon. Others consider Orthodox 
Christianity as an unsuccessful attempt at keeping the values of early Christianity, in 
fact a cover for nationalism. Most of the interviewees take part in these traditional 
rituals. Some of them try in that way to build and keep their own identity, and others 
consider rituals to be empty forms which are practiced to avoid attracting attention 
and not to provoke negative reactions from their surroundings. Students are con-
scious that the old Slav pantheon lives in Orthodox religion. Although, a number of 
them do not know whether they worship (believe) or not, there is a negligible num-
ber who are aloof and who are against religion.
According to some answers it is possible to distinguish several groups of inter-
viewees. First of all, there is a group of interviewees who fully accept the model of 
religion offered by the Serbian Orthodox Church - we can call them “Church” or 
“Convinced” Orthodox worshippers or believers (they represent one seventh - 14% 
of the total number of interviewees). Second, there is a group which accepts eroded 
or modified forms of Orthodox Christian religion; their relation to the Church is 
weaker, and often this form is called “folk Orthodox religion” (almost half of the 
interviewees - 44%).14 Both church and non-church Serbian Orthodox Christians 
accept the mixture of Christian and pagan religion, but church ones use more Chris-
tian symbols, whereas non-church ones use pagan symbols. As the third group, we 
have atheists, in fact non-worshippers (22%). The fourth group are worshippers, but 
their form of being religious is formed in harmony with other models: we can call
14 It is possible to distinguish four degrees of Church distinction, i.e. religious participation; total 
acceptance of Church model (14% of interviewees), partial acceptance (12%), acceptance of customs 
without going to church (15%) and very informal and undefined identification with Church conviction 
(18%). I formed CWO group from the first group, and WMO group from the other three. For more 
detail on “folk Orthodox religion” see D. Band ic , Carstvo zemaljsko i carstvo nebesko, ogled о narodnoj 
religiji (The Empire of Earth and the Empire of Heaven, experiments about folk religion), second, en-
larged edition, Belgrade, 1997, 239 ff., and D. BANDIC, Narodna religija Srba u 100 pojmova (Serbian 
Folk religion in 100 notions), Belgrade, 1991.
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them followers of alternative forms of religion (19%).15 It is characteristic for all the 
unconvinced worshippers of Orthodox religion that, they all, in a certain way accept 
the traditional, Orthodox model of religious life; all the alternative ones are charac-
terized by a non-traditional type of religion.
Most of them accept a modified form of Orthodox religion, and the smallest 
group are convinced worshippers of the Serbian Orthodox Church. Not many of 
them are actually connected to Orthodox religion, and there are many of them who 
are traditionally connected to Orthodox religion, without personal religiosity, and 
with a clear consciousness about confessional background. There are many of them 
as well, who accept the confessional background despite the lack of rational sense 
and being non-religious; they consider the traditional model as a part of their cul-
tural heritage. It is shown in one of the groups interviewed afterwards that full iden-
tification with Orthodox Christianity exists only in one fifth of the cases, and full 
and/or partial in 45% of the interviewees; formal acceptance of traditional religion 
exists in 83% of interviewees (they declare themselves in certain situations as Ortho-
dox). Full religious identification and religious participation can be found in 14%, 
and this is the very same percentage of those who would change their religion for a 
more pleasant life. Clearly defined Orthodox religious identification exists if full 
Orthodox religious participation is present. Within the group where religious par-
ticipation is not full, religious identification is heterogeneous and inconsistent. A 
check with the control group shows that agnostics often declared themselves as 
atheists, and ritual life atheists and agnostics are often like the life of Orthodox wor-
shippers.
Research on ethnicity demands research on inner and outer aspects of ethnical 
being (inner homogeneity of the group and the distance towards others). That is why 
I studied ethnicity in different ways: according to national declaration, scale of na-
tional ties, scale of traditionalism, ethnic distance, ethnic stereotypes and auto 
stereotypes, and with the help of attitudes towards certain social problems.16 Apart 
from ethnicity, some other parameters were also taken into account. One of them is 
authoritarian.
Interviewees from the groups of convinced Orthodox worshippers and worship-
pers of modified Orthodox religion are more traditional, national and authoritarian 
than the interviewees from the groups of atheists and alternative ones.17 Differences
15 “Alternative" group is formed of non-confessional worshippers (15% of all interviewees), undecided 
- undefined (4%), and members of small religious sects (1%).
161 took scales for researching social attitudes in shortened and modified form from Z. GOLUBOVIC, 
B. KUZMANOVIC, M. VASOVIC, Drustveni karakter i drustvene promene u svetlu nacionalnih sukoba 
(Social Character and Social Changes in the Light of National Conflicts), Belgrade, 1995.
171 will show results on the scale of authoritarian, scale of traditionalism and the scale of national ties. 
All the scales included eight statements, and each of them could be answered with one out of five an-
swers: starting with full agreement with the given statement to full disagreement with it. The maximum 
score on each of these scales was 40 points (maximum authoritarian, i.e. traditionalism, i.e. national ties), 
and minimum 8 points; the theoretical middle was 24 points, and that was the result which conditional-
ly represented the border between those who were not authoritarian, not traditional and not nationally
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in ethnicity among these groups are sometimes minimal, and sometimes significant 
(for example in the scale of national ties).18 Religious belonging is a true parameter 
of ethnic identity only on the group level, if individuals are considered, it should be 
checked. Certain forms of religious belonging are a true parameter of ethnicity only 
in comparison to another type of religious belonging, but not true in the absolute 
sense. This means that people who accept the traditional model of religion have 
stronger ties to their nation than those who do not accept this model; but it does not 
mean that followers of the traditional model would always show strong ethnicity.
Full acceptance of the Orthodox model of religiosity is in 5 of 6 cases connected 
to nationalism; in these cases through religion the nation is glorified. On the other 
hand, nationally oriented persons, in three quarters of the cases do not fully accept 
the Orthodox model of religiosity.19 Almost all of the people who declared them-
selves to be Orthodox (98.5%) have articulated national identity (they declared 
themselves national); on the other hand, almost every eighth (12%) interviewee who 
firmly declared being national, did not declare being Orthodox. More than one third 
of the interviewees (38%), although formally identified with Orthodox religion, try 
to fulfil real religious need in some other way.20
Interviewees refer to Orthodox religion as one of the basic national institutions 
and the Serbian Orthodox Church is considered to be one of the basic national or-
ganizations. Acceptance of Orthodox religion is not the condition for development 
of nationalism; in fact Orthodox religion is not the only nucleus of national con-
sciousness; although rare, there are cases when nationalism does not try to find sup-
port in religion. Two kinds of nationalism exist: both sacral and profane orientation, 
and the first one is more numerous. Generally speaking, when the model of being 
religious is closer to the Church model it is more connected to nationalism, authori-
tarian and traditionalism. The degree of acceptance of the traditional model of reli-
connected, on the one side, and on the other side there were those who had these characteristics. Average 
results on the authoritarian scale are: convinced Orthodox Worshippers (CWO) - 18.7 points; worship-
pers of modified Orthodox Religion (WMO) - 16.93, alternative (ALT) - 16.90; atheists (non-believers) 
(ATE) - 14.8. On the scale of traditionalism, the following results were obtained: CWO - 24.7 points, 
WMO - 23.2; ATE - 22.7; ALT - 21.7. On the scale of national ties, the results were: CWO - 28.2 points; 
WMO - 25.3; ATE - 22.3; ALT - 20.7. Ethnic distance was also researched, according to readiness to be 
married to people of other nationalities. In the CWO group there is aversion in 83.9% towards at least 
one nationality in respect of marrying, in the WMO group 81.4%, ALT - 64.3 and in the group ATE 
56.2%.
18 More than one third of the interviewees, among the characters from Serbian history, admire Nikola 
Tesla (36%), and less than one fifth (20%) admire St. Sava, founder of the Serbian Orthodox Church. 
Atheists and alternatives give priority to N. Tesla, interviewees from WMO admire Nikola Tesla more, 
whereas those from the CWO give priority to St. Sava. Orthodox people admire Greek people from 
ancient times (because of their developed democracy and spirituality) and religious “non-traditionalists” 
admire contemporary English people (because of the successful symbiosis of traditional and contempo-
rary culture).
19 84% are those who fully accept the Orthodox model of religion and are nationally oriented, i.e. they 
achieved a higher score than theoretical on the scale of national ties.
20 83% of interviewees in the control group declared that they were Orthodox, and only 45% of them 
accept what their religion preaches.
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gion is conversely proportional to the degree of individual emancipation, i.e. the 
degree of achieved critical attitude towards authorities and tradition and the degree 
of constructed personal attitude towards reality and independence.
The spectrum of religious identities of interviewees ranges from those who ac-
cept the old-fashioned mystic view of the world stressing the cult of ancestors to 
those who are super-confessional, universally religious. Atheistic orientation is a 
consequence of the need to purify consciousness from everything that is needless, 
ideological, imposed and manipulated through centuries; i.e. an attempt at a new 
religious identification.21 Greater empathy with elements of universal, more than 
elements of folk religion, shown by a great number of interviewees, is connected with 
rejection of the national pattern of culture as a mediator between an individual and 
universal values.
We can observe several layers within the group of Orthodox worshippers, and 
the description must depend on generalisation and simplification; these layers inter-
weave and they form different variations. The first layer mostly demands from the 
church affirmation for doing its pagan, i.e. practically magical praxis: in most cases it 
does not possess an ideologically developed national consciousness. It does not think 
about religion, and its religious being is described in stock phrases. The individuality 
of these people is often of the archaic and egoistical type. The second, partially 
Christian layer includes people who try with the help of the Church to reconcile 
Christianity and nationalism; they aspire to transcendentalism, belonging to the na-
tion as a higher entity, and they consider globalism as something, which endangers 
them. They consciously put their individuality into the service of national ideology. 
As recent events have shown, they have hard times experiencing the crisis of national 
values; they tend to identify their own destiny with national destiny. The third layer 
includes different individually contemplative attempts at transcendentalism. The 
fourth layer formally accepts the Orthodox model because of the lack of courage to 
reject it, and personally does not identify with it at all (or only a little).
According to conventional criteria, interviewees are educated, young people, but 
most of them have an attitude to religion similar to the masses; this attitude is not 
that of a cultural elite. Despite developed intellectuality (precisely, the ability to use 
terms for practical purposes), many of them do not show Fromm ’s  understanding of 
the ability to apprehend, regarding exploring the essence.22 All of that is reflected in 
the attitude towards the problem explored, which is often weakly articulated and 
defined, used term apparatus is often of a modest scope and full of clichés; ready 
models are accepted without any further elaboration. Although this problem is uni-
versal, in the given surroundings it is very indicative.23
21 See V. JEROTIC, op. cit.
22 See the chapter about sense, conscience and religion in Fromm ’s  book Zdravo drustvo (Healthy 
Society).
23 S. JOVANOVIC claims that wisdom and liveliness of Serbian folk sagacity is not deep, analytical 
wisdom, but it leads to momentary and unilateral conclusions; see S. JOVANOVIC, “Srpski nacionalni 
karakter, О kultumom obrascu” u Karakterologija Srba (“Serbian national character”, About the cultural 
pattern, in Characters of the Serbs), ed. B. JOVANOVIC, Belgrade, 1992,229-242.
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The traditional form of religion presents a less religious institution for the in-
terviewees, and more help in defining general cultural identity - in several cases the 
construction “Orthodox atheist”24 was used. There is graduation concerning close-
ness of the ideal model of the “Serb”: several interviewees asked about national 
belonging replied that they were “Orthodox Serbs”, considering it to be the top of 
the national hierarchy. Personal identity of individualised and non-traditional inter-
viewees chose the World for their reference group, but not nation: religion and na-
tionality are not inseparable categories for them. Their nationalism is evident, for 
example, during international sports events, and it starts as soon as it hinders per-
sonal development (even to a small extent). The long period in which the traditional 
form of religion was deliberately repressed, left consequences. Many interviewees 
are not familiar with traditional confession. Traditional confession still has certain 
secrets for them and a mystical attraction, which is connected with the creation of 
idealised images. They consider “Orthodox religion” and “Serbian nation” as arche-
types of universal values, and not actual reality. Only after getting to know and de-
mystification of traditional confession, could these interviewees form a lasting vision 
of religion.
Non-traditional religious interviewees are against tradition which obligates and 
restrains, and they are for tradition which enlightens and gives orientation. It is 
probably going to become clearer when re-traditional impulse weakens. Efforts 
made by certain structures aiming at making cannons of satisfying religious needs, 
represent attempts of those structures to achieve survival, and they are against the 
tendency of achieving positive freedom. They are against the need of the individual 
to accede the reality spontaneously and according to personal needs. As Mihail 
Najmi  quoted in the book Mirdad: “Which ancestors can claim the man whose only 
ancestor is God?”
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FOLK RELIGION - POLITICAL UNDERCURRENTS
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Abstract: To establish some relation between folk religion and politics, one could see that the 
present scenario in the technologically developed world is somewhat different. Thanks to the advent 
of knowledge in all spheres of human life and scientific and technological development the social as 
well as political bearing that religion could exercise on modern folk life, peoples’ attitudes are be-
coming different. In fact, man has unravelled many secrets of nature and has successfully combated 
a host of impediments he was hitherto facing. This has to a large extent influenced our folks’ atti-
tude towards religion. Very often religion and castes are confused with each other and we find that 
the latter is playing a major role in our present day politics. God, religion and such faiths are very 
much essential for our folks for their community living and they help people to lead an active and 
dynamic life. Politics these days is most often banking upon the religious faith of the people which 
obviously emerges in the form of caste differentiation and they try to find their way through such 
faiths and convictions. Politics manages to be one with our folks exploiting their faith for its own 
success and survival. Thus, it pretends to respect and safeguard the interests of religions, of course, 
eventually to meet its own ends.
It would be interesting to study the various religious customs, beliefs and convictions of our 
folk life and community observations of fairs and festivals and how political interference, though at 
times helps, but, most often unwanted and unwarranted, causes undue anxiety and disturbs the 
peace of the community life. The present paper intends to take up some aspects of this issue for a 
brief study.
Keywords: folk religion, politics, interference, India
Folk religion depends on beliefs to a large extent. For that matter, every religion 
has got ideals of its own. Religion can be very well identified in the very totality of 
life style in our rural setup. But the unfortunate thing these days is that our political 
system has reduced the universal meaning of religion to a considerable extent. Ow-
ing to constrained feelings, the meaning of religion has been disfigured. Religion and 
caste are being confused with each other. As a result of this, people are looking at 
religion suspiciously and sceptically. In folklore, people consider family and com-
munity as compared to caste and sect. They are not very much bothered about the 
intricacies of caste, sect, etc. as conceived or construed in urban circles. To facilitate 
a smooth living, they conceive their own definitions of social and political frame-
work. The significant point is that almost all-folk activities revolve around their reli-
gious framework as an axis. Today we have to note one thing. People are developing 
some type of outward aversion towards religion. A broad-minded secular feeling is 
undoubtedly good for the ultimate welfare of the society, if it is taken and initiated 
in good spirit. But, unfortunately, secularism is being projected as a political tool. No
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religion in people, no religion in politics, no religion in sports and so on has been 
the talk of the day on our platforms. The protagonists of such feeling forget one 
thing. The bare and bitter fact is that instead of religion, politics is intervening into 
all corners of life and spoiling the whole atmosphere. In fact, religion should be 
taken as a necessity, as a controlling factor to safeguard the welfare of the society. 
Because religion plays a dominant role in our folk society, they live peacefully and 
contentedly. One has to note that folk religion is more human in nature. How it is 
accepted and what is the ultimate bearing of religion on folk society is significant to 
note. Because of its simplicity and unstinted nature, folk religion, in reality, is human 
religion.
Beliefs and customs function as the backbone of folk religion. It is not necessary 
that there should be any cause and effect relation between these two things. Rarely 
at times, such beliefs and customs may have a scientific background behind them. Be 
there any cause and effect relation or not, it is a fact that religion is embedded in 
beliefs. Birth, marriage, fairs and festivals happen to be occasions to celebrate hap-
piness whereas occasions like diseases and death ceremonies bring people to share 
their grief. Thus in one way or the other, folk religion has proved to be a way of folk 
life. It is an exposition of the folk mind. Here thought and action are not different 
from one another. The influence of folk religion can be vividly seen on our social 
and political life of the present day.
In a way religion or Dharma pertains to our way of life. If we go on considering 
more and more on this topic, it tends to become abstract. In booklore Dharma has a 
special meaning. Most often all these things come under Hindu Dharma. In fact one 
could feel that to call these things Hindu Dharma itself might not be right. Through-
out the ancient religion we do not find any subjectivity or any extraordinary impor-
tance given to any person. Several thinkers have given serious thought to the funda-
mental aspects of life and their experiences, assertions and outlook towards life, 
which have paved the way to their philosophies. What they all preached comes under 
Dharma. In case of religions like Christianity and Islam people take the names of 
Jesus Christ or the Prophet Mohammad. But as far as Hinduism is concerned no 
such single name could be taken. There might be some exceptions in Jainism and 
Buddhism, but ultimately they also have merged into the main stream.
If we look at Indian lifestyle and tradition, we find the mainstream of Dharma 
has influenced everything within its ambit. In spite of this there are so many different 
subsidiary currents which maintain their own individuality. Such subsidiary currents 
actually control the whole life pattern of a specific society that follows them. In folk 
religion, the village deity or the family deity is treated with utmost respect. For al-
most all happenings in life, the family deity is worshipped and propitiated. Almost all 
happenings of life right from birth to death are attributed to the family deity or the 
village goddess. Similarly each and every ritual in our villages goes in the name of 
some god or goddess. Father and mother (maatr and pitr) are in the next place of 
importance.
Another important feature of all folk religion is that no disinterestedness is 
shown towards worldly life and happiness. The concept of renunciation or sanyasa is
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unknown to them. Forsaking worldly life and going behind some abstract happiness 
in the name of renunciation is unknown to them. In fact, the very essence of folk 
religion would be seen in the observances and performances of our rural milieu. The 
background of performances or rituals is nothing but faith or belief. In turn, the 
basis of any faith could be observed in keenness and interest shown by our villages 
towards worldly life. In toto, folk religion is confined, to a large extent to this world.
The faith exhibited by our rural masses towards rebirth is very much significant. 
They firmly believe that if one’s life were pure in this birth, one would lead a happier 
life in the next birth. They always believe that some unknown hand controls their 
entire life as well as social happiness. They imagine the nature and being of that 
unknown hand or divinity to be as simple and as transparent as their simple life. 
They try to honestly comprehend all they imagine about such a divinity. Unlike their 
urban counterparts, they do not have lofty ideas about religion. For them, it is not a 
separate entity from their life. And hence we do not find our folks indulging in mis-
deeds like robbery and murder. Even at such exigencies, we find our folks facing the 
situation nobly and collectively raising themselves well to the situation. We find a lot 
of generosity among our rural masses even at times of difficulties and distress. They 
want to see that the Lord or the deity whom they worship gets maximum attention 
and importance. Even when people considering themselves to be belonging to upper 
classes engage in disharmony and quarrel, there are instances where our folks have 
exhibited their protest by way of some traditional folk dances, rituals, ballads and 
such other forms. The incident that took place in connection with Puri Jagannath 
Temple may be cited as an example.
In folk religion magic and witchcraft play an important role. They consult magi-
cians to get rid of difficulties and diseases. A magician is often approached to know 
the cause of any disease. Using spelled ashes (bhasma), to get an amulet or a talis-
man tied on the hand or shoulder, whenever evil spirits exhort any person they are 
driven away by observing some rituals or chanting some mantras. Such things are still 
active in our folk society. Even today our folks are very scared of the magic or sor-
cery which one person may use to spoil another person. Even items pertaining to the 
usage of magic are considered to be inauspicious. The magic wands of a wizard, an 
elbow, a skull, a lemon, a needle etc., are considered to be most inauspicious. Even 
to look at such things is considered to be bad. Bhanamati type of incidents could be 
quite often seen in our northern part of Karnataka. People often share their experi-
ences with all anxieties and apprehensions about the difficulties they faced because 
of the notorious magicians from places like Kerala and Kollegái. There are also 
people thinking on the rational level discarding such happenings and experiences. In 
their view, such experiences are the results of ignorance and illiteracy. They are not 
prepared to accept this black magic as a science or a skill. In spite of all such rational 
claims, most of our cities, towns and villages are being continuously flooded with 
astrologers, babas, divine worshippers claiming to be the descendants of several 
divinities. Modern science and technology also have their own contribution in this 
regard projecting computer astrologers using a few strokes on the keyboard and 
giving a printout of what is in store for the gullible people who approached them.
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Because of the involvement of a super machine like the computer, even the learned 
urban masses are fairly influenced least doubting the authenticity or the prognosti-
cating faculties of the modern magic machine.
There has always been a struggle between science and religion. There are people 
saying that even a great scientist like Einstein believed in some superhuman power 
before he came out with his theory of relativity or the well known equation E = me2. 
His belief in religion must have been no less than his faith in science. Many modern 
thinkers might say that there is nothing surpassing human endeavour. They might 
advocate belief in one’s hard work and intellect instead of putting everything in the 
name of God. Probably they forget that something cannot be achieved to a great 
extent without having an innate faith in an entity that one firmly believes in. In folk 
religion, the animal and plant kingdoms as well as several inanimate objects play an 
important role and such features are being looked at from a modern point of view 
these days. However, the modern view is more and more practical and business like 
in nature, probably in every field. People consider items of immediate use to be of 
relevance. Tomorrows are not important for them.
Scientific thinking, revolutionary advances in technological fields as well as vari-
ous types of developments in many areas have opened avenues for world level com-
munication. In other words, this has paved the way for a cultural give and take. The 
impact of religion, wars fought to occupy others’ territories and the great losses in-
curred have made people of the world think in new directions. All these are devel-
opments seen during the past one or two centuries. One significant effect of these 
developments is that people understood the importance of all things around them; 
they found that no phenomenon is to be discarded totally without due inquiry and 
examination. Besides modern inventions, our world literature and culture, customs 
and values have also to be taken into account. As results of such inquiries, many 
persons of historical importance together with their thoughts and theories have been 
subjected to a lot of debates and discussions out of which some have survived and 
others have proved scarcely viable. Those who stand the test of time - whether per-
sons or their contributions - have really transcended the barriers of space and time.
Traditions and customs are being seen both scientifically and otherwise. Some-
thing considered scientific today might be turned down as unscientific tomorrow. 
Just as new things are accepted continuously, old things are being discarded. Often 
the level and way of discarding things reach culminating heights. This is really dan-
gerous. Probably the present lifestyle and unattached attitude of people may be the 
reason behind this. In the name of rationalism, people are often becoming so indif-
ferent about their culture, beliefs and customs. In the name of scientific outlook, 
God and beliefs are being considered as superstitious. Such things eventually are 
proving to be impediments to viewing things with an overall outlook and taking up 
an in-depth study.
To conclude, we always find some basic truth behind any belief or custom. 
Similarly every custom or ritual comes as a part of performance or a celebration. 
Broadly speaking, no ritual or folk performance is without sense and use. At least, 
the performing social group would get some consolation and peace of mind by such
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things. In the name of cultural activities like fairs and festivals, it will be a nice thing 
to watch our folks exchanging good will, greeting one another, sharing experiences, 
mingling culturally and so on. After all what charm could there be in life without 
such things? If our beliefs and rituals could accomplish this, the purpose is served. 
Our fairs and festivals and melas have their social and political purposes also. They 
bring people together in all these areas. They find occasions and opportunities to 
have discussions and exchange views on contemporary world and political matters. 
Thus we find a lot of influence of folk religion on politics. India being a country of 
villages, folk religion opens a number of avenues for our people to apprise them-
selves of the political undercurrents that will be continuously flowing within. When-
ever one considers a study of such political undercurrents, one has to be careful 
enough to consider the aspects of folk religion and its bearing on present day politics 
in an appropriate and suitable manner.
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Abstract: This paper concerns a local Bengali deity named Dharmaraj, whose worship in east-
ern India was quite extensive in medieval times. Today, however, ritual performances in his honor 
are confined to three contiguous districts of West Bengal. This decline in worship is partly due to the 
co-optation of a predominantly lower-caste deity by Brahmins. The degree to which “Sanskritiza- 
tion” has altered the practices associated with the deity shall be explored in both historical and eth-
nographic contexts based on medieval Bengali literature and anthropological fieldwork. The aim is 
to understand how the deity can be manipulated ideologically over time to serve the interests of 
different caste groups. I wish to sketch the dynamics of how Dharmaraj is currently constructed, in-
terpreted, and understood in one small village - Goalpara - located in Birbhum District, the center 
of the deity’s worship.
To do this, I will present data pertaining to annual puja, or ritual performance, for the deity. 
Ritual data will be supplemented with exegesis provided to me by a cross section of individuals be-
longing to various castes within the village. I intend to conclude by suggesting that the deity serves a 
mediational role in the village by resolving conflicts resulting from caste hierarchy. Moreover, his 
annual puja, although not levelling social status, displays a strong sense of Tumerian communitas, 
which allows for a temporary form of egalitarianism in which members of all castes gain access to 
the deity.
Keywords: Eastern India, Bengal, deity Dharmaraj, ritual performance, community
THE PLACE AND ITS PEOPLE
Goalpara is an all-Hindu community located in the district of Birbhum. It is di-
vided into two directional sectors called Purbapara (eastern neighborhood) and 
Pashcimpara (western neighborhood). The boundary line between them is a youth 
club built in a small clearing marked by a tube well. These two major divisions are 
recognized by residents who often refer to them as major points of orientation within 
the village. By comparison to other villages in Birbhum, Goalpara is quite small; it is 
populated by 915 residents living in 166 households. Although the village is numeri-
cally and economically dominated by Brahmans, a total of fifteen castes are repre-
sented. Brahmans also dominate the village economy due to their landholdings, and
* A longer version of this paper will be published in Acta Ethnographica Hungarica under the title of 
“Caste Politics, Ritual Performance, and Local Religion in a Bengali Village: A Reassessment of Limi- 
nality and Communitas.”
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many of the lower caste members of the village are employed by them as agricultural 
laborers. While a number of non-Brahmans own land, their plots tend to be much 
smaller, functioning mostly as domestic gardens. Brahman tracts are considerably 
larger and require more labor-intensive care in order to yield cash crops such as 
rice.1 A reciprocal interdependence is thus created: Brahmans must rely on the 
services of the lower castes, while lower castes rely on Brahmans for a portion of 
their income.
Brahmanical dominance is not just limited to the agricultural and economic 
spheres. Brahmans also control, or are at least tangentially involved in, most of the 
local ritual activities. The type of Brahmanization that has been occurring in Goal- 
para is not one-sided, however, for a number of influences also pass in the other 
direction. This seems to be the case in the Dharmaraj püjä, the topic of this paper, 
which was a completely low-caste phenomenon for a lengthy period in the past. Now, 
due to increasing Brahmanical participation, the püjä is slowly taking on a number of 
Sanskritic features without necessarily sacrificing many of the local practices associ-
ated with Dharmaraj (e.g., pig sacrifice and liquor consumption).2 In other nearby 
villages that celebrate the Dharmaraj püjä, the degree of Sanskritization has been 
greater, totally substituting blood sacrifice with the cutting of gourds and the ritual 
use of alcohol with milk.3 The replacement of vegetarian sacrifices for blood offer-
ings does not seem to be an issue in Goalpara. Since Brahmans, who eat portions of 
the sacrificial flesh, feel that they must officiate at the balidän (goat sacrifice) on the 
third and final evening of the püjä, there is no division of opinion on this issue. My 
own observations coupled with folk exegesis suggest that two sets of rites - one dis-
tinctively low caste, the other Brahmanical - exist side by side.4
There is a strong sense of caste interdependence in the domain of ritual, but it is 
also the ritual realm within which social hierarchy is contested. The Dharmaraj püjä 
is, perhaps, the most compelling example of this in rural Bengal. The püjä, some-
times called gäjan (thundering) in the region, is an occasion allowing for a great deal 
of participatory interaction by residents from all economic and occupational streams
1 It is worth noting here that Dharmaraj also owns 12 ttghas (= app. 4 acres) of land controlled by the 
dharma sarkár (Hbaxma committee). The profit generated by farming this land is used for partially fund-
ing the annual Dharmaraj püjä According to oral history, a wealthy jamidär (landholder) from an adja-
cent village called Taltor donated the land for this purpose.
2 Almost two decades ago, it was reported that a Dorn woman once remarked in conversation during 
the püjä that Dharmaraj was their caste deity. Once the Brahmans began noticing the increasing popular-
ity of Dharmaraj, however, they consciously decided to become involved in the püjä by asserting their 
influence in the ritual domain. This is attested by the following statement: “Dharmapuja belongs to the 
Dorn. It is ourpuja. Because the deity is so great, the Brahmans wanted to worship him” (ROHNER and 
CHAKl-SlRKAR 1988: 110).
3 The term “Sanskritization” was first coined by the Indian anthropologist M. N. Srinivas in his land-
mark monograph Religion and Society among the Coorgs of South India (1952). I use the term here in the 
sense defined by STAAL to signify “a process by which a lower caste attempts to raise its status and to rise 
to a higher position in the caste hierarchy. Sanskritization may take place through the adoption of vege-
tarianism, of teetotalism, of the worship of ‘Sanskritic deities,’ or by engaging the service of Brahmans for 
ritual purposes” (1963: 261).
4 For a more extensive discussion of this issue, see KOROM 1999.
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of life. In Goalpara, even the outcast leatherworking group known as Ruidas5 must 
participate in the púja, for their drumming is essential to the overall success of the 
rites for Dharmaraj. As I begin to describe the social structure of ritual specialists, 
this point will be explored in more depth. For the time being let me just point out 
that activities on the all-village level, such as the Dharmaraj púja, display a much 
stronger sense of Turnerian communitas (TURNER 1977: 131-165) than exclusively 
small-scale caste events. The performance of songs for the rain goddess Bhajo (bhäjo 
gän) on the last day of the month of Bhadra by members of the Ruidas caste, for 
example, is limited to their own demarcated environment. The performances often 
do not flow beyond the inner, domestic compounds of their homes. Large-scale pub-
lic display events, however, such as Dharmaraj púja, happen primarily near the sa-
cred spaces dedicated to this deity within the village, drawing people from all castes 
into worship.
EMIC GENRES OF DISPLAY
Püjäs in Bengali culture are always sacred events. They are punctuated times for 
worshipping specific deities; times for Hindus to reaffirm their relationship with the 
gods and goddesses who play central roles in their lives, thereby insuring the well-
being (kalyän) of the community in question.6 The term püjä may be derived from the 
Sanskrit verbal root - 'Jpüj’ which literally means “to make pure,” “to cleanse,” or 
“to purify” (Apt e  1985: 628).7 The tentative etymology of the word is certainly one 
aspect of its use in everyday discourse, since there is a cleansing process through 
worship that renews the community. Concerning püjä in Bengal, Ákos ÖSTÖR has
5 Ruidas is the Bengali variant of Ravidas, the untouchable Chamar (camär) holy man of Banaras. 
This is the name by which they refer to themselves as a distinct community. According to the caste’s 
sacred oral tradition, they were told to stop eating beef by an emissary of the guru and adopt his name as 
their caste title in an attempt at upward mobility. However, other people in the village refer to them by 
their caste title of Bayen (bäyen), which was probably attributed to them due to one of their caste occupa-
tions as drummers and musicians (cf. SEN 1971.2: 621). Ruidas are also called muci (cobbler), another 
common term for Chamars. On the background of the caste and their customs, see RlSLEY 1981.1: 175- 
182. On Ravidas’ life and teachings, see SINGH 1981.
6 There has been some controversy over the meaning of the term kalyän. In her study of prestation in 
a Hindi-speaking village in Uttar Pradesh, Rah eja  (1988) translates the term as “auspiciousness.” 
ROBINSON (1980: 172) makes a similar assertion regarding the use of the terms kalyäni and mahgal in 
Bengali. I find this problematic, however, since she also uses a number of other terms such as átbh to 
mean the same thing. For a comment on the semantic problem in Hindi, see KOROM 1990: 549. While it 
is true that a major Bengali thesaurus (MUKHOPÄDHYÄY 1990: 237) lists kalyän as a synonym for subh, I 
feel more comfortable translating the former as “well-being,” since this rendering is more common in 
everyday discourse.
7 The etymology and subsequent meanings of the term püjä have a long history of debate in Indologi- 
cal studies concerning whether or not the term is a Dravidian loanword in Sanskrit (cf. Bail ey  1961; 
THIEME 1957). Some have even suggested a double origin of the term in both languages. But more re-
cently, RADHAKRISHNAN (1965) has shown linguistically that the word must have been borrowed into 
Tamil. Whatever the true origin of the word, the meaning still seems clear, and I follow APTE here for 
conceptual, rather than linguistic, reasons.
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stated that “As an idea puja expresses a relationship between the human and the 
divine, earth and heaven. As an act it signifies the way men approach deities: a sym-
bol of offering as much as an expression of the act of offering itself. A system of 
classification, a logic of categories and a whole philosophy is expressed through the 
meanings of puja symbols” (1982: 21). A philosophy yes, but not one based on 
printed literature. Rather, residents tend to de-emphasize the centrality of textual 
narratives in their tradition, favoring instead orally transmitted stories about Dhar- 
maraj’s first appearance in the village.
Residents speak of the Dharmaraj püjä in functional terms reminiscent of older 
anthropological paradigms of myth and ritual proposed by Malino wski  (1954). 
When asked why the rite is performed most residents would respond in two ways. 
First, people generally say that “we perform the püjä so that we may get happiness” 
('jäte ämrä änanda päi). When pressed on the issue they generally provide a cause and 
effect answer: “We perform* in order to gety.” The püjä therefore has a very prag-
matic dimension. Not much time is spent speculating on the nature of Dharmaraj 
and his worship, yet virtually everyone in Goalpara seems to know something about 
him, for normative claims concerning him are often expressed in very subtle and 
sophisticated ways (KOROM 1997b). In many parts of Bengal, the term gäjan 
(thundering) is used to refer to the event. This word is only used in a very specific 
sense in Goalpara today to refer to one performance that occurs during the rites.8 
Instead of gäjan, the term melä is sometimes used interchangeably with püjä when 
talking about the dharmänusthän (Dharma function or event). But most often melä is 
employed alongside the term püjä to discuss the so-called profane (apabitra) dimen-
sions of the overall event.
Melä means “gathering,” “meeting,” or “assembly” (Sen  1971.2: 778). These 
connotations are embedded in one of the current uses of the word to mean festival.9 
The Dharmaraj püjä is, in other words, a time for celebration and relaxation as well 
as spiritual dedication and reflection. It could also be said that püjä demonstrates the 
willpower of ascetic lack and sacrifice, while melä allows for licentious behavior, 
conspicuous display, and consumption of goods. It is a time, as Roger Abrahams  
states about the language of festivals, “for bringing out, passing around, for giving 
and receiving the most vital emblems of culture in an unashamed display of pro-
duce” (1982: 161).10 In this sense, the Dharmaraj püjä transcends sacred and profane,
8 SEN 1971.1: 218 translates the term literally as “shouting.” He himself, however, traces the word to 
garjana (thunder), the form in which it is used in Goalpara to distinguish it from Shiva’s gäjan. It can also 
be translated as “roar.” In the village, the term is used for the rite known as megh garjan (cloud thunder).
9 Etymologically melä does not imply the same thing as the Latin festum (merriment, revelry), from 
which the word festival derives. But me/äs are indeed considered to be occasions for public displays of joy. 
The qualities and characteristics of meläs fit in well with FALASSl’s structural typology of festivals as rites 
of passage, reversal, conspicuous display, and consumption. See FALASSI1987: 4-5.
10 While Abraha ms  is thinking of festival behavior in a more universalized sense, his ideas tie in 
nicely with Hindu notions of exchange and transaction as analyzed in MARRIOTT 1976:109-142. Also, as 
Bour die u  (1977, 1989) has suggested, the “size” of the public event and calculating the number of 
people in attendance should be factors considered when discussing exchange as a display of wealth, but 
we need not follow his rationale of this to the letter as a “display of symbolic capital.”
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allowing residents an occasion for religious fulfillment in a congenial and celebratory 
environment that takes the performance of religious rites out of the temple precincts 
and into the marketplace. While this dimension of the phenomenon is no less signifi-
cant (cf. KOROM 1999), I wish to focus on the political and spiritual dimension of the 
püjä here, for it provides us useful insights into how caste tensions can be defused 
periodically within a socially sanctioned environment of display.
THE WORSHIP OF DHARMARAJ CONSIDERED 
SPATIO-TEMPORALLY
In medieval times Dharmaraj púja was celebrated primarily in the “core area” 
known as Rarh (rärba), which served as the historical stage for the events narrated in 
the Dhctrmamangal literature upon which the deity’s worship was founded. Dharma 
worship flourished along with this epic literature and may have spread into the con-
tiguous areas of Bihar in the west, Assam in the northeast (Neogi  1951), and as far 
south as northern Orissa. But due to historical exigencies, the decline in the recita-
tion of the literature, and gradual absorption into other modes of worship (especially 
Shaivite), Dharmaraj’s communities of devotees shrank considerably in size, only 
maintaining a strong foothold in the Rarh region. Ethnographic evidence from the 
1950s, however, suggests that the ritual performance was more widespread 
(Bhattac hary ya  1952,1953) even in the modern period. The most popular gäjans 
or püjäs are performed presently in Bankura, Burdwan, and Birbhum, with the high-
est concentration found in the last. They are mostly celebrated during the hot and 
rainy seasons - from Baishakh (baisäkh = April-May) to Shraban (árában = July- 
August) - to ensure the advent of the rains and the subsequent rice harvest, al-
though a few minor püjäs in honor of Dharmaraj are held during the winter months.
The Dharmaraj püjä carries varying degrees of importance from place to place. 
In towns such as Beliatore (Bankura District) the ritual is a huge and elaborate affair 
known throughout Bengal. But in most of the villages celebrating Dharmaraj’s pres-
ence, the ceremony is small-scale, attracting only people from the immediate envi-
rons. It is perhaps unusual that Dharmaraj is the paramount deity in Goalpara, but 
because he is given the title of grämya debatä (village deity) he is believed to be the 
guardian of the village, the protector of devotees, and the persecutor of wrongdoers. 
Everyone in Goalpara unquestioningly states that Dharmaraj is the most important 
deity in the village, and that his püjä is the largest and most important in the annual 
festival cycle.11 There is also no question concerning the efficacy of worshipping 
Dharmaraj: he must be appeased for the individual and collective well-being of the
11 One of the criteria used by people in Goalpara to judge the importance and success of an event is its 
“bigness.” The term bam (big) and phrase khub Ьага (very big) are used to signify the size and stature of 
an event or person. Thus the phrase Ьага lok (big person) is used in Bengali to signify a rich or influential 
man. This idea may be part of a larger “folk aesthetic” in Indo-European notions of performance. On 
“bigness” as a concept in Europe and America, see GOLDSTEIN 1991.
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community, as the personal experience narratives I have discussed elsewhere attest 
(KOROM 1997c).
Although a certain Brahman living in Goalpara performs a daily pijä at the vil-
lage temple housing the Dharma áilá (stone), the focus of community worship is on 
the annual celebration. The annual performance of Dharmaraj’s worship is consid-
ered even greater than the püjä for Durga, which is without doubt the largest and 
most popular religious celebration in West Bengal. Dharmaraj’s centrality is also 
suggested by statements we find in the origin narratives told in the village to account 
for the unique timing of the püjä during the month of Chaitra (caitra = March- 
April). I have discussed these narratives at great length elsewhere (e.g., KOROM 
1996, 1997c), so I do not wish to dwell on them here. It is necessary, however, to 
point out two important orienting factors. First, according to the master narrative of 
the village’s oral tradition, Dharmaraj himself appeared in Goalpara and stated that 
he should be worshipped in the village. In community elder and master storyteller 
S. P. Chattopadhyay’s version of the story, Dharmaraj appears in the guise of a 
Brahman to a herder boy (bägäl) and proclaims that the püjä should occur on the 
pürnimä (full moon) of the month of Chaitra:
nä ami ekhäne äbirbhäb haba. tumi jene räkha je ei grame ei jäygäyämi thäkba 
Well, I will appear here. Keep in mind that I will stay in this spot, in this village.
ämär püjä karbe är gramer bhi tare ämär ek angáa prastar khanda niye giye 
Worship me and take a piece of rock which is a part of me inside the village
gramer bhltare sthapanä karbe sekhäne püjä habe
[and] establish it inside the village. There will be püjä there.
püjätä habe caitra pürnimäy. caitra pürnimäy ei püjä habe
The püjä will be on Chaitra pürnimä. On Chaitra pürnimä this very püjä will hap-
pen.
Chaitra is the last month of the Bengali year, and the worship service is held, as 
the narrative states, on pürnimä, the full moon. In reality, this makes Dharmaraj püjä 
the last ritual of the year, falling just before the beginning of a new cycle. Residents 
of Goalpara see it as the first püjä of the new year because it falls at a time of transi-
tion, foreshadowing all other village observances to follow during the next cycle. In 
this sense, the ritual itself is situated in a liminal zone. The Dharmaraj püjä thus 
suggests both opening and closure. It is simultaneously a time to end the festival 
cycle and a place to begin. It provides, in Jonathan Z. Smith ’s terms, “a place upon 
which to stand,” a punctuated period providing the village’s basic religious orienta-
tion. As Smith  writes, “There is... the possibility of a real beginning, even of achiev-
ing the Beginning, a standpoint from which all things flow, a standpoint from 
which...[one] may gain clear vision” (1978: 289). Such a period of collective action is 
also an appropriate time to reflect on social distinctions and caste hierarchy because
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everyone in the community is obliged to participate economically and ritually in the 
event.
A version of the aetiological narrative told to me by S. P. Mukhop adhyay , the 
püjäh (ritual specialist) who performs daily services at Dharmaraj’s temple, confirms 
that the deity appeared in Goalpara prior to manifesting himself in other locales in 
the district. For this reason, the people of Goalpara view their püjä as the most im-
portant one in the area, the origin of origins. As Mukho padhy ay  states:
ämi motämoü jetä pürbapuruser käch theke sunechi setä hacche ei dharmaräj thäkur 
That which I have roughly heard from the ancestors is that this very Dharmaraj 
lord
räja balläl sener ämal theke haye ásche. ár ki?
has come down from the time of King Ballal Sen.12 And what else?
kathita äche je ei dharmaräj thäkur, mäne bises karé birbhúm distrikerpratham sthän. 
It is said that this very Dharmaraj lord, I mean especially Birbhum District’s first 
place.
mäne ämäder eigoyälpärä theke äbirbhab hayeche. 
I mean from our very Goalpara [he] appeared.
The passage suggests a unique position for Dharmaraj in Goalpara, and succinctly 
voices indigenous concepts about Dharmaraj’s primary role in village worship. In 
other words, it is said that Dharmaraj should be worshipped first and foremost in 
Goalpara. From the point of view of the residents, Goalpara is the center of Dhar-
maraj worship, and his püjä is central to the village’s ritual activity. A line from a 
printed version of Dharmaraj’s origin narrative (Mitra  1972: 127) clarifies the point 
to an even greater extent:
e ahcale jata dharmapüjä hay, sabär äge ämärpüjä cäi
In this region, however many Dharma püjäs there may be, I want mine to be be-
fore them all.
12 Ballal Sen was the second in the line of the Sen kings, who ruled a great portion of Bengal for over 
125 years. He was the son of Bijay Sen, who died in 1158CE, leaving his kingdom in the hands of his son. 
See MAJUMDAR 1943: 216-218. This suggests a very long period of development for the püjä, but it is 
necessary to approach the historical reference with caution, since Ballal Sen, for reasons unknown to me, 
has become a sort of folkloric figure and culture hero in Bengali oral and popular tradition, and many 
features of Bengali culture are often traced back to his reign. It is highly questionable whether any of the 
Dharmamangal literature in its preserved form dates back to the 12th century (cf. SEN 1975: 141), but it is 
quite possible that the worship of the deity predates any of the texts or their rise in popularity. SEN (1975: 
163), however, notes that an obscure early 18th-century text titled Niranjanmangal describes a chance 
encounter between the Dharmamangal’s hero Lausen and Ballal Sen. This fact links the mythic, historic, 
and legendary. On mythological knowledge during Bajlal Sen’s period of rule, see HAZRA 1985.
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Such pivoting of the sacred grounds belief and practice in one distinct location. 
But unlike many larger and more popular sites of kratophany (manifestation of 
power), as Eliade  has termed them (1958), Goalpara’s locus of power does not 
have a written tradition associated with it, as I have been stressing. Instead, the im-
portance of the place, time, and performance of the Dharmaraj püjä is maintained 
and perpetuated by a corpus of oral narratives about his first appearance in the vil-
lage.13 Let us now move on to a consideration of ritual actions taken by the key ac-
tors involved in the püjä to provide more texture for situating my concluding discus-
sion of liminality and communitas.
DOWN BY THE RIVER
Bathing and ritual purification play a major role in Hindu rituals, so they must 
be performed prior to worship. As Lawrence Babb  has stated, “the principal actor or 
actors in ritual must themselves be in a purified condition before approaching the 
deity” (1975: 47). Purity before the deity is a necessary precondition of worship in 
virtually all Hindu rituals, and purification must be performed if a rite is to be effec-
tive. Running waters are the most powerful means of purification because the river 
“both absorbs pollution and carries it away” (ECK 1981: 217). To accomplish this 
task in preparation for the püjä, Subodh Chattopadhyay, a Brahman youth from the 
village, makes arrangements for a bus to transport village residents to a place on the 
banks of the Ganges known as Uddharanpur two days before the püjä begins. 
Uddharanpur is located approximately one hour south of Goalpara by road. The 
scenic spot is a popular local pilgrimage site because the Ganges broadens there into 
a gently flowing river.14
When the bus arrives in Goalpara at 5 a.m. on the 24th of Chaitra (April 7, 
1990), pilgrims of all castes, are waiting to board. The seating arrangement did not 
necessarily break down into caste groups, but it was clear that clusters of caste-based 
friends had formed on the bus both to and from the river. The atmosphere was not, 
strictly speaking, one of sacredness; rather, the trip served the additional purpose of 
allowing people to take a leisurely break from their daily routines. This was espe-
cially true for many of the women on board, who told me that they saw the occasion 
as an opportunity to gossip with their friends and to get away from their husbands,
13 These themes are the subject of other studies authored by me. See KOROM 1996,1997a,b,c, 1999.
14 The Ganges (ganga) rose in prominence some time after the decline of the Indus Valley civilization, 
and eventually became the archetypal sacred waters. Her name means “going” or “motion,” coming from 
the root gam (APTE 1985: 399). Her waters are swift and powerful, for she is áakti, female energy in the 
form of water. Because the Ganges is considered to be a symbol of life and fertility, she incorporates all 
potentialities in her water. She is the fons et origo, the source of all possible existence, for water is without 
form. From this formlessness springs forth all potentiality. In her all seeds are contained. She is literally 
the germ of life. Symbolically, she is that void from which all things come, and to which they must return 
in the end. She gives life in the beginning and accepts death in the end. For more on this line of reason-
ing, see Elia de  1958:188ff. On the mythology of the Ganges, see ECK 1986:166-183.
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while simultaneously accruing punya (merit) by bathing in the Ganges, the mother of 
all rivers.
As soon as we arrived, everyone proceeded to the river. The pilgrims then pro-
ceeded to the bathing ghät (steps) and purchased white sugar candy {mol) to offer 
the river during the bathing rite. As people began purchasing their offerings, they 
gradually segmented into family and caste units, wandering to different spots along 
the river to bathe. One by one, the pilgrims began to move down the steps toward 
the water. Brahmans performed the gáyatá mantra in praise of the sun, while other 
castes simply hailed Ganga, the river goddess. After each person finished their bath, 
they filled pots with water and clay, then washed their clothes in an informal ritual to 
purify clothing as well as body.15 While clothes were drying, the Goalpara group 
moved around the pilgrimage complex, purchasing souvenirs such as religious pic-
tures, chapbooks glorifying the site, and shopped for fried snacks (bhäja) and sweets 
to eat along with the muri (puffed rice) brought from home.
No one ate until after everyone had finished bathing. A scenic, quiet spot a short 
distance from the river was discovered by one of the children, and everyone sat in 
small groups eating large mounds of puffed rice mixed with water, raw chili peppers, 
fried snacks, and sweets. People were quick to point out that one should not overeat 
from this point onward because partial abstinence was one obligatory aspect of the 
observances that must be kept during the púja, especially for those individuals who 
would become the devotees (bhaktyäs) of Dharmaraj. Conversation during the meal 
was mostly about the forthcoming púja. A main concern among the women was the 
amount of housework and cooking they would have to do for guests and relatives. 
Those to become bhaktyäs, were gathered in their own circle, discussing the activities 
that would take place during the püjä and why each had taken on the responsibility 
of becoming a temporary renunciant. The children played after their meal, while the 
remainder of the men talked about all of the fine liquor that would be consumed on 
the last day of the püjä. Conversation went on in this manner for approximately two 
hours, at which time Subodh assembled us for the return journey, and by 1 p.m. we 
were back in the village. The pilgrims returned to their homes to share prasäd with 
family members. Local pilgrimages of this sort are standard practice in north India 
(cf. GOLD 1988), for whenever a great religious event approaches, it is desirable to 
bathe in the Ganges, especially for those people who have made a mänasik (vow) for 
the occasion.
What is it, then, that makes water such a powerful symbol? How is it that seem-
ingly dirty water can bring about an ontological change in the pilgrim? Pilgrims sim-
ply told me that the bath is performed to clean body and mind prior to the püjä. In 
order to enter the realm of the sacred one must be pure. Ritual purification offers 
the pilgrim the opportunity to place himself back into the sacred sphere from 
whence we came by removing the finite and impure activities of existence. Goalpara
15 It is interesting to note that women do not escape housework by going on such journeys, but crea-
tively incorporate activities such as washing into the leisure-time activity itself. This phenomenon is fairly 
widespread in North India. For another example, see KUMAR 1988:83-110, esp. 89.
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residents echoed this by acknowledging that the exigencies of daily life make one 
impure. Therefore, bathing must be a prerequisite to worship. Historians of religions 
have taken this idea one step further by interpreting the act as a primal event. As 
Frederick STRENG has noted: “To purify means to return to a powerless form, the 
original power, which in itself is pure” (1969:92).
The bathing process constitutes a “rite of separation” (van  Genne p 1960) from 
the previous life, a symbolic rebirth into a new and pure condition. It is a total re-
generation during which physical form becomes as boundless as the water into which 
it is immersed. It is a total “reintegration into the formlessness of preexistence,” as 
Mircea Eliade  has stated (1958: 188). By emerging from the water, the pilgrim 
“becomes a part of the act of creation in which form was first expressed” (ibid.). It is 
an act which is repeated over and over again during the course of the püjä. One 
contemplative Brahman pilgrim explained this symbolic interpretation of scholars as 
an act of parturition, describing the Ganges as mi (mother) and bathers as her chil-
dren being born from her waters.
By partaking in the sacred repetition of bathing, the pilgrim experiences the 
whole of time. From the moment one emerges from the water until the moment one 
again performs the act of immersion, the cycle of time is theoretically experienced. 
This cycle can be interpreted on two levels: On the human level immersion is 
equivalent to death, and emergence can be seen as a new birth, for the pilgrim 
comes out of the waters as a child without any sin {päp). On the cosmic level the 
immersion could be interpreted as symbolic of pralay (cf. ZIMMER 1974: 3-22), the 
cataclysmic flood which periodically dissolves existence as we know it into the all-
engulfing primeval ocean of milk, the ksirsägar (milk ocean). The world is once again 
created anew after this cataclysm, continuing the endless cyclical pattern of time. 
Although a phenomenological interpretation such as the one presented above might 
lend meaning to our symbolic understanding of the event as an essential representa-
tion of the cyclical and transient nature of Hindu time reckoning, residents would 
not see it this way. For them, the separation is only temporary and has no conscious 
cosmogonic significance. However, one village resident did confirm that the bath 
washed away sin, while another curious bystander who overheard our conversation 
chimed in, saying that the bath allows one to go home anew (natun kare).
Those who are able to attend the annual outing think of themselves as having 
achieved something special. They say that they feel pabitra (sacred), and are ready to 
begin their participation as audience and performer in the annual rites. But while I 
have discussed briefly the process of bathing as an entry into the pure realm of sa-
cred activity, I do not want to overemphasize the sacred dimension over the profane; 
nor do I wish to separate the two realms completely, for as we have seen, the journey 
also entails a dimension of leisure, a free-time activity. Pilgrims clearly see these two 
forms of activity as inseparable. This is true of the whole püjä phenomenon as well, 
as I have attempted to suggest elsewhere (KOROM 1999).
I have hinted above that the bathing rites are structurally similar to rites of pas-
sage in the sense defined by Arnold VAN Gennep  (1960) and elaborated by Victor 
TURNER (1973, 1974, 1977, 1979). While the entire püjä event could be inter-
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preted as a periodical rite of passage for the whole community, the bhaktyäs, to 
whom I turn below, go through a more specific transformation of status because of 
their special role in the rituals.
BECOMING A DEVOTEE
The bhaktyäs (or bhaktas = devotees) are a special class of people who, for nu-
merous reasons, such as vows (mänasik), money, comradery, happiness (änanda), or 
the general well-being of family and community, volunteer to perform austerities 
during the three days of rituals. The greatest number of devotees by far come from 
the lower castes of the village. Although the total of twenty-seven bhaktyäs are domi-
nated by Lohars, they come from four castes in Goalpara, including two Brahmans, 
three Haris, and two Doms, the latter belonging to the untouchable class. The bhak-
tyäs perform their austerities not for specific reasons, but for the well-being of their 
family. This reason is given by devotees who perform such austerities in other vil-
lages as well. My information closely corresponds to the statement made by R. M. 
Sarkar  concerning devotees from other places in Birbhum. He writes that while 
many bhaktyäs have specific vows in mind when they become devotees “all are cen-
tered round the general well-being of the person or of the families” (1985: 266).
As suggested elsewhere (KOROM 1997b), the püjä is becoming increasingly 
dominated by Lohars as Doms, who originally claimed proprietary rights over the 
püjä, decrease in population in the village. It is very common to hear Lohars refusing 
to accept the claim of the Doms, stating that Dharmaraj has always been their caste 
deity. On one level, everyone says that Dharmaraj is the village deity (grämya debatä), 
but on a more subtle level Lohars tend to construct their own caste identity around 
him. Such caste competition, however, does not impinge attempts to abolish caste 
hierarchy among the devotees during the ritual period. As I demonstrate below, 
however, this is an imagined equality more akin to a Weberian ideal type. In reality, 
distinctions are made, not only during social interaction but also in the context of the 
rituals performed. Egalitarianism is an ideal, but cooperation is the reality for which 
püjä participants strive. The bhaktyäs’ entry into special ritual status begins with the 
bathing journey, but this is a phenomenon in which anyone can take part, so another 
rite takes place after returning from the river to mark the beginning phase of their 
social transformation.
After returning to Goalpara, the bhaktyäs go to the youth club in Pashcimpara, 
where they are met by the village barber (näpit). He performs bhakta kämäna 
(devotee shaving) by giving each of the devotees a haircut, trimming their mus-
taches, and shaving their armpits. The act of tonsure parallels the Brahmanical 
ирапауапа (sacred thread investiture) ceremony which marks a Brahman’s entry into 
twice-born status (ROBINSON 1980: 188). Similarly, the kämäna ceremony begins the 
process of ritual transformation experienced by the bhaktyäs. This act is seen as 
paradigmatic of being a bhaktyä, since all of their subsequent performances during 
the püjä are described as kämäna. Shaving body hairs is therefore understood to be
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an act of personal sacrifice, like all other forms of austerity (tapas) to be practiced 
during the event. For his labors, the barber receives the shank of a sacrificed goat 
on the last evening of the púja. However, the barber did not shave everyone present. 
While he was shaving devotees of the Lohar caste, the Haris shaved each other. 
The two devotees of the untouchable Dom caste did not even show up, since they 
shaved themselves at home. This was true of the Brahman bhaktyäs as well, 
who performed the rite in their own courtyards. Thus, both “highest” and “lowest” 
castes were forced by traditions of relative purity and pollution to do it for them-
selves. It is interesting to note that during my first conversation with veteran bhaktyä 
Mukti Hajra, he explained to me that everyone is equal (sabäi sámán) during the 
pm.
Recorded statements like Mukti’s pronouncement, have led some anthropolo-
gists to use Turne r ’s paradigm of communitas without verifying the accounts. Al-
though subalterns (mostly low caste) like Mukti assert communitas even while con-
tinuing to observe difference, there is a distinct sense that the ideal can never be 
actualized, as I would like to suggest in my conclusion. The low-caste yearning for 
equality is quite different from Brahmanical interpretations, which tend to reinforce 
notions of hegemonic power over other members of the village. What results is an 
emic ambiguity concerning exactly what sort of transformation occurs during the 
performance of rituals. Brahmans and other high castes maintain that Lohars and 
Doms never achieve a status change, while low-caste devotees insist that they do 
indeed elevate their position, albeit temporarily. This sort of reasoning should sug-
gest a need to use Turn er ’s musings with selective caution. While his notion does 
retain a measure of analytical value and might be useful in some contexts, it does not 
have the universal applicability he originally intended. However, the rites of passage 
model is a useful one for understanding the temporary transformation undergone by 
devotees prior to and during the rituals. I shall return to this notion in the conclud-
ing section, but for the moment, let us return to the devotees.
While the shaving ritual is in progress, the bhaktyäs sit on the ground joking, 
smoking, and talking about all of the events to take place over the next few days. 
Much conversation focused on the large quantities of alcohol that would be con-
sumed on the last day of the püjä. The consumption of alcohol is not seen as a pro-
fane act, since it is said that Dharmaraj himself is very fond of drinking. Antinómián 
religious behavior such as intoxication is justified by linking the act of consuming 
alcohol with an activity in which the deity also engages. By identifying the deity with 
such human vices, as one resident put it, humanizes Dharmaraj, making him more 
accessible and comprehensible to the average worshipper. Drinking thus becomes a 
sacred activity that combines service (seba) for the deity with the pleasure of intoxi-
cation (neáá). As chief drummer Sushil Das remarked one evening when he was 
playing the special püjä rhythms on his dhäkiot me:
megh garjan ses hayegeche. tár pare e bäre äpnär bäfirä khäoyä-deoyä.. 
Megh garjan has finished. After that, this time, your musicians eat...
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khäoyä-deoyä halte... mad [häsya]! bába mad khete khub bhälabäse 
to say eat...liquor [laughter]! Bäbäloves to drink liquor.
ämär svajätianek okhäne jän. kintu..alpa alpa madkhäy.
Many of my caste brethren go there. But...they drink quite a bit of liquor.
taté neéá kintu pachanda haye jay.
So there is pleasure in that intoxication.
ebahg ämär svajäti khubi änanda läbh karé matan ei mad tad khäoyärpar.
And it is like my caste brethren attain very much happiness after drinking this 
liquor.
e bär bhäräl larä e bär äpnär bhäräl larä haye gela e bar bhaktyärä änanda karche 
Now bhäräl larä. Now your bhäräl larä has happened. Now the bhaktyäs make 
merry.
bäßräo änanda karche e bär oi äge du din je nächanä bäjanä bejeche,
The musicians also make merry. Now those last two days that dance music has 
been played,
sei bäjanä bäjiye bhaktyärä änanda karla bäßräo änanda karla
after playing that very music the bhaktyäs mádé merry, the musicians also made
merry.
e bär änanda karte karte gräm beriye haye jäy.
Now, while making merry they go around the village.
Drinking serves an important function during the püjä as a mechanism for attain-
ing happiness {änanda). As Sushil suggests, villagers justify drinking by stating that 
bäbä (i.e., Dharmaraj) himself loves alcohol. The logic here is that if it is good 
enough for the deity, it must be good enough for mortals. Drinking makes Dhar-
maraj happy, and if he is happy, so too is everyone else. The practice is not random, 
however, for bhaktyäs must maintain a strict diet through partial fasting (upabäs) 
once they have been shaved.
After the shaving is completed, the bhaktyäs bathe once again in one of the many 
village ponds and return to their own homes to partake in their last full meal before 
the püjä. This last big meal, called bhärer bhät (filling rice), simple as it is, is a time 
for contemplating the seriousness of the forthcoming events, while simultaneously 
anticipating the joviality and transgressive behavior of the ritual’s final day. The 
meal is another indicator of the bhaktyäs’ transition to a new status, for because they 
eat only boiled food without raw chilies, they see it as a common form of personal 
sacrifice. Later in the evening, after the meal, the bhaktyäs gather together and 
“talk” {kathä bala). The talk is informal and takes many forms. Ajit Lohar, the kol
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deyä£ (head devotee) reviews the sequence of events for the next three days with his 
fellow bhaktyäs. This is a sort of male bonding ritual that consolidates their special 
relationship as people set off from other participants. It also adds to an idealized 
sense of communitas imagined by the devotees during the event.16 On the next even-
ing, the püjä will begin at the Dharmaraj temple, when they receive their uttatiya, 
symbolic of the paitya (sacred thread) worn by Brahmans.
INTENSE WORSHIP AND FESTIVITY
The first day of the püjä occurs two days before the full moon (25th of Chaitra, 
1396 [April 8, 1990]). In the morning, everyone in Goalpara is busy making last mi-
nute preparations for the forthcoming events. The bhaktyäs have already begun their 
partial fast and taken their first sacred bath of the day. As preparations are com-
mencing in Goalpara, the dhäJds in Shiyan are tuning their drums. Back home in 
Goalpara, people can be seen cleaning their houses, washing down the dirt paths in 
front of their homes for the purpose of purifying the route Dharmaraj will take when 
he is led in procession through and around the village. Children are playing 
throughout the area, especially near the Dharmaraj temple. In their play, they take 
on the roles performed by ritual specialists and musicians, and it is fairly common to 
see children pretending to beat imaginary dhäks and dhok, or acting out the various 
rituals performed by the devotees.17 Essentially, this day is still one of normal activ-
ity, for everyone is completing their work schedules to allow for ample free time 
during the püjä.
By sunset all of the preparations are complete, and people begin congregating at 
the temple. With the exception of the Brahman bhaktyäs, who already wear their own 
sacred threads {paitya), the remaining low-caste devotees sit to the sides of the tem-
ple winding together the seven strands of white cotton thread to serve as their ut- 
tatiyas after their consecration. The eventual donning of the uttahya marks the sec-
ond major event that signals the advent of changed status, but it also denotes an 
expression of subordination on the part of the devotee in the powerful presence of 
Dharmaraj. This practice is most likely related to the subjugation of a prisoner, as in 
the proverb (De  1392 B.S.: 65):
galäygämcha diye fene änä
Placing a cloth around [one’s] neck [in order to] drag
16 The devotees’ status is even more demarcated on the next evening when they say that they enter into 
dharma gotra (Dharma’s lineage) as a result of receiving the uttariya, as discussed below. On changing 
from one’s normal lineage to raise status during the púja elsewhere in West Bengal, see also Sarkar  
1986: 252; 297-298, footnote 7.
17 Acting as bhaktyäs is a kind of informal training for future devotees, for I often overheard bhaktyäs 
saying that they too learned about the ritual activities during their childhood play. Indeed, the rituals are 
indigenously labeled as khelä (play). See KOROM 1999.
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While they wind their threads, they wait for a new figure, the műi deyää to arrive 
from the nearby village of Taltor.18 When he arrives, he sits with the bhaktyas, locat-
ing himself closest to the door of the temple. By nine at night, Shibu dä, the visiting 
Brahman ritual specialist who officiates the occasion, has arrived from his own vil-
lage. The one large and two small bäneivais, symbols of Dharmaraj’s fecundity and 
power, have already been placed in full view on the veranda earlier in the day. Shibu 
dä is sitting cross-legged to the left of the objects as he signals his willingness to be-
gin. The stage is now set for the transformation of the bhaktyas,. The threads, now 
completely woven, are put into the custody of the priest by Ajit Lohar, the kol deyää 
mentioned earher. A few more drummers are present, but the majority of dhäkis 
from Shiyan will not arrive until the next morning.
The drummers pick up the pace of playing the püjäs opening beat to let every-
one in the vicinity know that the event is about to begin. This is the first of many 
special rhythms or laus (waves) played at different times during the next three days. 
Most people do not know the rhythms by their special names, since they are referred 
to loosely even by the drummers. But everyone knows the significance of each beat, 
and will recognize that the specific ritual performance associated with each rhythm is 
about to begin. As the opening rhythm sounds, Bipad Mandal, the organizing 
committee’s secretary, ceremonially brings out a “folk-book”19 wrapped in an auspi-
cious red cloth and hands it to Shibu dä, who will read out the dharma bandanä 
(Dharma invocation) to the devotees. A heightened pace of drumming signals to 
everyone in the area that the püjä has started. When the audience is completely si-
lent, Shibu dä begins reciting the text’s couplets in a lilting, chant-like fashion. After 
the completion of each couplet, the bhaktyäs, who are now standing and holding 
their threads (uttaúya dharan) with folded hands in front of the seated chanter, re-
peat the lines while gently swaying from side to side in a manner said to represent 
the movements of Dharmaraj’s horse.20 When they have completed each repetition, 
the drummers begin to play very loudly as the bhaktyäs lead the audience members in 
näm dák, the name call for Dharmaraj. The call is a drone-like shout in the form of
18 The term műi means “root,” and it is generally accepted that deyää comes from deb (deity) + aiigsa 
(portion). For a discussion of the latter’s etymology, see BHATTACHARYYA 1975 : 627-628. This title is 
given to the main bhaktyä who performs many of the key rituals on behalf of the entire group. In Goal-
para, the position of műi deyää is hereditary, and was held in the early 1990s by Sudho Krishna Ghosh, an 
octogenarian member of the Sadgop (milkman) caste. Hierarchically, he is given more spiritual power 
than the kol deyää, who, is nonetheless functionally significant in his role as foreman of the devotees.
19 On the characteristics, classification, and cultural importance of folk-books, see YASSIF 1987: 20-27. 
The book is actually an inexpensive primary school notebook containing some hand-written texts used at 
various times during the ritual. The text was written out in 1956 by the late Gaurishankar Mukhopadhyay, 
grandfather of Harishankar, currently the village’s daily püjäri. No one knows whether he wrote the text 
from memory or copied it from a book. The text does include some scribal errors, but it would be difficult 
to presume that this is due to a faulty memory or an inaccurate text. This is the only copy, and is securely 
kept in the secretary’s chest along with the püjä ledgers.
20 As village resident Shashthi Sutradhar stated to me, “Dharmaraj rides on a horse.” This is a com-
mon belief in Birbhum District, where it is understood that Dharmaraj will often mount a white horse in 
the dead of night and ride through wooded areas and fields. See KOROM 1997b: 166-167.
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an exclamatory interjection similar to the English “oh.” It rises in volume until the 
local name of Dharmaraj (Baharadihi) is vocalized, during which it slowly decreases 
until completed with the final expletive go (e.g. oooooh bäbä baharädihi dharmaraj 
gooooo). As ROBINSON has pointed out, the nám dák punctuates the püjä “in such a 
way as to articulate transitions from phase to phase” (1980: 114). In this sense, the 
name call is a framing device, demarcating smaller sets of ritual acts within the 
overall püjä event. The name call is also significant as a communal performance 
because it is the only real ritual action in which audience members fully participate 
as performers. One must recall here that the level of noise generated is one indicator 
of a successful püjä. Therefore, every voice is considered to be essential in arousing 
Dharmaraj. The call is repeated after every couplet to coerce him into the assem-
bly.21 Through this verbal act, the deity not only “comes,” but “becomes” to the re-
sponse of the calls (ROBINSON 1980: 71).
When the bandana is completed there is a great deal of drumming and general 
noise-making to arouse Dharmaraj’s interest, cajoling him to join the assembly for 
the duration of the püjä. Drumming continues for approximately twenty minutes, 
while the kol deyää orders the bhaktyas to prostrate themselves in front of the tem-
ple. Once all of the devotees are on the ground, a lit incense burner is passed over 
their bodies several times by the kol deyää to the accompaniment of nám dák. This is 
done to purify the devotees before they proceed through the village and rice paddies 
to the muktadhar pukur (pond of liberation). Elsewhere in Bengal this act is inter-
preted as a suicide threat (hatya) to reinsure Dharmaraj’s active participation 
(Robin son  1980: 154-155). The act is reminiscent of Ranjabati’s (the textual hero 
Lausen’s mother) impalement and Lausen’s self-dismemberment in the Dharma- 
mangal literary tradition to secure boons from the deity. In Goalpara, however, the 
kol deyää describes it simply as an act of obeisance. It is approximately 8 p.m. by 
now, and the crowd has grown considerably. Most audience members do not follow 
the procession to the pond; instead, they linger at the temple or return home for 
their dinner, while the devotees proceed to the pond.
The bhaktyás must complete their metamorphosis to a higher status before they 
can perform the feats of austerity (tapas) during the remainder of the püjä. To com-
plete their change they must perform a procession through the village to the muk-
tadhar pukur, transporting the large báneévar and an earthen pot called pürkalä (full 
pot) along with them. The objects are placed on the heads of two bhaktyás to the 
accompaniment of a new drumbeat played solely for this purpose. As the procession 
begins winding its way westward along the main path of the village, another rhythm, 
distinctively called cälän (moving), is played. During the procession incense burners, 
which are waved in the faces of the swaying bearers of the bänesvar and pot, are be-
21 On the notion of coercing the deity, see ROBINSON 1980: 110. See also MlTRA 1972: 95, 170 and 
DAS 1983: 682. There is also textual evidence for another reason this practice is performed in Gha- 
naram’s version of the Dharmamangal. See CAKRABARTTl 1962:
mariyä nä mare tuyä näm jape je
He who chants your name, does not die [even] in death.
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ing carried by other devotees. The procession occasionally halts for a few minutes so 
that people in the houses along the main path may come out and receive the darsan 
(auspicious sight) of the parade. The rhythm played during these halts is called nä- 
canä bäjnä (dance beat). The halts are said to bring luck and well-being to the indi-
vidual who does the seeing. At these arresting moments the ritual objects are given 
to other bearers, so that each bhaktyä has the opportunity to carry one of the items 
before reaching the pond. After each halt, the drummers revert to the cälän beat and 
continue to move along the road, eventually proceeding into the open paddy fields. 
Drumming continues as the pace of movement quickens. Finally, the group arrives at 
the pond, where the drumming abruptly ceases when the devotees form a circle 
around Shibu dä on the eastern banks of the pond.
Once everyone is silent and seated, candles are lit and the ghat bandana (bathing 
step invocation) is recited. The text is once again read line by line from the folk-book 
by the officiating priest Each section is repeated three times by the kol deyää, after 
which näm dak is performed by all present. Then the bänesvar is bathed in the pond 
by the műi deyää to the accompaniment of a nameless rhythm played only during 
bathing rituals. At the same time, the pot is filled with pond water - now considered 
the holy bath water of the bänesvar- and some flowers. Robi nso n  (1980: 89) inter-
prets the pürkalá and bänesvar as female and male sexual symbols respectively, their 
conjunction resulting in a union to confer fecundity on barren women. The addition 
of the flowers to the pot is, in her estimation, an act of impregnation (ibid.: 90). Her 
perspective is adumbrated in the second and third verse of the ghät bandanä with the 
mention of an unidentified water maiden and the sanctification of the water, which 
subsequently becomes the “waters of life” (ibid.: 91). The interpretation is viable 
insofar as fertility is seen as one of the goals of the püjä. However, as conceived in 
Goalpara, fertility is only one form of mangal (auspiciousness) conferred during the 
püjä.
The püjä cannot, therefore, be reduced to one common goal because the reasons 
given by devotees for performing sebä (service) imply that there is another more 
general and overriding communal concern for blessings (äsirbäd) and happiness 
(änanda). My data is also corroborated by Sarka r ’s (1985: 253-263) information 
from another cluster of villages in Birbhum, where the frequency of fertility men-
tioned as a motivation for performing sebä is quite low. Nevertheless, curing barren-
ness must certainly be seen as one aspect of the püjäs efficacy.
More drummers have arrived from Shiyan by now, including Ratan Das, the new 
leader of the dhäkis. They join the others as the devotees gather around Shibu dä, 
the bathed bänesvar, and the pürkalä. The uttariyas are also placed around the spikes 
of the bänesvar, while a banana and green mango are impaled on the plank’s metal 
spikes.
A betal leaf coated with sindur (vermilion paste) and white sweetmeats to be 
distributed as prasäd (food offerings) are also placed on the plank. Shibu dä then 
smears sindur taken from the bänesvar on the foreheads of all the bhaktyäs. At this 
point, he begins to recite from memory verses in hybrid Sanskrit from the Dhar- 
mapuja Bidhan, a liturgical manual consulted for correct procedure (BANDO-
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PÄDHYÄY 1323B.S.: 29).22 After reciting a brief passage in homage to Dharmaraj, he 
distributes the uttahyas to the low-caste bhaktyäs. Interpretations differ, but most 
people are of the opinion that the bhaktyäs enter into the deity’s gotra (lineage) at 
this point, taking on the temporary status of Brahmans. Robinson ’s data from 
Baruipur, West Bengal reconfirms this point of view, since her field consultants are 
of the opinion that the devotees and the bäneävar become “affiliated in the mingling 
of the waters” (1980: 85), thereby causing the change in lineage. The water of the 
рйгкаМ therefore represents this mingled water which passes from the ritual items to 
the ritual actors in due process. As a result, all become Dharmaraj’s agents.23 After 
this, the guru mantra, the 101 names of gods, is recited as the full pot is passed 
around to each devotee as an act of communal solidarity. The recitation is accom-
panied by puspänjali (flower throwing) for the baneávar, and the consecrated flowers 
are then placed in the pot. After the consecration, the water in the pot is considered 
to bepabitra (holy). Thereafter it is referred to as áüntijal (peace water). It is said to 
undergo a transubstantiation during the preceding ritual because it becomes a me-
tonymic replacement (cf. Tambiah  1968) for Ganges water. The sänti jal is then 
used in all of the púja rituals for general anointing.
The rituals of the first day seem to suggest that the bhaktyäs acquire an elevated 
status far superior to their everyday caste positions in the local hierarchy. Although I 
cannot go into specific detail here (but cf. KOROM 1999) to describe all of the ritual 
activities performed after the above initiatory events, there is one ritual performance 
in particular that is pertinent to my concluding discussion of ritual status and caste 
politics. The performance, known as mukta snän (bath of liberation), occurs on the 
evening of the second day. The mukta snän ritual begins at approximately 10 p.m., 
after hours of secular performances by brass bands in the vicinity of the temple pre-
cincts. How the ritual begins is relevant to my earlier statements concerning the 
hypothetical equality of all bhaktyäs during the püjä and Victor Turner ’s related 
notions of liminality and communitas.
When the time comes to bring the deity out of the temple, the koJ deyä£ organ-
izes all of the low-caste bhaktyäs in a straight line leading from the door of the tem-
ple to the end of the courtyard. Then he orders the bhaktyäs to kneel down with their 
heads touching the ground, so that a human bridge is created. When this is done, 
Shanti Bhattacarjya, one of the Brahman bhaktyäs, walks barefoot over the backs of
22 The text is in Bengali script, and is, according to my research associate, Abhijit Ghosh, “very bad 
Sanskrit.” Shibu da himself does not know the meaning of what he is reciting, but says that he learned it 
from a copy of the text housed in the university library at Shantiniketan. He insists that the appropriate 
passages must be recited, but need not be understood. His option of giving priority to the utterance over 
the meaning of the text lends credence to STAAL’s (1979) argument concerning the “meaninglessness of 
ritual.” The Dhannamangal of Ghanaram also mentions the liturgical use of this text. See Cakraba RTt I 
1962: 90.
23 A minority of others believe that the transformation of status occurs during the reciting of the 
Dharma bandana. It is interesting to point out here that the Brahman bhaktyäs insist the lower caste 
devotees do not become Brahmans through this process, but only like Brahmans. Their opinion recapitu-
lates hierarchy, rather than abolishing it or relieving it. Another more visible method of demonstrating 
Brahmanical dominance occurs the following night, and will be discussed in greater detail below.
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the other devotees into the temple to the sound of drumming. There are two indige-
nous interpretations of this act. When asked later, Shanti said that it must be done to 
show that Brahmans are superior to other castes. But the other devotees all claimed 
that this must be done because the Brahman’s feet cannot touch the ground when he 
is entering the temple to bring bäbä (father) out. Thus, from the Brahmanical point 
of view, the ceremony reinforces caste hierarchy, whereas low-caste people see it as 
a sacred act, and still claim that equality reigns during the püjä. While Turner ’s  
point of view concerning the “betwixt and between” status of the people going 
through a rite of passage is well-taken, it is clear from this act that communitas is 
present in only a qualified sense, as suggested in the last section. Rites such as these 
do not eliminate caste restrictions, but simply alleviate some of the tension gener-
ated by social rules, allowing low-caste members of the community a more open 
forum for negotiations concerning rank and village affairs that may (or may not) be 
implemented when the village returns to mundane time. Because Brahmans never 
view the devotees as equal to themselves during the püjä, we must understand the 
notion of communitas as a potential ideal that is never fully actualized and subject to 
multiple interpretations dependent upon the various social positions of the actors 
involved. However, this observation raises the question of what, if any, usefulness 
the concept has in the study of caste-based society in India. In the final section, I 
should like to review the theories of TURNER and Arnold VAN Genne p, his original 
source of inspiration, to draw some conclusions on the data presented in this essay.
ASPECTS OF LIMINALITY
In this concluding section I wish to explore two prominent theories used in the 
anthropological study of rituals that have been found to be useful for understanding 
the ways in which an individual undergoes status change during special periods of 
time. The first is that hypothesized by the folklorist Arnold VAN GENNEP in his 1909 
book Rites of Passage, and the second, being liminality, a more recent theory con-
structed by the anthropologist Victor TURNER.24 TURNER was obviously influenced 
by VAN Genne p’s book, but built upon it by adding new ideas to the rites de passage 
paradigm. Both van  Genne p and Turn er  attempt to make their theories univer-
sally applicable. As many critics have pointed out (e.g., Bynum  1984; Sallnow  
1981), their conclusions may be somewhat broad and difficult to substantiate as uni-
versale, but their ideas do coincide with my data concerning the devotees of Dhar- 
maraj in Goalpara to a certain extent. I do not intend to draw universal conclusions 
here, but rather attempt to show how the particular series of rites described above 
fits into the paradigm.
241 am aware of Lincol n ’s  (1991) critique of va n  Gen ne p’s  spatial model of ritualized social passage 
based on his analysis of women’s initiation rites in which he suggests enclosure-metamorphosis- 
emergence as an alternative to separation-liminality-reincorporation. Lincol n ’s  alternative may apply to 
his own gender-specific data, but for the purposes of my discussion here, I focus solely on VAN Gen ne p’s  
work as a precursor to Turner’s concerns discussed immediately thereafter.
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Van  Genne p starts off with the basic premise that life consists of a series of pas-
sages or transitions. Life, according to him, is a “succession of stages with similar 
ends and beginnings” (1960: 3). Each of these transitions is marked by “ceremonies 
whose essential purpose is to enable the individual to pass from one defined position 
to another” (ibid.). He then goes on to subdivide each of these passages into three 
distinct phases. The first phase involves rites of separation (preliminal rites) in which 
the individual or group is ceremonially set apart from the rest of society. Phase two 
consists of rites of transition (liminal rites). This is the middle phase of the process 
during which the participant, having been removed from his or her everyday sur-
roundings, becomes part of a smaller group for the duration of the transition. It is a 
new and awesome experience for the initiate in this paradoxical position. First of all, 
he has been removed from the larger body of society and becomes a part of a smaller 
one, itself set off from society. It is during this phase that many of the changes affect-
ing the liminars occur. Finally, after the completion of the rituals, the third phase, 
known as rites of reincorporation (post-liminal rites), are put into play. The rite of 
reincorporation is the period when the liminal group is taken back into society to be 
part of the integrated whole once again (van  Gennep  1960: 11). This, then, is the 
threefold model proposed by VAN GENNEP at the turn of the century. I should point 
out here that rites of passage are usually construed as permanent changes, such as 
Hindu life cycle rites (samskäras). However, the transformation undertaken by 
devotees during the Dharmaraj püjä is a temporary and recurrent one, lasting only as 
long as the annual püjä itself, which in the Hindu idiom would be classified as a nitya 
(recurrent) ritual. It is important to keep this distinction in mind when attempting to 
understand the passage of the bhaktyäs from this point of view, for a basic distinction 
is made between permanent changes and temporary ones in the Hindu context. 
However, a “rite of passage,” as explicated by van  Genne p, can refer to any spatial 
or temporal process, whether permanent or recurrent, during which a change of 
status, behavior or character takes place.
Turner  took up where van  Gennep  left off, but focused most of his writing on 
the liminal phase of the temporal or spatial passage. He further added the notion of 
symbolic death at the beginning of the rites, followed by rebirth during the final 
phase when the initiate is reincorporated into the larger body of society (Turner  
1974: 273). Liminality is a transient phase. It is a state in which the liminar is, as 
Turner  says, “betwixt and between all fixed points of classification” (1974: 232). It 
is an ambiguous state in the sense that its attributes are not like those of the past or 
the future. In liminality, the ritual initiate is passing through a symbolic domain in 
which many of the rules and regulations of his previous existence no longer apply, 
for he is in a strangely familiar, yet new world. This new world is a kind of “eternal 
now.” The initiate is in transit between two cognitive realms. In the case of the 
Dharmaraj püjä, the bhaktyäs are intermediaries between the community and the 
deity, so their centrality as ritual conduits of the deity’s power places them in this 
paradoxical position of marginal centrality.
I have mentioned earlier that the Dharmaraj püjä occurs during the month of 
Chaitra, a time when other auspicious rituals such as marriage are not performed in
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Goalpara. Although this is generally true in other Bengali communities where 
Dharmaraj püjä is not scheduled during the month of Chaitra, it is said that the cur-
tailment of many other rituals during this special time makes the efficacy of the püjä 
for Dharmaraj all the more potent. Certainly there is some concept of time during 
liminality, for, as we noticed, the punctual timing of ritual events is one of the major 
duties of the kol deyaá. But there is a distinct sense of the abatement of profane time 
in which “the structural view of time is not applicable” (Turner  1974: 238) because 
the normal duties of life are postponed for the bhaktyäs during the days of the püjä 
event. The ritual specialists participate in a sort of eternal present, a mythical time 
during which an archetypal action of the god or ancestor is being repeated in the 
course of performing rites and significant actions (Elia de  1958: 390ff). In the case 
of the Dharmaraj püjä, such significant actions are based on the village’s master nar-
rative mentioned earlier and, as I have suggested elsewhere (KOROM 2000), implic-
itly replicate some of the events that occur in the Dharmamangal literature. This 
paradoxical time which is no time becomes a threshold which makes a direct experi-
ence with the sacred more accessible. The experience may be in the form of posses-
sion, an externally visible phenomenon which is rare in the Goalpara context, or an 
inward, intuitive one of which only the person undergoing the experience is acutely 
aware.
In liminality a clearer sense of understanding mankind’s relationship to the cos-
mos is possible, for the initiate learns of his own culture through the narratives, sym-
bols, and rituals involved in the püjä. The meaning of life is experienced directly 
by the bhaktyäs through the symbols visualized and the actions performed during 
the event. Sometimes this knowledge is transmitted to younger bhaktyäs by their 
senior counterparts through discourses orated during the early morning baths of 
purification each day during the püjä. New knowledge, unlike that learned during 
the preliminal phase, is gained through narrative acts. It is a deeper knowledge, 
a direct experiential awareness embodied by the individual, a point often made by 
new bhaktyäs, performing the austerities for the first time. For veteran devotees, the 
process is one of progressive insight as well as a renewed altered state. Newly ac-
quired knowledge leads to the acquisition of power. It is a spiritual power available 
only to those who partake in the austere practices that must be performed during the 
püjä.
The new power is then applied by the bhaktyä after his reincorporation into his 
society at the end of the rites. However, in the case of Goalpara, the acquisition and 
use of power gained during the rituals is very subtle. In one sense, the older ideals of 
the society are preserved by the symbols, for they are a storehouse of that which can 
be conceptualized and known. Through the rituals performed and the stories heard 
in liminality, one becomes more aware of one’s own traditions. In his ritualized al-
ienation, the bhaktyä is able to see things more clearly, for he becomes increasingly 
sensitive to the cultural issues he may take for granted during his day-to-day life. In 
this way, the traditional values of Hindu society in its localized context are preserved 
and passed on. As A. K. RAMANUJAN has stated: “Alienation from the immediate 
environment can mean continuity with an older ideal” (1973: 38). There is another
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slight paradox in this Statement in the sense that the liminal phase offers a radical 
new knowing, but adheres to an older traditional ideal. Thus it seems that the püjä 
is, in part, a maintaining force in Goalpara society in that it preserves through repli-
cation the prescriptions given by the deity in the village’s master narrative. At the 
same time, however, it can also reinforce social rules and the strictures of caste hier-
archy.
Even those rules which are carried over into the liminal phase from the earlier 
one are relaxed by not being overemphasized during ritual practices performed 
while being a liminar. The best example of this is caste interaction during the püjä. 
As we have seen, caste restrictions are not completely abolished during the bathing 
and shaving rituals, but notions of purity and pollution are certainly attenuated in 
many ways. The structural divisions of caste cannot be eliminated totally, but they 
can be confronted in various creative ways during the period of license provided to 
the devotees during their liminal period. The ideals of the püjä support an anti- 
hierarchical stance on the ideological level, at least from the low-caste perspective. 
Yet they do not do away with them completely, for the problem of social stratifica-
tion cannot be eliminated altogether through ritual practice. After all, the liminal 
phase will eventually end, and afterward everyone will once again have to work from 
within their own respective caste identities to negotiate the existential reality of 
status on an ongoing and daily basis. Thus, caste distinctions are not abolished, but 
rather negotiated by stressing cooperation, even though the Brahmanical interpreta-
tion reifies hierarchy within the context of the mukta snän performance. During the 
liminal phase of the rituals, a stronger sense of community consciousness emerges. 
It is what TURNER calls communitas. Communitas stresses reciprocity and comrade-
ship during this phase. And through this mutual help, a stronger sense of ritual 
equality based on a recognition of identity differentiation emerges. The Goalpara 
scenario suggests that counter-status is subtly shaded and highly nuanced even dur-
ing ritual functions, for it is understood in varying degrees by participants. In other 
words, perception of status change depends on the original status of the interpreter
or actor.
The visual emblems displayed by the bhaktyäs during the rituals are also rela-
tively the same, regardless of rank or status. With the exception of the paitya, the 
sacred thread worn by Brahman bhaktyäs,, every devotee wears the same clothes and 
abstains from the same foods, thereby forging common experiences. As the bhaktyäs 
perform the shaving rites and pass into the liminal phase on the first evening of the 
püjä, they theoretically surrender all their possessions. Differences in property and 
wealth mark the status of the individual, which in turn makes communitas a difficult 
principle to which one must adhere. But during the rituals, all material possessions 
are left behind in the home. This symbolic act implies the bhaktyäs’ willingness to 
become part of a cooperative whole. By removing possessions, enhanced opportunity 
for communitas is nurtured.
During the rituals performed as part of the püjä egalitarianism is also present to 
a certain degree. The performance of rites for Dharmaraj’s various manifestations 
amounts to potential symbolic reduction because there is a tendency of movement
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from diversity to unity. This movement is quite considerable if one takes into ac-
count the fact that low castes and Dalits (untouchables) are also included within the 
scope of this reduction. Quoting Babb  again: “Worldly hierarchy is therefore mo-
mentarily eclipsed - reduced to relative insignificance by the overwhelming inclu-
siveness of the hierarchical opposition between the mundane and the divine” (1975: 
60). In this way, the group of bhaktyäs can achieve a sense of unity. But because the 
sacred/profane realms of life contain blurred boundaries in Goalpara, the dichotomy 
is not always as clear-cut as Babb  suggests. Quite often the potential for unity is not 
actualized due to divisive factors that emerge during the event. For example, 
drunken brawls on the last day of the püjä have been known to occur among devo-
tees, leading to factionalism within the ritual group.
The annual initiation of the bhaktyäs is clearly a rite of passage. Their bathing 
and shaving rituals on the day before the püjä begins mark their separation from the 
society of which they are a part, even though they are never isolated physically from 
their community in the sense of a pilgrim. The movement leads them into a liminal 
phase on the first evening of the püjä when they receive their uttaiiyas. This is the 
second stage of their passage, and they remain in this position until the conclusion of 
the rites three days later, when they unceremoniously toss their threads in the muk- 
tadhar pukur to signal both the end of the annual püjä and their return to normalcy. 
Upon throwing their uttaiiyas into the pond on the day after the püjä is over, they 
become reincorporated into the larger whole.
There is also another level on which this passage can be interpreted. Rather 
than to see it as one passage, the püjä can be seen as a successive series of transi-
tional movements, ultimately ending up with a final reincorporation. Each day in 
and of itself is a rite of passage, for daily bathing and new austerities are performed 
in a highly ritualized manner to punctuate the experiences of devotees within even 
smaller frames of reference. What I am arguing is that we notice shorter rites of 
passage within the larger all-engulfing one. If, as I have suggested above, each bath 
is a symbolic death and rebirth, and each rite of separation also a rite of death end-
ing with rebirth during the third phase, then the püjä must be seen as smaller succes-
sive passages within the larger whole. I realize that this line of reasoning could be 
argued ad infinitum (e.g., each moment being a symbolic death and rebirth), but it is 
not my aim to carry the analogy beyond this point. I do feel, however, that under-
standing rites of passage in specific ethnographic contexts offers a potential to em-
ploy more fully the ideas of VAN GENNEP and TURNER, for the rites of Dharmaraj 
do suggest a sort of infinite regress into continuously smaller units of time, invoking 
a sense of time within time more reminiscent of Turner ’s phrase “betwixt and be-
tween” than his notion of “time out of time.” Time consciousness, then, in relation 
to ritual sequences could be seen from this point of view, which allows for the punc-
tuation of smaller units of time within a larger temporal framework because bhaktyäs 
share a sense of durée, as Henri Bergson once called it, an “inner time” which does 
not correspond to clock time.
This form of durée belongs to an experience of time which is shared by the 
devotees as a result of constant interaction generated by activities performed during
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the ritual sequence.25 Moreover, time as a distinctively shared experience among the 
devotees lends more credence to the idea that these temporary renunciants are limi- 
nars. It is while playing the role of liminar that the bhaktyä is most empowered to 
speak on equal terms to his Brahman counterparts, potentially creating the circum-
stances to negotiate more egalitarian action among and within the village’s local 
caste system.
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POLITICS AND FOLK RELIGION IN THE PERIOD
OF TRANSITION*
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Abstract: The several decades of totalitarian aggressive atheism have drastically changed the 
folk religion. In new political conditions this legacy remains very important, because it develops 
some typical features of contemporary religion-politics interrelation. The Orthodox religion became 
more and more linked with the political discourse. What was forbidden for a long period of decades 
out of a sudden became first official and then even obligatory, like atheism before. Some facts taken 
from Russian mass media of the nineties illustrate how the legacy of the Soviet past and the new 
popular version of Orthodoxy correlate with the politics.
Keywords: folk religion, politics, communist, Russia, the USSR, atheism, paganism, stereo-
types, Orthodoxy, mass media
In this paper I will discuss some examples of relationship between folk religion 
and politics before, during and after the era of perestroika. I will also concentrate on 
the significance of the traditions and stereotypes in these links, exploring mainly the 
cases from my own experience.
It would be reasonable to start long before the crucial 1985, but it is impossible 
to do so in such a short talk. I will allow myself only to remember the fact that after 
long years of persecution of the church and the priesthood in Russia the very con-
cepts of folk religion and politics acquired a very specific nature. Even more specific 
and diverse was their correlation, particularly if we take into account such basic op-
positions as geographic (central-rural parts), ideological (strong-weak oppression of 
the officials), confessional (Christianity-Islam), sociological (communist bureauc- 
racy-“ordinary” people), national (Russia-other nationality), etc. The role of the 
individual (e.g. family background, personality) is very important in every single 
occasion. We can speak of the rural regions as the places where in spite of the op-
pression of the local authorities and the lack of churches, religion, folk beliefs and 
folk faith were saved and honoured in form of as we call it folk Orthodoxy. It was 
characteristic not only for Russians, but for other nationalities living in the USSR as 
well. I will give only one example from my field work of this period. In 1984 I took 
my students to the former Moldavian Republic where Moldavians, Ukrainians, Rus-
sians and Bulgarians lived in big villages. I chose one village, I have been to be-
* This research is supported by Russian Foundation of Fundamental Studies (RFFI), grant “Speech 
and Mental Stereotypes in Synchrony and Diachrony” 97-06-80015.
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fore. I knew that the head of the local committee was my colleague, who had gradu-
ated from the Moscow State University, German Department. When I explained to 
him the purpose of our expedition (to put down archaic traditions, folklore, etc.) he 
said briefly: “We fight against all this, you won’t find anything interesting”. Embar-
rassed, I still started to interrogate the people and the very first woman (the village 
teacher) I met told me that they still performed many rituals (like asking for rain and 
many others) in spite of the ban of the local communists. The pagan rite for rain was 
frequently followed by a service, a prayer to which the whole village came. “At least 
several drops of rain would fall from the sky”, - concluded the teacher. Then I dis-
covered that folk beliefs were a still crucial part of life not only for the elder, but for 
the younger people as well, who knew the rituals in detail and took part in some of 
them. My colleague definitely knew it, being born and brought up in this village. But 
he also knew that the cultural anthropologists or ethnolinguists at that time were not 
allowed to study folk religion. The scholars could not use the terminology, even in 
such innocent subjects, like, let’s say folk calendar customs. The books on these top-
ics were very rare as well. (I will add in brackets that several years later this field of 
research became very popular and the demand for the books on religion and folk 
traditions is huge).
Hypocrisy was part of the Soviet politician’s attitude to religion and folk tradi-
tion. It is not surprising that there were (and still are) so many narratives describing 
how in a miraculous way atheists started to believe in God (Orthodox Miracles 1993, 
pp. 27-29). To be objective I have to add that there are many stories telling how 
communists started to believe in magic (like the evil eye, the importance of pagan 
commemorating acts, etc.). The canonical and folk Orthodoxy coexist even in depict-
ing the images of politicians (Big Communists, as they are called in the popular 
tradition, which was a synonym for atheists, the believers in communist principles 
and ideals).
The several decades of totalitarian aggressive atheism have failed to destroy the 
folk religion. The attempts of the politicians (leaders and ideologists of the Com-
munist Party) to create a new religion with new “saints”, rituals, values and formulae 
were succesful only for a limited period of time. By the 80s the ideological clichés 
and the new-speak in the nonofficial discourse were only used in numerous anec-
dotes and jokes.
We are still not able to adequately analyse the role of perestroika in all the 
spheres of the life of an individual and the country as a whole. The consequences of 
reconstruction embrace everything - not only the ideology, philosophy, politics and 
economics, art, but also the language, mentality, religiosity of the people, their eve-
ryday habits, etc. What is primary and what is secondary here, it is difficult to judge, 
but, I think, the most interesting thing is the interrelation of different areas during 
this period of time. Such an example is the correspondence between politics and 
religion. It is a very topical problem now, and not only for Russia, but for other for-
mer socialist states as well.
When perestroika started and freedom and democracy step by step penetrated 
into the society, one could observe several tendences which are still relevant. Infor-
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mation for a scholar was and still is everywhere - in the everyday life, in mass media, 
in church. The aggressive atheism of the officials gave place to religiosity. First of all, 
the revival of the Orthodox Church meant some material changes: opening of closed 
churches and monasteries,1 reconstruction of the ruined churches, creating of Sun-
day schools for children and adults, publishing of the Bible and all sorts of religious 
literature, etc. The Orthodox religion became more and more linked with the politi-
cal activity. What was forbidden for a long period of decades out of a sudden be-
came first official and then even obligatory. I will never forget my impression when I 
first saw the slogan in front of the Kremlin: “Merry Christmas” instead of “Happy 
New Year, Comrades”. It was a shock, which was doubled probably by the fact that 
in Russian “Merry Christmas” sounds not secularly, it definitely has some Church 
Slavonic characteristics (as you know the language of the Church is Slavonic, not 
modern Russian).
The physical presence of the religious practice at the end of the 80s became 
more and more perceptible. It could be compared to the Christianization of Russia 
by the scale. It was followed and supported by other tendencies in the society, for 
example the changing image of the mass media. Mass media which are tightly con-
nected with politics (both official and nonofficial) started to grow in their quantity 
and to differentiate in their content. Thus the language of the newspapers, maga-
zines, radio and TV diametrically changed. To speak on the faith, religiosity, on 
observance of celebrations, to quote the Bible became very popular. Sort of a fash-
ion was and still is to use quotations from the Holy Gospels in the advertisements - a 
new item for the post-Soviet reality. Again aiming at creating an image as attractive 
as possible, the copy-writers transform the sentences making the sense opposite 
(‘The last will be the first” - the slogan of a Russian bank, that disappeared after 
August, 17, 1998). The TV translation of liturgy, Easter service with comments be-
came ritual. The politicians also changed diametrically. Many of them gave up their 
atheism and became ‘pure’ Christians. At the very beginning when Eltsin, Luzhkov 
and others just started to appear in these programs holding a candle in the church 
some people very wittily called them “candlesticks”.
A very indicative part of the image of the modem Russian politicians is their re-
ligious practice. They do not think that the society cannot forget very quickly the 
atheistic position of the Communist Party, that the quotations from the New Testa-
ment in their speech cannot be perceived adequately. G. Zjuganov, General Secre-
tary of the Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, uses 
Christian allusions all the time, once in his interview on the radio he said: “Not the 
people, nor the God would understand and forgive us, if we take part in this dem-
onstration”. This tendency lasts, here is a very recent example: on the 14 of Septem-
ber (1999) after the explosions in Moscow the vice-president Gustov said on the 
radio: “I lighted a candle in the church, praying that Putin’s Cabinet would not be
1 Compare some statistics: the number of monasteries and nunneries has changed during the last 
decade from 18 to 400, the priesthood has doubled (Hie ro mon k  Ilari on  1999).
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disbanded”.2 To be a Christian is not only fashionable now (how it was at the begin-
ning of perestroika), it is a must for officials. That’s why all the public activity of our 
government (especially opening of the new banks, exhibitions, etc.) is often accom-
panied by the acts of consecration. Again, hypocrisy is part of the official policy in 
modern Russia, comparable to the behavior of their Soviet counterparts I described 
at the beginning.
These facts are on the surface. But there is something more specific which ties 
the politics with the religion and constitutes the political programmes of different 
parties. It is not characteristic for all the parties. A universal development of the 
concept of religion in the political discourse is the tight liaison of the religion with 
the ideas of nationalism and patriotism. Every day one can hear or read something 
which illustrates some of the points of this interrelation, especially now, when the 
election campaign started. Most interesting and objective facts can be found in the 
special publications of the “Russkaja Mysl” and “Nezavisimaja Gazeta”.
I will give only two extreme examples, taken from the recent articles in mass 
media. Russia of the future in the programs of Christian political parties is the Saint 
Russia, based on the East Orthodoxy. The mixture of ideas allows the commentators 
to talk of “political racist neopaganism’ (VERKHOVSKY 1999). One can find an in-
teresting confirmation of this idea in the program of the “Orthodox Russian Na-
tional Council”: “Orthodoxy is the state religion of Russia. Together with this a seri-
ous research of the Pre-Christian culture and religion should be undertaken. Thus 
we unite the spiritual values, which in the whole make national folk religion... The 
Orthodox religion is cluttered up, 60% of it is not Russian, it is alien” (Op. cit.).
Another example - rather funny now - the information on the sect, the members 
of which venerate Lenin as God and think of him as the second part of Christ. They 
call themselves Communist Party “Unity Vsevolod” - Union of all confessions, na-
tionalities and peoples, or cosmic communists. The specific feature of this movement 
is the idea of Lenin as Christ, but calling the two figures “two bases of the Universe, 
incarnations of principles ‘in’ and ‘jan’” undoubtedly shows that this mixture of reli-
gious terms and concepts is very typical for the state of mind of the people for at 
least the last fifteen years (SEROV 1999).
These two publications give a critical point of view, while hundreds of smaller 
newspapers, church booklets, etc. sometimes contain such ideas which have nothing 
to do with the Orthodox religion but pretend that their position is the only right one. 
This mixture of Christian faith and so to say pagan beliefs, superstitions is quite evi-
dent in our parishes nowadays. The neofits who come to the church bring over their 
spiritual background which is far away from the Orthodox faith. I have to recall that 
when the freedom came to Russia, the search for new spiritual values was so inten-
sive, and the lack of knowledge was so huge, that ordinary people reading thousands 
of publications just got lost. The old Russian folk beliefs (fortune-tellers, rituals,
2 This sentence could be understood only in the context of the political history of last year, when three 
Prime Ministers were dismissed one after another.
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everyday recommendations, demonology, weathercasts, etc.) often falsified could 
have been combined with whatever one can just think of - old Greek or Roman 
beliefs, Hindu rituals, esoteric ideas, etc. I remember once my elderly relative - 
woman in her 60s (baptized and active Russian Orthodox) called me and said that 
on that day at midnight I should fumigate the corners of the rooms. I said, Why? She 
answered that on the TV there was a program and that on this night people should 
venerate the Goddess Vesta, who helps the families to live in peace. Another thing 
from the spiritual practice of this woman is her visit to a healer who said to her that 
she was ill because of her sins. A priest was present there working together with the 
healer, so he read some prayers. “The healer told me I should come once more for a 
prayer and I will forget about my illness” - the lady went on. (The healer was an 
extrasense, as the Russians call them, they are very popular in Russia, there is a sort 
of cult of them and their abilities).
The mixture of magic and miracle can be observed everywhere. I was present in 
the church once when christening took place. I heard the lady who was preparing to 
become Godmother of a three-years old child saying: “Look at this man! (Actually, it 
was the priest.) He is holding light in his hands, some magic will happen now”3. We 
can find the same potpourri of words, symbols and beliefs in numerous advertise-
ments of the new Russian magicians, healers, fortune-tellers. Some of the texts are 
incredible, like “Peter Smirnov. Apostle and Bishop of Black Magic. Your beloved 
will crawl to you on his knees. 500% guarantee”. The cross, candles are in the neigh-
bourhood of the cup with the medical symbol (the snake), the emblem of the Rus-
sian Monarchy (the two-headed eagle) and so on and so forth.
Light was partly shed on this problem in some recent publications (Buzin  1999). 
The problem of contamination of Orthodoxy and paganism with sometimes dominat-
ing of the latter in the behavior of the parishioners is very serious now. One of the 
reasons for such a situation is that the parishioners do not understand the service, 
partly because of the archaic language, partly because people do not want to under-
stand it. Before, when the books, even the Bible were not available they would have 
an excuse. Then the folk notions would cover the Orthodox ideas.4 The border be-
tween folk tradition and Orthodox faith is very difficult to mark (and this is a long 
dispute already). Now the problem is of a different kind: the books and TV and ra-
dio programs on religion are so numerous, that to find the right way becomes diffi-
cult again. The books sold in the parishes which are supposed to educate the newly 
baptized contain information which is far away from the real faith - it is a sort of
3 In Russian the words for ‘magic’ and ‘miraculous’ are partly synonyms. They come from different 
discourse, the first one definitely is associated with folk tales and folklore in the whole, it cannot be used 
in the canonic texts about the saints, etc. If it is used, it has negative sense, opposed to Christianity as 
paganism.
4 We know this fact very well from our field research from the beginning of the 80s. The situation has 
not changed by now. Folk Orthodoxy has its own concepts, it can be very firm in some ideas, which com-
pare or even mix personages, like Eve and Mary, Christ and Nicholas, etc. (it is universal, compare the 
Bulgarian data - Badal anov a  1999). The folk tradition ascribes some relations to the saints, as, for 
example, I was told by an old Russian Christian lady, bom in a village close to Moscow, that Saint Nicho-
las is the Father of Jesus Christ, and many other examples in our archives.
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Strange superstitions of modern times. For example a series of books “Give me an 
advice, Father” discusses whether a priest is allowed to drive a car or to go to the 
swimming pool. The answer is “No”. Another open public discussion which started 
in July-August in Russia, was whether it was sinful to have a dog as a pet at home.
To my surprise I found the practising Orthodoxy and folk faith in their total 
mixture at a very sad occasion, when my aunt died. We called an agent, who showed 
himself well-prepared from the point of view of the church and folk traditions. He 
was absolutely sure in his statements (by the way the lack of hesitating, the typical 
Soviet desire to teach everybody and everywhere still exist in our country). He knew 
everything in detail. He even could foresee his clients’ political preferences. When 
choosing the colour of the coffin (there were two colours - blue and red) he tried to 
help us asking “what are the colours for the newly-born boys and girls?” When he 
saw that we were still choosing, he said: “Don’t hesitate, red does not mean the 
Communist in the funeral. The communists do not bury their comrades in red cof-
fins”. This case deserves a special analysis, due to the unbelievable chaotic contami-
nation of the information taken from different world religions, but I will stop here 
because of lack of time.
To conclude I want to underline that in spite of the new conditions in our coun-
try (democracy, revival of the church, change of values, etc.) some stereotypes still 
work. The mass religion is very pragmatic, almost pagan in its essence, it does not 
presuppose Faith, or obedience, or observance of the Commandments. The mixture 
of concepts is widely used by the politicians who aim in their programs at exploiting 
the Orthodoxy in the form it exists in modern Russia.
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Abstract: As Head of State, Head of the Church of England and the living symbol of the na-
tional unity, the British monarch embodies the political and religious institutions of the United 
Kingdom. Consequently, the ceremonies and events involving the monarch and the royal family 
constitute a central part of the civil religion of the nation-state. One potential problematic of the of-
ficial discourse on national identity made available through the civil religion is the principle of he-
redity, which by elevating the status of royal birth simultaneously lowers the status of the mass of the 
people. However, this positioning does not cause widespread offence, or provoke general hostility 
towards the institution of monarchy. On the contrary, as the public mourning for Diana Princess of 
Wales demonstrated, royalty has the power to mobilise the sentiments and actions of millions. 
Drawing upon fieldwork conducted over the past ten years, my concern in this paper is with unoffi-
cial public participation in royal ceremonials and events as folk version of the official civil religion. 
More particularly I am concerned with the ways in which these folk participants negotiate their so-
cially inferior positioning by switching between the competing discourses of democratic egalitarian-
ism and of heredity status, discourses which the concept of constitutional monarchy seeks to com-
bine.
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One summer evening in 1990 I stood squashed amongst a mass of people, con-
tained behind crush barriers, outside a cinema in London’s West End. This crowd 
was not waiting to see the film, they were there to see the Duchess of York arrive for 
a charity performance. When the Duchess stepped from her highly polished, chauf-
feur driven car, she paused briefly to wave and smile at the crowd and the press 
photographers, before advancing towards the official reception party lined up to 
greet her. As she swept past my section of the cheering crowd, resplendent in even-
ing gown and diamond tiara, I overheard an American onlooker complain to his 
companion, ‘Now I really feel like a peasant!’ From the tone of self-disgust in his 
voice it was evident that his use of the term ‘peasant’ was not being used to denote 
an identity as a farmer, but carried the connotation of being a person of very low 
social standing.
Like all public appearances by members of the British royal family this one by 
the Duchess, was surrounded by ceremonial which, as DOUGLAS (1970) reminds us, 
serves to highlight social and cultural boundaries. It also dramatises who people are 
and who others will take them to be (BUCKLEY-KENNEY 1995). For the American 
this was an event in which the boundaries of social superiority and inferiority be-
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tween royalty and the crowd were being highlighted and, in the dramatisation of the 
high status of the Duchess, he read a corresponding statement of his own social in-
feriority. However, although a similar response was potentially open to everyone else 
present, the rest of the cheering and excited crowd gave no indication that they 
shared his interpretation. On the contrary, everyone else appeared to be experienc-
ing the event in a positive, rather than a negative way.
This situation provides, in microcosm, an example of a paradox of British socio-
political culture. A particularly vivid summary of this is given by Edgar Wilso n  
(1989) who describes the British constitutional monarchy as being:
‘incompatible with democracy in principle, yet in practice, 
amidst widespread and caste based inequality, injustice and real 
deprivation, the ancient symbol and instrument of hereditary privi-
lege remains unchallenged. It apparently even grows in popularity’ 
(Wilson  1989:1).
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WlLSON’s critical stance also demonstrates that negative interpretations of the mon-
archy are not restricted to Americans, but are also made by Britons (see for example, 
Hitchens  1990; Wilson  1989: Nairn  1988; Hamilton  1975; Birnbaum  1955). 
However, like that of the American in the crowd, they represent a minority voice in 
British culture. This situation is not without political significance. Should negative 
interpretations become the dominant voice, then the continuance of Britain as a 
constitutional monarchy would be threatened. However, so long as positive interpre-
tations predominate, the constitutional monarchy is likely to remain unchallenged 
and secure. It is this situation which provides the wider context of my interest in how 
people construct and maintain a positive interpretation of the relationship between 
themselves and the monarchy.
THE REAL ROYALISTS
So far I have been using the term ‘people’, but in a large scale society, this is too 
undifferentiated and nebulous a term. My focus of interest is, therefore, a small 
group of men and women who make a particularly active engagement with the mon-
archy. I became aware of existence of the ‘real royalists’, as they style themselves, in 
the autumn of 1988. During 1989 and 1990 I carried out fieldwork with them, as 
research for a doctoral thesis in social anthropology (ROWBOTTOM 1994) and for an 
accompanying ethnographic film (HENLEY-ROWBOTTOM 1993). A second period of 
intensive fieldwork followed in 1996 and 1997 for a television documentary 
(HENLEY-ROWBOTTOM 1997) and most recently during the mourning for Diana 
Princess of Wales (ROWBOTTOM 1999). In between these periods of extensive field-
work I have maintained contact with key informants. It is ethnographic data from 
this ten year involvement with the royalists that informs this paper.
All the royalists I worked closely with collected pictures, books, ceramics, or 
other memorabilia of the royal family, examples of which were displayed in their 
homes. Some of these collections are small, but others have grown large enough to 
fill a whole room in their homes. Many of these objects are commercially produced 
ceramic commemoratives of coronations, royal weddings, births, anniversaries and 
other events in the life cycle of the Queen and her family. Other items, such as scrap 
books, photograph albums and framed individual photographs, they create for them-
selves. Some of the most highly prized images of the royal family are the photo-
graphs the royalists themselves have taken when attending royal visits.
The term ‘royal visit’ refers to the official visits made by members of the royal 
family to hundreds of civic, commercial and charitable organisations throughout 
Britain, during the course of any one year. At the end of each of these visits the royal 
visitor usually walks over to the crowd and exchanges greetings and brief pleasant-
ries with some of the onlookers. This stage of the proceedings, which has become 
known as the ‘walkabout’, is central to the royalists’ activities as it provides the 
chance of a face to face meeting with the royal family. In pursuit of this goal, they 
regularly undertake long journeys, stand for hours in all weathers, finally drawing
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the royal personage towards them through the offering of a gift. These gifts usually 
consist of flowers, or a photograph of the intended recipient that the royalist took at 
a previous meeting. Although the walkabout is part of the official proceedings, the 
royalists presence and presentations have no official status, they are entirely self 
motivated. Indeed, it is the willingness to regularly and voluntarily undertake the 
discomforts of travelling and waiting in the vagaries of the British climate in order to 
meet with the royal family that constitutes their definition of a ‘real royalist’.
The total number of people sharing the royalists’ practices is difficult to calcu-
late with any certainty. As they are not part of any formal organisation there is no 
register of interested people. Consequently, their association with each other is 
based on the friendship networks that develop out of encounters with like minded 
people at royal visits. As attendance at these events necessitates travelling to another 
part of the country, few of the royalists live in the same geographical area. Friend-
ships have to be maintained through letters and telephone calls in which information 
is exchanged and arrangements made to meet together at future events. Through my 
key informant’s friendship network I met around sixty royalists who regularly travel 
the country. In addition there were others that I encountered only once, as well as 
people I never met, but heard about in the royalists’ stories, or who featured in me-
dia reports. It is, therefore, likely that there are other networks in existence, as well 
as other individuals who do not wish to join up with others. I also regularly encoun-
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tered people who went to all the royal events which took place in or around their 
home town or city, but who were not able or willing to travel long distances.
The core of my key informant’s friendship network, that is the people with 
whom he and I most frequently travelled, consisted of fourteen people; nine women 
and five men. Three of the women were over sixty, one was a teenager, and the re-
maining five were middle aged. Of the five men, one was a teenager and another was 
in his late twenties; the other three were middle aged. Both the men and the women 
were almost exclusively drawn from an upper working, or lower middle class back-
ground, without the practices they had developed none would normally expect to 
have close encounters with royalty.
Although only a small group in relation to the total population of Britain and 
even as a proportion of the crowds at royal events, the royalists are representative of 
more widespread sentiments. They often remark that ‘many people feel like we do’ 
and this is evident, not only amongst the crowds that turn out for royal visits, but in 
descriptions of public responses to large scale ceremonials such as, the Coronation 
(Shils -Young  1953); the Investiture of Prince Charles as Prince of Wales 
(BLUMLER et al 1971); the Queen’s Silver Jubilee (ZEIGLER 1977). The most recent 
large scale expression of public sentiment was the public mourning for Diana Prin-
cess of Wales (Walt ers  1999). As I have pointed out elsewhere (Rowbot tom  
1998), the main gifts offered to the Princess in death, such as flowers and her own 
image, reflected the main items the royalists offered to her in life and, indeed, con-
tinue to offer to living members of the royal family.
In discussing the form taken by the public mourning folklorists have readily rec-
ognised this as the expression of a folk or vernacular religiosity. This is especially 
apparent in the construction of shrines (Bowman  1999; Chan dl er  1999) at sacred 
places, and ‘an obvious parallel between the journey to Kensington Palace Gates 
[the home of the Princess] and the purposive journey to some sacred place which is 
the core of most pilgrimage’ (CHANDLER 1999:150). Following from this my present 
point is that the folk religiosity, readily recognised in the mourning for Diana, is also 
to be found in the regular practices of the royalists. They too undertake pilgrimages 
to sites temporarily made sacred by the presence of royalty to offer flowers and im-
ages and, in the display of images and other iconic objects in their homes, they can 
be said to construct domestic shrines.
Religiosity is also apparent in the experience of transcendency described in the 
royalists’ accounts of how their meetings with royalty put them in contact with their 
membership of the nation. In the words of one man:
‘Unless you have experienced it you can’t understand it. When-
ever I stand in front of the Queen, or any member of the royal fam-
ily I am always filled with such feelings of loyalty and pride in being 
British.’
When, as often happened, he made this, or a very similar statement, other royalists 
present readily agreed that this was also their experience. In describing the meaning
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their activities held for them, they invariably made an association with ‘Britain’, or 
with ‘being British’. The most common kind of statements being, ‘The monarchy 
means Britain’, or ‘Basically, its about being British’. A strong belief in the royal 
family as the symbol and guarantee of national identity is evident in a statement 
made by a female royalist: ‘If we lose the royal family what is there? We are just an 
island with some people on it with nothing to say we are British’.
The equation of the monarchy with the nation is not an idiosyncratic one. Mi-
chael Billi g , in an analysis of conversations about the royal family recorded in sixty 
three English households, also found expressions of belief in the monarchy as the 
guarantee of national identity (Billi g  1992: 33-35). Nor is the equation an insignifi-
cant one. What the royalists express as a personal experience echoes the official 
ideology of the civil religion of the British nation-state.
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CIVIL RELIGION
Civil religion is a sociological concept which has been defined as ‘any set of be-
liefs and rituals, related to the past, present, and/or future of a people (‘nation’) 
which are understood in some transcendental fashion’ (HAMMOND 1976: 171). The 
concept describes practices intended to generate loyalty to a particular nation state 
(BOCOCK 1985:) in ways which transcend the boundaries of difference within a na-
tion. Transcendence, integration and loyalty are said to be generated through public 
ceremonies designed to promote national unity and social cohesion (BELLAH 1967). 
Civil religion is religious, therefore, in the Durkheimian sense of putting people in 
touch with the transcendent, through an engagement with symbols and ceremonies. 
It is also religious in the anthropological sense of providing ‘a plausible myth of the 
ordering of existence’ (Clarke -Hoover  1997:17). The usefulness of the concept 
lies in its proposal of a religious form through which national unity can be expressed 
in a heterogeneous and highly differentiated society, as well as in the way ‘it pro-
poses a basis for the relationship of the individual to the larger modern society’ 
(Mc Guire  1992: 184). In Britain, where the sovereign is constitutionally the Head 
of State, Supreme Governor of the Church of England and the living symbol of na-
tional unity (COI 1983: 10; MORRAH 1958: 41), the monarchy retains its traditional 
role as the constitutional, religious and symbolic centre of the nation. The public 
appearances of members of the royal family, which are surrounded by ceremonial, 
form a central component in the official civil religion of the British nation state 
(Bocock  1985; Thompson  1986).
The claim that any religion, civil or orthodox, can provide a ‘sacred canopy’ 
(BERGER 1967) able to unite and pull together all the complex elements of a mod-
em society has been subject to criticism. Although I accept the view that a totally 
integrative function is ‘not wholly convincing’ (TURNER 1991: 58) as the data from 
my fieldwork demonstrates, the concept cannot be easily dismissed. Therefore, 
rather than making exaggerated claims for an integrative function I suggest a more 
productive approach lies in viewing civil religion as a discourse on national unity. As 
this is put into the public domain through the agencies of the state it constitutes an 
official discourse in which the monarchy represents the symbol and the guarantee of 
British identity. It follows from this that, rather than debating whether or not civil 
religion can have an integrating effect, it is more useful to explore how people inter-
pret and use the discourse.
The political significance of this is indicated by Christopher HITCHENS, when he 
observes that the monarchy as the guarantee of national identity, ‘can only be true 
for a person who sincerely believes it’ (HITCHENS 1990: 34). However, having made 
this observation Hitchen s then treats ‘sincere believers’ as unworthy of serious 
consideration, preferring instead to present an alternative republican discourse. The 
problem with this kind of approach is that it fails to take account of the importance 
of ‘sincere belief’ in the processes that reproduce the ‘truth’ of the civil religion. It 
also misses the creativity essential to this process for, as already noted, the discourse 
of the civil religion is a paradoxical one. Although the Queen may provide ‘the living
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symbol of national unity’ (COI 1983:10), her position at the apex of society is prem-
ised on hierarchy, making the monarchy a means of categorising people into the 
social superior and the socially inferior (Hayden  1987: 5). The monarchy is, there-
fore, simultaneously the symbol of unity and difference. This contradiction has to be 
negotiated by those, such as the royalists, who recognise themselves as being ad-
dressed by the discourse of the civil religion and who willingly consent to their 
‘subjection’. The rest of this paper is concerned with the way the royalists construct a 
positive view of the monarchy, the nation and themselves.
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FRAMING EVENTS
Acknowledgement of difference provides the royalists with the knowledge that 
guides their actions as royalists, setting limitations on what is and what is not possi-
ble. Difference provides them with their primary interpretive framework (Goffman  
1974). Within this framing it is axiomatic that the royal family represent the nation 
by virtue of their traditional status at the apex of the social hierarchy. Acknow-
ledgement of difference is evident in the royalists’ description of the Queen and the 
royal family as being worthy of ‘respect and admiration’ because they are ‘very spe-
cial people’. This contrasts with their descriptions of themselves as ‘ordinary people’ 
who are privileged to be able to speak to the royal family.
However, in elaborating on the meaning of their own activities the royalists 
switch to the frame of unity. As one of the women expressed it: ‘by going on royal 
visits, being interested in royalty and talking about them I believe I am helping to 
actually keep the monarchy in the country ...’. The importance of this, as previously 
noted, is the royalists’ belief that without the monarchy we would have nothing to say 
that we are British. In this way they rhetorically construct themselves as engaged in a 
joint enterprise with the royal family to maintain the monarchy and, therefore, Brit-
ish national identity. This sense of partnership is also evident in the way the royalists 
view their activities. They describe themselves as ‘a familiar face in the crowd’, with 
whom the royals can ‘hold a friendly conversation’, or ‘share a laugh and a joke’ 
about previous encounters. In this way the royalists see themselves as lightening the 
burden of greeting hundreds of strangers who are often ‘overawed and tongue tied’ 
in the unfamiliar presence of royalty.
Like all rhetorical framing the royalists understanding of their relationship to 
the royal family, the monarchy and the nation, is heavily dependent upon the co-
operation of others. In securing the cooperation of the royal family the royalists 
utilise the conventions of gift giving. Offering a gift invokes a cultural obligation to 
receive (MAUSS 1990, 1950) and acceptance apparently confirms the donor’s idea of 
the recipient and of the relationship that exists between them (SCHWARTZ 1967). 
Conversely, the rejection of a gift denies the donors’ view themselves, the recipient 
and their relationship. The co-operation of the royal family in accepting gifts is, 
therefore, essential to the maintenance of the royalists’ beliefs. The following inci-
dent provides an example of a meaning-threatening situation and of the way one 
royalist constructed a transformative account of what had taken place.
A TRANSFORMATIVE ACCOUNT
One very cold afternoon I stood with five royalists around the midpoint of a 
walkabout by Diana Princess of Wales. Three of the royalists, two middle aged 
women and one young man, had brought flowers, the other two, a young woman and 
an older man, had each brought framed photographs of the Princess which they had 
taken at a previous meeting. The young woman, who for the sake of clarity I shall
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Fig. 5. Part of a crowd gathering to see the Queen. Photograph Anne Rowbottom
refer to as ‘Beth’, was a little worried that, because her photograph was very slightly 
out of focus, it might not be of sufficiently good quality to offer to the Princess. The 
others, after admiring the gilt frame in which the photograph had been placed, as-
sured Beth that the Princess would like it. The walkabout began and proceeded ac-
cording to everyone’s expectations with the Princess shaking hands with as many 
people as possible and accepting gifts in her usual friendly way. However, when she 




Is that for me?’
I’m afraid so.
Afraid so?, Why don’t you ... Will you keep that? I’ve 
got plenty of pictures 
Are you sure?.
Yes. You keep that.
Is it that bad?
It isn’t that bad, No. I can look in the mirror if I want 
pictures. You keep that.
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The Princess then moved on, accepting the gifts of others in the same way as before. 
Because the Princess was always held to be a warm, friendly and caring person, her 
response to Beth appeared as unusual as it was unexpected. Consequently, the royal-
ists were presented with a meaning-threatening experience that required an expla-
nation which would restore their fundamental assumptions. Immediately after the 
Princess had left one of the women, who for the sake of clarity I shall refer to as 
‘Patricia’, took me aside and began to develop an explanation of what had taken 
place.
Patricia began by stating in a puzzled and somewhat shocked tone:
The Princess didn’t take Beth’s photograph did she? Poor Beth, 
she must be very upset. I don’t understand why it wasn’t accepted, 
do you? Perhaps she didn’t take it because it was in a frame and she 
thought it was too expensive for her to accept from a member of 
the public.
In explaining the difficulty that might arise over an expensive gift, Patricia stressed 
the necessity of remembering that, however friendly the Princess might be, she was 
a member of the royal family. As royalty do not usually accept gifts from or-
dinary members of the public, it was a privilege to be able to offer them things 
and, therefore, in order to keep this privilege it was important not to seem presump-
tuous. Inexpensive items, such as flowers, or unframed photographs were appropri-
ate, but more expensive items were not, as these might seem to presume too close a 
relationship. Patricia’s worry was that if some royalists were perceived as being 
overly familiar with the royal family, then they might stop accepting gifts from the 
public altogether. On reflection, however, Patricia realised that as the Princess had 
accepted a framed photograph from another royalist, her explanation required 
modification.
Patricia then tried to construct an explanation around Beth’s physical appear-
ance, noting that, as Beth was not very tall and of slight build, people regularly 
thought her to be much younger than her nineteen years. Therefore, she reasoned, it 
was perfectly possible that the Princess had also assumed Beth to be much younger 
than her actual age. If so, perhaps the Princess thought that, unlike the adults 
around her, Beth could not afford to give a photograph in a frame and this was why 
she asked Beth to keep it. It was also possible, Patricia continued, that if the Princess 
had thought of Beth as a child, she may have thought she was merely being shown 
something that a young girl valued and not realised it was being offered as a gift. 
Perhaps Beth had held it out in too hesitant a manner, suggesting to the Princess 
that it was being shown, rather than offered to her. In support of this, Patricia rea-
soned that the Princess could have understood Beth’s, ‘I’m afraid so’, in response to 
her own question, ‘Is that for me?’, to mean that the photograph was something with 
which Beth was reluctant to part, rather than intended as an apology for offering a 
slightly blurred picture.
That the Princess’ refusal had been kindly meant was evident, Patricia thought,
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by her pleasant and friendly manner towards Beth. The photograph may not have 
been accepted, but there had been nothing nasty in the way it was refused. It was 
as if the Princess, knowing that Beth valued the picture, had wanted her to keep it 
for herself. Consequently, Patricia reasoned, Beth should not be embarrassed or 
distressed by what had taken place. Finally she went on to suggest that the photo-
graph had now acquired something extra special as, in saying to Beth ‘you keep that’, 
it was as if the photograph had become a gift from the Princess to Beth herself. Pat-
ricia was pleased with this conclusion and she resolved to make this point to Beth 
later.
DISCUSSION
In constructing her interpretation Patricia transforms a potentially meaning- 
threatening encounter into something that restores her understanding of the charac-
ter of the Princess and her relationship with the royalists. The sociologist, Erving 
GOFFMAN, describes this as ‘remedial work’, an activity motivated by the possibility 
that there has been a deliberate intention to cause offence. That is to say, in con-
structing her account Patricia understands the possibility of ‘interpretations of the 
act that maximise either its offensiveness to others or its defaming implications for 
the actor himself [sic]’ (GOFFMAN 1971: 138-139). The task that Patricia has under-
taken is to prevent a possible or, in GOFFMAN’s terminology, a virtual offence be-
coming an actual one. The problem she faces is that the potential offensiveness of 
the Princess’ action lies in the way it turns the logic of the gift against the royalists. 
An example of the threat this poses is apparent in an interpretation made by Leslie 
WOODHEAD, a television producer who saw video footage of the encounter between 
the Princess and Beth. According to WOODHEAD, the refusal of Beth’s photograph 
was an occasion when the Princess bent under the strain of the royalists’ attentions 
which, at times ‘must be more than the royals can bear’ (WOODHEAD 1991: 15). 
This, the worst possible interpretation, threatens the royalists’ meaning system by 
denying the value they attach to their practices. It is this possibility that Patricia’s 
remedial work must avoid confirming.
Motive and intent are significant factors in determining whether an offence has 
actually taken place, but only the potential, or virtual offender has direct knowledge 
of these. Usually, clarification can be sought from, or is volunteered by the virtual 
offender (GOFFMAN 1971). In this case, however, the social difference between the 
protagonists is such that the royalists cannot ask for a clarification of intent from the 
Princess herself. Instead it is Patricia who undertakes an explanation that will make 
safe a disruptive experience. By initially confirming that Beth’s gift was the only one 
to be refused, Patricia established that an offence might have taken place, but effec-
tively located the problem within the parameters of a specific interaction, rather 
than a response to the whole group. The rest of the explanation could then concen-
trate on the particular circumstances of this one encounter between the Princess and 
Beth.
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Patricia’s remedial work then began in the interpretive framework of difference. 
The inequalities of relative social status were highlighted in the suggestion that, by 
offering an apparently expensive gift, Beth was claiming too close a relationship. In 
Patricia’s account this transgression of the status boundaries not only weakens the 
obligation to receive (MAUSS 1990, 1950), but also means that the Princess displayed 
the right relationship to the rules of the social order governing interactions between 
royalty and commoners. This achieves one aim of remedial work in respect of the 
Princess, in so far as it minimises the defaming implications for her moral character 
(GOFFMAN 1971). It is not fully successful, however, as it retains the suggestion that 
there was a deliberate intent on the part of the Princess to assert her superior status 
and to remind everyone else of their relative inferiority. In avoiding the danger of 
confirming this negative possibility, Patricia’s developing explanation then switched 
to the interpretive framework of unity.
In underestimating the age of Beth and seeing her as not much more than a 
young girl, Patricia constructed the Princess as being just like everyone else. Her 
behaviour is now to be understood in terms of what anyone would think and do. In 
this framing unity takes the form of royalty being just ‘ourselves writ large’ 
(Willi amson  1986: 76) and their actions can be understood through the knowledge 
acquired in ordinary, everyday living (BILLIG 1992). Patricia’s attribution of the ac-
tions of the Princess to an understandable and common mistake offers a mitigating 
claim common to remedial work, namely, that ‘the circumstances were such as to 
make the act radically different from what it appears to have been’ (Goffman  1971: 
140). That is to say, having wrongly identified Beth as a young girl, the Princess be-
haves in a protective way, refusing to deprive her of an apparently treasured posses-
sion. In this way her actions are radically transformed. Rather than an assertion of 
social superiority, the action of the Princess becomes one that any responsible and 
sympathetic adult would adopt towards a young person. In this way Patricia can ac-
knowledge the refusal of the gift as the act of a social superior but, by applying the 
norms of everyday life, the basis of the superior and inferior relationship is changed. 
Rather than royal and commoner, the relationship becomes that of adult and child in 
which the intent of the Princess is not a potentially disturbing assertion of social 
superiority, but a highly acceptable expression of protectiveness and concern towards 
a young person.
Finally, in effecting a closure of her account, Patricia returned to the frame of 
difference and constructed the Princess as an extraordinary person. The magic of 
monarchy is suggested in the way Beth’s picture is said to have gained some special 
quality through contact with the Princess. In terms of both difference and unity the 
cooperation of the Princess in confirming the royalists’ view of their relationship 




Patricia’s interpretation is constructed in a very different way from that of the 
American who provided the starting point for this paper. Like the negative interpre-
tations of constitutional monarchy made by the British republicans (WILSON 1989; 
Hitchen s  1990; Hamilton  1975; Birnba um  1955) the response of the American is 
constructed solely within the interpretive framework of difference. In contrast, Pat-
ricia negotiates the possibility of making a negative interpretation of monarchy by 
switching her explanation from the framework of difference, to that of unity, and 
then back to difference again. Switching in this way allows her to construct an ac-
count in which a potentially demeaning experience can be transformed into a reaf-
firmation of the relationship between the royalists, the monarchy and the na- 
tion.Through the use of difference and unity as alternative and relatively discrete 
frames of interpretation Patricia is able to negotiate the central paradox of constitu-
tional monarchy and the civil religion. In her remedial work Patricia is following the 
method widely used by the royalists when explaining the meaning their encounters 
with royalty hold for them. By using difference and unity as alternative interpretive 
frames the royalists are able to avoid confronting the contradictions inherent in the 
central symbol of the civil religion.
This process of negotiation is not without political significance given that the 
idea of the royal family as the guarantee of national identity is fundamental to the 
discourse of the civil religion. The importance of understanding the way the larger 
population of Britain negotiates this official discourse is likely to increase as the 
British political structure undergoes a substantial change. The present political 
situation includes a movement not only towards greater European unity, but also to 
an internal devolving of government to the constituent nations of Great Britain. The 
outcome of these changes remains uncertain. One possibility is that the break-up of 
Britain as a unified state has begun, another is that a movement towards a federal 
state will take place. Whatever the outcome, a crisis of national identity seems likely 
which promises to be especially acute in England, where ‘British’ and ‘English’ are 
often treated as synonymous. In this developing situation the existing form of civil 
religion, centring on the monarchy, will also be subject to change. It could provide 
the official symbol of a pan-British identity, or it could become a focus for the devel-
opment of a separate English nationalism. Alternatively, of course, the monarchy 
could fail to provide an adequate symbol of a new national identity and be replaced 
by something different. In the context of Britain and its constitutional monarchy, the 
way these changes are working out provides a relevant topic for research. What I 
have tried to demonstrate in this paper is that in understanding the development of 
these processes the folk religiosity that surrounds the official discourse of the civil 
religion provides a relevant topic for further exploration and theorising.
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“WE WERE LED BY THE LORD IN A SPECIAL WAY..
VISIONS, EXPLICATIONS AND REALITY 
IN A TWENTIETH CENTURY CALVINIST CONGREGATION
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Abstract: The main religious lay-leader of the Hungarian Calvinists living in Carpathian 
Ukraine was the peasant-prophetess, Mrs. Mariska Borku (1910-1978). Her higly important work, 
the so-called “Third Testament” is a manuscript, written under the influence of the Holy Spirit. It 
was considered by Mrs. Mariska Borku and her followers as a holy text, a part of the Bible. These 
almost 800 biblical “quasi loci” were spread in hand-written copies and were read aloud at religious 
meetings in the Hungarian villages of Carpathian Ukraine, even 10-15 years after her death. Beside 
the biblical paraphrases, religious songs and prayers, one fourth of the text consists of her visions. 
The prophetess never explained these visions and the Holy Spirit’s “verbs” to her followers - only 
announced them. Recently the largest religious community of her followers, mostly women over 
fifty, exists in the village of Dercen. Its lay-leader, Miss Ida Balia, can explain the Words of the 
“Third Testament”, and the visions of Mrs. Borku on the occasion of their private religious service 
Sunday afternoons.
My study offers a short survey of the historical and political situation of the area between 1920 
and 1995, in which the emphasised folk religion played a very important role in the survival of na-
tional identity and in strengthening the faith of the Hungarian inhabitants living in a very often 
tragic minority status.
I illustrate my presentation with original visionary texts of the “Third Testament”, and their 
actual-political exegesis given by the recent lay-leader of Mrs. Mariska Borku’s followers.
Keywords: religious lay-leader, peasant-prophetess, Hungarian Calvinists, Carpathian Ukraine, 
influence of the Holy Spirit, manuscript, the so-called “Third Testament”, private religious service, 
survival of national identity, minority status
A special phenomenon of Calvinist folk religion in Carpathian Ukraine is a 
peasant-prophetess, Mariska Borku (1910-1978) and the still existing circle of her 
followers. Since 1989 I have been dealing with the activity of this prophetess, her 
personality, and the social and intellectual influence and folklore of her teachings.'
The region where Mariska Borku lived makes this theme especially fascinating. 
This part (Sub-Carpathia) of today’s Ukraine belonged to Hungary before the First 
World War when 60% of the population were Ruthenians, 25% Hungarians and the 
rest Jews, Romanians and Germans.2 Under the terms of the Treaty of Trianon, the 
territory was annexed to Czecho-Slovakia. The Czech rule lasted from May 1919 till 
October 1939 when it was reoccupied by the Hungarians who lost it again in 1944.
1 KÜLLÖS 1993, 1998, 1999. I did fieldwork on four occasions (spring 1989, autumn 1992, summer 
1993 and 1995) in the company of Calvinist Dean Ambrus Molnár.
2 Cf. Sza bó  1993.
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The multiethnic Sub-Carpathia belonged to Ukraine for a short while, then in July 
1945 became part of the Soviet Union. The ethnocide carried out between 1944 and 
’47 at the order of Stalin was only recently revealed. All Hungarian and German 
men between the ages of 18 and 50 from this region were interned in November 
1944 on the pretext of “three days of work”. Only a half to two-thirds of the men 
returned years later from the prisoner-of-war camps. (Unfortunately, there are still 
no precise figures on the numbers of internments and deaths.)3 Since December 
1991 Sub-Carpathia has been part of newly independent Ukraine but this has not 
brought much in the way of positive change for the remaining 155 000 to 160 000 
Hungarians, who still constitute the biggest national minority in the region. Because 
of the difficulty in securing a livelihood, Hungarians, particularly intellectuals and 
tradesmen, have been migrating to Hungary in a steady stream since 1991.
I have sketched in this background to give an idea of the unstable historical and 
political conditions in which a Calvinist Hungarian peasant woman with two children 
was “called” by the Holy Spirit to preach in October 1936 in Tiszaágtelek. It will also 
give a better understanding of why the Hungarian minority, repeatedly confused in 
its identity and nationality, persecuted for its religion and living a precarious exis-
tence, needed and still needs to believe in this lay religious leader.4
The activity of Mariska Borku over a period of 40 years has two results and 
traces that can be examined from the angle of folkloristics, history of religion and 
cultural anthropology.
One is the so-called Third Testament (Lettszövetség), a manuscript written under 
the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, combining texts of various genres, which is a 
document not only of the work of a peasant woman who preached for 40 years, but 
also reflects her spiritual experiences and theological views. Mariska Borku and her 
followers regarded this writing as the third part of the Bible, a renewed covenant 
with the Lord proclaimed by the Holy Spirit, and it is still read at religious services 
held in the family and homes. Manuscript copies of varying length can still be found 
in Calvinist villages of Sub-Carpathia. This is understandable since, up to the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union (1990), official religious practice was regarded as a sedi-
tious activity, and it was impossible to obtain Hungarian-language printed religious 
materials, Bibles, prayer books or hymn books. Anyone who wanted such material 
made hand-written copies in exercise books from old publications borrowed from 
whoever would lend them, or from other people’s manuscripts, and read these. To 
my greatest surprise, I found that in the seventies and eighties people in Sub- 
Carpathia longing for religious literature made copies from each other’s exercise 
books of Milton’s Paradise Lost in Hungarian translation. In these circumstances the 
Third Testament written under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit filled a keenly-felt
3 György DUPKA1993.
4 Mariska Borku was not the only Sub-Carpathian peasant-prophet in the 20th century. A prophetess 
was active in 1938-50 in the neighbouring village of Nagydobrony. One of my students wrote a PhD thesis 
on her personality and her religious activity which was known in a much more limited circle. For details 
on this, see SÁNDOR 1998 and 1999.
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need. The followers of the prophetess are still able to quote from it by heart and 
revere it as a norm. The work is thus not only a constituent part of modern peasant 
literacy but also of religious oral tradition in Sub-Carpathia. (This is now true only 
for the generation over 50.)
The other phenomenon to be examined from the angle of religious ethnology is 
the existence of the so-called peasant ecclesiolas, small prayer groups formed within 
the Calvinist congregations in Hungarian villages of Sub-Carpathia (Nagydobrony, 
Dercen, Fornos, Csongor). The faithful who regard themselves as believers in the 
Third Testament and live in spiritual fraternity now represent no more than 2 to 5% 
of the different congregations, but everywhere they are the most fervently religious 
core of the community.
I have chosen as the basic text for this paper the longest folk manuscript known 
to me, a copy of the Third Testament done by a woman in Dercen (Róza Fodor, 
1928). It contains 780 “Words”. Out of these 780 religious texts of various genres, 
183 (more than a quarter) are narratives of visions.5
In interpreting and analysing the visions of Mariska Borku I relied on two re-
lated sources:
a) visions recorded in writing in the Third Testament,6
b) narratives living in oral tradition, containing visions, dreams and miraculous 
recoveries related to her prophetic activity, or explaining her written Words and 
visions and applying them to current events.
In this paper I shall deal with popular interpretation of a few of the prophetess’ 
visions of historical, current political or local relevance.
Mariska Borku was “called” at the age of 26, after family problems and illnesses, 
in a vision accompanied by hallucinations, in the same way as the biblical prophets.7 
She thought these unusual phenomena were a sign of her approaching death, and 
only gradually became aware that they were the will of God: “...I was found to be 
faithful in small things and so He entrusted a spiritual family to me. I tend the flock 
under the guidance of the only shepherd. ” (445)
I found on the occasion of my first collecting trip that Mariska Borku only ex-
plained the Words learnt from the Holy Spirit and the visions if she was specifically 
called on to do so. Her task was only to transmit the divine manifestations. When I
5 I was able to make a photocopy of this manuscript notebook in October 1992. Its owner lent it only 
reluctantly and for a short time, since it was part of her daily religious practice to read the Third Testa-
ment. For understandable reasons, it was even more difficult to obtain the autograph manuscripts of 
Mariska Borku for the purpose of making photocopies. It was not until June 1993 that her daughter 
decided to lend her mother’s “sacred” writing. She was afraid that without it, trouble would befall her 
house and family. However, she also dreamt that the time would come when this sacred text could be 
published, so she regarded this research as the fulfilment of her prophetic dream. Up to 19931 had copies 
only of the autograph copy of the first 187 “Words” - which Mariska Borku had sent to the Calvinist 
minister of Nagydobrony in 1937 - and of versions of the Third Testament copied by three followers.
6 The figures in brackets refer to the numbering of the Dercen Third Testament copy.
7 G. ANDRÉ 1982; KISS 1942; DREWERMANN 1985 (one chapter also appeared in Hungarian in 1991 
under the title: “Jelenések, isteni elhívások, víziók és próféciák” [Apparitions, divine callings, visions and 
prophets]. Egyház és Világ II, 13:6-12).
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asked questions her followers addressed me to a “spiritual sister” in Dercen, Ida 
Balia, a spinster crippled in childhood, saying that she was the person able to inter-
pret the Words and visions of the Third Testament. “She has been given this grace”, 
and as the lay-leader of the 20 to 30-member peasant ecclesiola still operating in 
Dercen, she does so every Sunday afternoon. Thus, in presenting the visions of the 
prophetess I have relied mainly on the explanations and interpretations of Ida Balia 
and her circle, who call themselves the “workers of the Third Testament”.
The method I use for analysis could perhaps be called “anthropological herme-
neutics”.8 I attempt to link the reading and aesthetically perceived level of the texts 
with an approach that interprets retrospectively and also decodes the historical and 
spiritual aspects.
One of the central themes and main messages of the Third Testament is to con-
firm that the teachings of Mariska Borku are not in contradiction with the Bible; she 
is not the founder of a sect but an intermediary. She carries out her activity under 
divine inspiration, with the help of the Holy Spirit, for the good of her immediate 
community.
The Words of Mariska Borku stress in a number of places that the Third Testa-
ment and the Bible (Old and New Testaments) belong together, forming a three- 
part whole. The following pronouncement is practically unassailable theologically 
and a manifest truth in her folkloric culture which favoured the tripartite principle:
God says: in the Old Testament: I am as the Father,
In the New Testament I appear as the Son,
And in the Third Testament I teach and speak 
As the Saviour by the Holy Spirit.
“When a prophet of the Lord is among you 
I reveal myself to him in visions
I speak to him in dreams" - we read in the Bible. (Numbers 12:6)
I found in my fieldwork that the majority of my informants attributed coherent 
meaning to the happenings of real life and the pronouncements and visions of the 
Third Testament. They constantly compared the events of everyday life and history 
with the Words of Mariska Borku and were able to explain and accept the most var-
ied and unexpected life situations with these texts calling for spiritual awakening, 
patience and charity and strengthening their sense of being chosen.
For example: “A cloud of darkness has descended on the house of prayer" - wrote 
Mariska Borku in one passage, and her followers in Nagydobrony link this pro-
nouncement with the real fact that in the Soviet period the churches were closed and 
children under 18 were forbidden to exercise their religion.
Allow me to cite two visions of particular current political relevance in the Third 
Testament:
8 On the model of the literary hermeneutics of H. R. JAUSS 1981. See also Orbán  1992.
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1. "I was taken in spirit by an angel from river to river and from lakes to lakes. And 
the angel pointed to the lake and river and said: - The waters in these are poisoned. - 
The angel of death came down and took me to the dried up river and there were dead 
fish there, and took me to a swampy lake, and they teemed there. And finally, the angel 
took me to a mountain, this well was dug by Noah, and I saw a multitude of living fish 
in it, and said: - This is the living water gushing from inside the mountain, that you have 
received from Jesus for preservation. These fish drink from it and eat manna under the 
palm-trees. ”
According to Ida Balia, leader of the lay congregation, the poisoned waters are 
the evil teachings of the Russians and the communists, which spread over a very 
great area, “from rivers to rivers and from lakes to lakes". These evil teachings are 
causing the destruction of human life. The swampy lake symbolizes the church which 
is full of errors and therefore its followers live with great difficulty (“wasting away”!); 
it is only the fish in “living water” in Noah’s well, the “workers of the Third Testa-
ment” - who prosper. An important message of the visions of the prophetess was 
dissatisfaction with the Calvinist Church and the priesthood who failed to ease the 
“spiritual hunger” of the believers. In these visions the walls of the church are 
cracked, only the foundations are intact; in cases it has fallen in ruins and she helps 
to rebuild it; or the path leading to the church is overgrown with weeds and she has 
to clear it; elsewhere the angel shows her at the Communion table how to prepare 
good food for the congregation.
It is difficult for the outsider to decide which vision of the prophetess should be 
understood in a figurative sense and which have concrete content applying to a local 
event. Her followers know this exactly, although they emphasize that Mariska Borku 
did not prophesy, “she did not do superstition” (that is, she was not a seer or a 
healer), her task with the help of the Holy Spirit was spiritual guidance and enlight-
enment, setting an example and bearing witness. As Ida Balia put it: “She was like 
Hobab for us.”9
I did not understand the following vision in the Third Testament either, until Ida 
Balia explained it:
2. “Early in the morning I was taken up to the mountain of faith (by the Lord). A 
stone’s throw from the mountain, where I was standing, columns of fire in the form of 
banners descended from the heavens, and I thought they would bum the earth. As I saw 
this, I prayed more fervently to the Lord, and then I saw a divine hand reaching down to 
the very lowest fire, and it pulled up that great fire. Standing on the mountain I gave 
thanks to the Lord because I survived. Thy will be done, my Father. Amen. ”
I quote Ida Balia’s explanation: “You will be remembering the Prague Spring? 
Well then the two sides, the western side and the Soviet Union, they were а-sitting in 
the train here, because Tiszaágtelek and Ágcsernyő are close, - that’s where they 
were, and Mariska Borku told how the soldiers were set up there, all the land around 
Agtelek and Nagydobrony was full of them, because World War Three would have
9 See Numbers 10: 29-32.
158 Imola KÜLLÖs
started here, they would have clashed here. But then the Lord averted that. It 
doesn’t matter that the Soviets occupied Czechoslovakia! That was the Lord’s will. 
Because if the West had occupied it, then World War Three, the battlefield would 
have started here, not in Russia, because its border (that is, of the USSR) was here 
then, but the Lord defended this area for the sake of the prophet, because the Third 
Testament wasn’t yet written then. Then He reached down, then pulled up the great 
fire with His hand, then they reached an agreement: the Soviet Union occupied 
Czechoslovakia, they agreed there on the train, then we were spared the soldiers. - 
But Mariska Borku said that - if the Lord hadn’t pulled the fire with His hand - not 
even the black soil would have been left here! Such a great mercy! This is how we 
were led by the Lord, how we knew where history stands.”
All the Words of the Third Testament show a thorough knowledge of the Bible, 
and in particular the Revelation of Saint John and the Psalms. It is actually a para-
phrase of the Bible. The layout of the notebooks containing the Third Testament - 
the arrangement of the texts in two columns and their numbering - reveals the bibli-
cal model. And the material collected locally provided abundant evidence that in the 
culture found today in the Calvinist villages of Sub-Carpathia the language of every-
day religious communication is a figurative language full of biblical similes, meta-
phors and parables (in reality, the language used in the beautiful translation of the 
Bible done in 1590 by Gáspár Károli). In their spontaneous prayers, dream and vi-
sion narratives, and in their religious poems the “workers of the Third Testament” 
use the imagery of that translation, as well as the style and phraseology of an 18th 
century Calvinist book of prayer10 that has appeared in numerous editions. It was 
among the most moving experiences of my career to hear the eloquence of these 
barely educated women and to see their deeply experienced faith in God.
The exceptionally rich collection of visions in the Bible paraphrase of Mariska 
Borku is quite literally narrative theology.n Further analysis of this material offers a 
unique possibility for getting to know and understand Calvinist spirituality and folk 
mentality in Sub-Carpathia.12 Up to now the ministers, representatives of the local 
church only forbade its use if it came to attention, or from the outset ignored it. But 
none of them took the trouble to look into these folk manuscripts, to “decode” the 
“message” this prophetic tradition had for them, too. The entire activity and per-
sonality of the prophetess of Tiszaágtelek and the narrative tradition that has grown 
up around her Words all show what a wide gap there still is between the so-called 
elite and folk culture. More precisely, how the people attempt to reconcile the phe-
nomena of reality with official theology, how they reshape it according to their own 
laws and adapt it into their own traditional ideology, folklore.
Although the peasant-prophetess carried out individual religious activity, the in-
fluence of her extraordinary life-work is communal and many of its characteristics are
10 György SZIKSZAY: Keresztyényi tanítások és imádságok a keresztyén embernek külön-különféle 
állapotai és szükségei szerint. [Christian Teachings and Prayers for the Multifarious Conditions and 
Needs of the Christian] Debrecen 1795.
11 On this concept and the anthropology of the senses, see W. BRÜCKNER 1979.
12 Gacsá LYI 1985; SÁNDOR 1998.
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universal,13 The Third Testament is not only an unmatched document of Hungarian- 
language Protestant folklore, but was also a source of spiritual strength for the Hun-
garians of Sub-Carpathia during the years of Soviet oppression, which strengthened 
their sense of belonging together and was an integral part of the survival strategy of 
more than one small village community. For it exhorted patience, steadfastness and 
unconditional faith in God, and proclaimed religious ecumenism, saying:
“The Word is addressed to everyone!"
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Abstract: From the 16th century, Estonia has been a predominantly Lutheran country. Never-
theless, since the 1740s several religious movements have occurred in Estonia occasionally conflict-
ing with the established Lutheran Church. More serious Christianisation among the Estonians be-
gan with the Moravian movement which spread widely in Estonia during the 18th and 19th centu-
ries. The Moravian congregations stayed inside the Lutheran Church. The next influential religious 
movements in the 19th century were the movement of the Heaven-Travellers and shifting from the 
Lutheran to the Russian Orthodox Church. After the 1880s, various Protestant congregations 
sprang up in Estonia and developed into a considerable power alongside the Lutheran and Ortho-
dox Churches. Throughout the period, discussed in this paper (from the 1740s to the beginning of 
the 20th century), the main centres of the new religious movements have been in the counties of 
West Estonia inhabited not only by the Estonians, but also by the community of the Estonian 
Swedes. The paper discusses the religious movements in West Estonia and the influence of these 
movements on the popular culture of the Estonians and the Estonian Swedes.
Keywords: Estonia, Lutheran Church, Moravian movement, Russian Ortodox Church
According to the confession dominating in official religious life, Estonia in the 
18th century could be called a Lutheran country. Yet the more serious Christianising 
of the previously rather formally Christian country-folk was brought about not by the 
official Lutheran Church, but the religious movement of Brethren congregations 
spreading within the Lutheran Church. The Brethren movement began to spread 
wider among the Estonian peasantry in the 1740s, gathering greater momentum in 
the counties of West Estonia: Saaremaa, Läänemaa and Hiiumaa. The West Esto-
nian counties remained the main centres of the Brethren movement in Estonia in 
the 19th century, too. In the 1840s, an extensive tendency appeared in Saaremaa to 
change from Lutheranism to Russian Orthodoxy; in the 1880s, the same trend 
spread to Läänemaa and Hiiumaa. The movement of religious awakening which 
began in West Estonia in the last quarter of the 19th century, gave rise to the ap-
pearance of new Free Churches in Estonia. Several other minor religious move-
ments took place in West Estonia in the beginning of the 20th century and these 
regions have maintained certain peculiarities of religious life as compared to the rest 
of Estonia all through the 20th century.
The aim of the paper is to present a survey of the religious movements and con-
gregations in West Estonia from the 1740s up to the year 1918, when Estonia was 
part of the Russian Empire. The article also discusses the roots and impact of these 
movements on the popular culture of the Estonians and Estonian Swedes (the
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Swedes had begun settling on the islands and coast of Western Estonia from the 
13th-14th centuries onward). Also, the developments of the religious institutions of 
West Estonia have been briefly compared to what happened in the religious life of 
the rest of Estonia and the neighbouring countries. The author has limited himself 
mainly to Christian congregations and religious movements, although mention is 
made briefly of the heathen beliefs surviving into the 18th-20th centuries.
OVERVIEW OF RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS 
AND CONGREGATIONS IN WEST ESTONIA FROM THE 
MID-18th TO THE BEGINNING OF THE 20th CENTURY
The roots of the United Brethren (Moravian, Herrnhuter) movement go back to 
the 15th-century religious movement of the Bohemian and Moravian brethren, the 
followers of which founded the Herrnhut community in Germany, in 1722. Count 
Nikolaus Ludwig von Zinzendorf became head of the Herrnhuter congregation 
founded in 1727. One of the characteristic features of the Herrnhuter movement was 
active missionary work. At least 81 missionaries were sent out from Herrnhut in the 
years 1729-1743, to awaken Estonian and Latvian peasantry to religion. The peas-
ants accepted the German brethren - simple artisans and teachers, in the most part - 
because they learned the local language and belonged to a lower class than the local 
German landlords. Nevertheless the success of the Herrnhuter missionaries de-
pended largely on the support of the local Lutheran clergy and landlords. Most of 
the Herrnhuter missionaries arrived in Estonia after 1738-1739, preparing the 
ground for the extensive religious awakening that spread among the peasantry at the 
beginning of the 1740s (see: IUA 1995).
In North Estonia, the Brethren movement spread widest in Läänemaa and Hii- 
umaa, where the number of members of the Brethren congregations grew to about 
2000, in North Estonia as a whole, the number was about 4800 (IUA 1995: 240-244). 
Side by side with Estonians, active part was taken in the religious movements also by 
the Estonian Swedes. The parishes of Vormsi and Noarootsi in West Estonia, settled 
mainly by Estonian Swedes, remained the main centres of religious movements in 
Estonia up to the emigration of Estonian Swedes in the 1940s.
As for South Estonia, Saaremaa rose to a leading position in the Brethren 
movement, which was led there by the superintendent of the Lutheran Church of 
Saaremaa, Eberhard Gutsleff junior. Several phenomena alien to the Lutheran 
Church can be observed in the religious movement of the Saaremaa peasantry, such 
as the rebaptising of adults and banning work on Thursdays and Saturdays. Prayer 
meetings lasted for days and nights and saw trembling, dropping down, motionless 
lying. People had visions and revelations of Christ’s bleeding body or hand, of 
heaven- and hell-travelling, of a heavenly rain of blood; others were soothe-saying 
prophetically. The Herrnhuters launched a campaign against folk culture, which they 
declared was heathen. Incidents are recorded of destroying old sacred groves and
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sacrificial sites, as well as of jewellery, festive clothes and folk musical instruments. 
Alcohol, smoking, dancing and other such worldly pleasures were declared sinister; 
the same went for stealing and other such crimes (later on, Estonian history books 
have often operated with the obviously mistaken claim as though not a single crime 
had been performed in Saaremaa in the years 1740-1745). The same kind of bans 
and limitations remained characteristic of the Brethren movement later, too. In the 
1740s, the number of people involved in the Brethren movement in Läänemaa, Hii- 
umaa and Saaremaa is estimated at about 5000-6000. In Saaremaa, Herrnhuters 
constituted about 20-25 per cent of peasantry (RUSSWURM 1855: 159, 283-284; 
Girgens ohn  1869: 453; Pöldmäe  1935: 127-128; Philip p 1974: 159; Iua  1995: 
240-244, 250).
The Brethren did not set up an independent church in the Baltic, remaining, ac-
cording to their leaders’ whishes, within the framework of the official Lutheran 
Church. Yet the separatism, open enmity towards the landlords and “religious exag-
gerations” gave rise to (and offered a pretext for) a growing dissatisfaction with the 
Brethren among landlords and clergy. In co-operation with authorities, the anti- 
Herrnhuter clergy achieved the banning of the movement with a decree from Em-
press Elisabeth, in 1743. The Herrnhuters’ prayer houses were closed and the more 
prominent brethren were forced to leave the country. The Lutheran clergymen had 
to sign a declaration in which they agreed to ban the Herrnhuters’ activities in their 
parishes (Harnack  1860: 82; Pöldmä e  1936: 253; Phi li pp 1974:162-163,167; Iua  
1995: 197, 203-204). Yet obeying the orders was not controlled very consistently or 
effectively, depending largely on the attitude of the local landlords. Despite the bans, 
new Herrnhut brethren arrived in Estonia and secretly carried on their missionary 
work. Although the religious movement went underground and had to overcome 
obstacles and repressions, it continued with relative success in West Estonia. In 
1801, there were 4422 members of Brethren congregations in Hiiumaa and Saare-
maa (Phil ipp  1974: 388,410-411), which made up about 11 per cent of peasantry.
The first half of the 19th century witnessed a new rise in the Brethren move-
ment. It was favoured by the decree issued by Tsar Alexander I in 1817, allowing the 
Brethren congregations freely to pursue their activities, and by the movement of 
Heaven-Travellers which began to spread during the second decade of the century, 
mainly within the framework of the Brethren congregations. The centres of the 
movement of Heaven-Travellers were in Läänemaa and Hiiumaa, where the move-
ment began in 1814. There arose several visionaries and prophets who claimed they 
had seen revelations and who conducted their own charismatic prayer meetings. The 
Heaven-Travellers, for the most part women and girls, claimed they had been to 
heaven and hell. They told whom they had met in heaven or who had been in hell, 
and foretold people their fate after death. As a result of the Heaven-Travellers’ mes-
sage, the Estonians and Estonian Swedes of Läänemaa burnt their festive dress and 
jewellery, in order to prepare themselves for the imminent end of the world. The 
German Moravian J. G. Werner has described how awakened peasants in Noarootsi 
parish prepared for the end of the World in 1816 burning all their earthly belongings 
following the orders of a local prophet. Some of the the Heaven-Travellers also
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Fig. 1. The chapel of the Brethren congregation in Valjala parish, Saaremaa county, Estonia. 
Photo by E. Pöld, 1938 (Photo Collection of the Estonian National Museum, No. 821: 5)
celebrated Saturday and Thursday. Several prophets from Hiiumaa were accused of 
baptising each other with fire and smoke and of celebrating the Holy Communion 
among themselves. Heaven-Travellers and their enthusiastic adherents caused much 
trouble to the Lutheran pastors and the German Moravians (RUSSWURM 1855: 235- 
236; Pöldmäe  1935; 1958: 457-459). In the early 1820s that ecstatic movement 
gradually died out, but the Brethren congregations in Western Estonia successfully 
continued their activities.
In the mid-1850s, there were almost 9000 members of Brethren congregations in 
Läänemaa, Hiiumaa and Saaremaa (constituting 8.6 per cent of the population in 
Saaremaa), and thousand more participated in the prayer meetings (in Saaremaa, 
they added up to about 15 per cent of the population). All over Estonia, the ap-
proximately 50 000 full members of the Brethren congregations made up about 6.7 
per cent of the population. In 1839, the number of Brethren prayer houses in Esto-
nia reached 156 (Phil ipp  1974: 219-221, 405-409), which exceeds by one third the 
number of Lutheran parish churches.
In the middle of the 19th century, the Lutheran Church engaged in active strug-
gle against the Brethren congregations, particularly in South Estonia, and in the 
second half of the century the movement suffered an internal decline and a great 
drop in the numbers of membership. The decision of the 1857 Herrnhut Synod to 
stop direct activities of the Herrnhut centre in the Baltic region certainly played a 
part in the decline of the movement, too (see also: Phil ipp 1974: 321ff, 368-369).
Another important change in the religious life of West Estonia was the move-
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Fig. 2. The prayer room of the chapel of the Brethren congregation in Valjala parish, Saaremaa county, 
Estonia. Photo by E. Pöld, 1938 (Photo Collection of the Estonian National Museum, No. 821: 6)
ment from the Lutheran Church to the Russian Orthodox Church. In the years 1845- 
1848, about 17 per cent of South Estonian peasantry transferred their allegiances 
from Lutheran Church to Orthodox Church, mainly motivated by economic and 
social hopes. The percentage of those who shifted church was highest in Saaremaa, 
where by the year 1848, 29.8 per cent of the peasantry had adopted Russian Ortho-
dox faith (KRUUS 1930: 344, 400). After this shift, the Russian Orthodox Church 
began to build new church buildings and schools for the Estonian peasantry, thus 
entering into active competition with the Lutheran Church. In the 1880s, the ten-
dency to convert from the Lutheran to the Orthodox Church broke out in North 
Estonia, with its centres in Läänemaa and Hiiumaa. Tsarist authorities supported 
the spread of Orthodoxy and took steps against the Lutheran Church, which caused 
the growth of membership in the 15 Orthodox congregations of Saaremaa up to 40 
per cent of the population by the turn of the 19th-20th centuries. In Läänemaa and 
Hiiumaa, 13.2 per cent of the population were Orthodox in 1897. The census of 1897 
reveals that 84.2 per cent of the total population of Estonia were Protestants (mostly 
Lutherans) whereas 15 per cent were Russian Orthodox or Old Believers (Perv aja  
1905: 122-125; Palli  1998: 29-31).
To a certain extent, another religious movement which swept over Läänemaa in 
the 1870s - the Awakening of Läänemaa - was also related to the shifting to Ortho-
doxy. The Awakening of Läänemaa began with the arrival of two Swedish missionar-
ies, Thure Emanuel Thorén and Lars Johan Österblom. They started working as
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teachers and missionaries in the Noarootsi and Vormsi parishes in 1873 (see: 
ÖSTERBLOM 1927; Valent in  1938: 40ff). In the 1870s-1880s, the new religious 
awakening began to spread among the Estonian Swedes and then among the Estoni-
ans, too. People began to strive for a salvation of their souls and were “saved”. In 
new religious communities there also occurred several ecstatic practices, such as 
jumping, dancing, laughing and hand-clapping at the prayer meetings (Schu ltz  
1880: 580-581; Protokoll 1883: 5,1884: 6; Oste rblom  1885: 39-43; Norma nn  1885: 
113; BUSCH 1928: 32).
At the beginning of the 1880s, many converts in Läänemaa and Hiiumaa started 
to hold their own communion, baptism, wedding ceremonies and funeral services. 
The attitude of the Lutheran officials toward the movement had been more or less 
favourable at the beginning, but it became very hostile as soon as the converts 
started to secede from the Lutheran Church, which first happened in Vormsi, in 
1880. One of the main reasons for that was the immorality and lack of real faith 
among the members of the Lutheran congregations {Protokoll 1881: 5-6; Spind ler  
1893: 156-157,161; BUSCH 1928: 28-29).
The persecution by the secular authorities and Lutheran Church grew more vig-
orous, and the movement dispersed into different factions. The awakened people 
organised the first Baptist, Irvingite and Free Believers’ congregations in Estonia. 
Many converts accepted the Orthodox faith in the 1880s. In the cradle of the awak-
ening movement of Läänemaa, for instance - on Vormsi Island, more than 500 
people or one fourth of the island’s population converted to Orthodoxy in the 1880s, 
despite the fact that the Estonian Swedes of Vormsi did not understand the Russian 
language at all (Protokoll 1884: 6-7, 1885: 7; Istoriko-statistitsheskoje 1895: 540; Iz 
Arhiva 1910: 39ff.). Many converts also lost their intense religious feelings or re-
mained faithful to the Lutheran Church and to the Brethren congregations under 
the Lutheran Church.
Up to the end of the 19th century, the most influential of the new congregations 
were the illegal Free Believers’ communities. The Free Believers’ movement also 
spread from Hiiumaa to Saaremaa county at the end of the 19th century. Several 
other confessions previously unknown in Estonia also began to spread among the 
West Estonians at the end of the 19th and beginning of 20th centuries. In Saaremaa, 
the Methodists gained particularly great support. The first Methodist congregation 
in Estonia was founded there in 1910 (see: RiTSBEK 1996). Since the beginning of 
the 20th century, the Baptists have been the most influential among the new congre-
gations in West Estonia.
Religious life outside the Lutheran Church in West Estonia remained active 
during the period of the Estonian Republic (1918-1940) and also during the period 
of the Soviet occupation in Estonia from the 1940s, despite the atheistic policy of 
Soviet authorities and rapid process of secularization, especially when comparing to 
the other regions of Estonia.
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THE ROOTS OF THE RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS AND THEIR 
IMPACT ON THE POPULAR CULTURE
There are several important factors that assisted or may have assisted in the 
arising and fast spreading of new outbursts of religiousness in West Estonia in the 
18th and 19th centuries. Among these factors figures the poverty of the peasants, as 
well as the relative backwardness of schools and secular social life. Economic back-
wardness is most conspicuous in the coastal and island regions of West Estonia. All 
the greatest outbursts of religious feelings, however, occurred in the poorer coastal 
parishes. Next, the importance of (socio-) psychological factors in the broad and 
ecstatic spread of religious movements must be emphasised, as well as the role of 
leaders, both of local and foreign origin, in the arising and development of the 
movements.
We must also consider the connections of the religious movements of the coun-
ties of West Estonia and Estonia as a whole with the trends of religious life spread-
ing in the neighbouring countries. Usually, the Christian religious movements in 
Estonia in the 18th and 19th centuries did not originate among the local peasantry 
but got at least the initial impact from outside Estonia. Foreign missionaries played 
an important role in the starting of the religious movements. Both the German 
Herrnhuters and the Swedish missionaries who started the Awakening of Läänemaa 
arrived from abroad. A certain role in the conversion of Estonian and Estonian 
Swedish peasants into Russian Orthodoxy was played by Russian clergy. The relig-
ious movements taking place elsewhere also help to understand better the trends of 
development of the West Estonian religious movements during the period of their 
organisation into different Free Churches, in the last quarter of the 19th and begin-
ning of the 20th centuries. At that time, various Protestant awakening movements 
and Free Churches were winning broader support in the Baltic guberniyas and Rus-
sia’s European territories, as well as in the Lutheran countries of Scandinavia and 
elsewhere in the world (see: Amburger  1961; Klibanov  1965; Nikolski  1988; 
HOPE 1995). In the last quarter of the 19th and beginning of 20th centuries, some of 
these religious movements and Free Churches reached not only West Estonia, but 
other parts of Estonia, too, mainly through the activities of foreign missionaries.
In their further development, the West Estonian religious movements acquired 
several characteristic features, too, especially the movement of the Heaven- 
Travellers and those of the last quarter of the 19th century. Thus, for instance, the 
religious awakening movement of Läänemaa features dancing in prayer meetings as 
a peculiarity, whereas in Hiiumaa, at the beginning of the 20th century, people acted 
the roles of different animals at prayer meetings. The rituals that gave rise to the 
name “vat-worshippers”, that is, rituals where a vat was used for baptism or com-
munion, also appear to be originally West Estonian. Uncommon are also efforts to 
“hatch out the God”, to fly to the Heaven (together with a cow), going around na-
ked, hunting the Devil all over the walls, stuffing the Bible into an oven and even 
attempts to offer people in burnt sacrifice (EAA, f 1249, n 1, s 77,1140; Walgus, No. 
5, 1884, No. 37, 1885; Saarlane, No. 25, 1887; Olewik, No. 36, 1902; OSTERBLOM
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1885: 40-44; KÖPP 1926: 83). Yet, reports of such phenomena are frequently unreli-
able, just like stories about the custom of exchanging shirts or about sexual rites 
practised by the awakened. Even the extreme phenomena in the awakening move-
ments, however, are not fully incredible in the light of reports about similar awaken-
ing movements elsewhere in the world. Essentially, the Estonian religious awakening 
movements of the 18th and 19th centuries were not much different from analogous 
movements elsewhere in Europe.
One of the main reasons why religious movements spread so rapidly and new 
Free Churches sprang up was the remoteness from the people of the Lutheran 
Church. Up to the founding of the independent Republic of Estonia in 1918, the 
overwhelming majority of Lutheran pastors were of German origin (see: Saard  
2000). The predominance of Germans was also supported by advowson, followed in 
most congregations, which forbade these congregations to choose a suitable pastor 
for themselves and forced them to accept the one chosen by the landlord and patron. 
Too large congregations also constituted a major drawback of the Lutheran “land-
lords’ church”. Unlike several popular religious movements and Free Churches, the 
official Church was not able to satisfy fully the people’s religious needs. The lan-
guage and turns of speech used by the peasant preachers in the prayer house must 
have been much better understood by the people than the sermon made by the Lu-
theran pastor. Probably one of the main secrets of the success of the awakening 
movements discussed above was in the emotional approach to religion and a more 
easily understandable message which the Lutheran Church could not offer. The 
persecution by the Lutheran Church of the awakened believers often only reinforced 
the convictions of those who had suffered for their faith and frequently caused hos-
tility towards the Lutheran Church.
In the Estonian congregations of the Russian Orthodox Church, however, most 
of the priests were Estonians by the beginning of the 20th century (Postimees, No. 
45-46, 1910). The Tsar’s manifesto of 1905 in principle brought about religious tol-
erance, which was followed by an upsurge in the activities of the Free Churches and 
a small-scale re-conversion of Orthodox Estonians into the Lutheran Church. Ac-
cording to the census of 1922, the proportion of the Orthodox had grown to 19 per 
cent of the population of the Estonian Republic, a development mainly due to the 
annexing of basically Orthodox territories. 78.6 per cent of the population were reg-
istered as Lutheran (Rahva demograafiline 1924: 50). But neither the Lutheran nor 
the Orthodox Church was able to bring Christian teaching close to the Estonians and 
Estonian Swedes.
Perhaps it is only during the culmination of the Brethren movement that we can 
speak about a broader spread of the intense Christianity with really devoted adher-
ents all over Estonia. At the same time we must not forget that only a minor part of 
the population was directly involved in the Brethren movement in the 18th and 19th 
centuries, amounting to no more than one tenth of the population even during its 
highest peak in the middle of the 19th century. Frequently this minority was also in 
opposition to the greater part of population who had not experienced religious 
awakening. No other Christian movements of comparable dimensions, covering all
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Fig. 3. The prayer house in West Estonia. Photo by M. Rukki, 1913 
(Photo Collection of the Estonian National Museum, No. 1347: 40)
of Estonia, have occurred in Estonia after the decline of the Brethren movement. 
Since the Lutheran and Orthodox Churches remained remote of the Estonian peas-
antry and the percentage of Free Church members was low, there was actually no 
reason up to the 20th century to speak about a more serious adherence of Estonians 
to any Christian confession. The religious life of the 20th century, however, can 
rather be characterised with the word “secularisation” than “Christianity”. The an-
swer to the question whether Christianity has ever been widely accepted in Estonia 
at all is rather in the negative than in the positive.
Several researchers also consider it possible to view the Brethren movement of 
the 18th—19th centuries as the first national movement of the Estonian peasantry or 
at least as a phenomenon preparing ground for such a movement (Ilja  1995: 237; 
Phil ipp 1974: 367). This view seems actually to be born out by the educational and 
literary activities, song production and starting of choirs by brethren with peasant 
origins. The Brethren societies were the first peasant organisations where it was 
possible freely to pursue collective activities without the direct intervention of land-
lords. Social emancipation and the growth of awareness among peasants was further 
promoted by involving numerous Estonian laymen and women in the supervising of 
congregations, by building prayer houses for funds collected from voluntary dona-
tions next to the official Lutheran churches, etc.
Yet it is obviously rash to regard the Brethren movement as a kind of national 
awakening or even a preparation for it. The main aim of the movement was still to 
awaken the country-folk religiously, to become the people of Jesus, not the people of
170 Jaanus Plaat
Estonia. A brother was an awakened peasant, a German Herrnhuter, even a 
Herrnhuter landlord, not an un-awakened peasant from the farmstead next door. 
The Herrnhuters were not note-worthily connected with the National Awakening 
movement that spread in Estonia during the second half of the 19th century and 
even worked against it. For those who had awakened, the line between “us” and 
“others” did not run so much by national or even social boundaries as according to 
the depth of faith, in places even according to membership in one certain congrega-
tion. But it was first and foremost the Herrnhuters, not ordinary Lutherans, who 
were considered deeply religious.
The influence of the Brethren congregations was highest in the West Estonian 
counties. But the difference of religious life of West Estonia from the rest of Estonia 
stands out more clearly in connection with the religious movements of the last 
quarter of the 19th century. If the earlier movements of the Brethren congregations 
and the Heaven-Travellers spread wider not only in West Estonia, but elsewhere in 
the country, too, this was not the case with the religious movements of the last 
quarter of the 19th century. It was the movement of National Awakening that spread 
at that time in the other Estonian counties; in Läänemaa, Hiiumaa and Saaremaa, 
however, it met with the least enthusiastic reception.
At the end of the 19th century, the activists of new religious movements took a 
hostile attitude towards popular culture, because of which old beliefs, folk tales and 
practices were suppressed and forgotten. The Awakening of Läänemaa and preach-
ing of new prophets caused destruction of various phenomena of the old popular 
culture of the Estonians and Estonian Swedes. In several regions of West Estonia 
colorful national costumes, national music and music instruments, popular songs and 
dances, folk religion and sorcery were considered to be sinful by the “Children of 
God”. For example, in 1870s missionary Lars Johan Österblom declared the folk 
songs, dances and costumes of the Estonian Swedes of Vormsi Island and Thure 
Emanuel Thorén the dances of Noarootsi parish to be sinful (BUSCH 1928: 12). Sev-
eral Swedish authors (Danel l  1909; Wenner ström  1931) have also stressed that 
Österblom did not tolerate old folk culture and that sense of national identity of the 
Estonian Swedes weakened because of his missionary work, as all the Swedes and 
stonians had to become brothers and sisters disregarding their nationality.
The revivalist movements in West Estonia have also changed the local folk-
lore. Estonian folklorist Oskar LOORITS claimed that the Moravian movement was
so influential in West Estonia that it partly wiped out old folk songs and stories, 
replacing them with prayers, religious songs and stories about local prophets 
(LOORITS 1932: 39). Auother Estonian folklorist Rudolf PÖLDMÄE also mentioned 
that West Estonia abounds in stories about prophets, heaven-travellers, reve-
lations, spirits and everything supernatural (PÖLDMÄE 1938: 439). Some prophecies 
of the West Estonian 19-century prophets have been believed in up to the 20th cen-
tury.
At least among the converts of the Awakening of Läänemaa new religious songs 
replaced the old ones. The so called Swedish songs, brought by missionaries Thorén 
and Österblom were soon translated into Estonian and became part of repertory of
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Baptists and Free congregations (Eesti Postimees, No. 29, 1881; Walgus, No. 5, 1884; 
OSTERBLOM 1885: 50; EKM, КО, f47, m 41:33,11/7).
While the revivalist movements fought old popular culture, many features in 
these revivalist movements seem to suggest that the rituals and behefs of converts 
were also influenced by folk beliefs and the profane. Some authors claim that in 
many centers of the revivalist movements in Läänemaa and Saaremaa, the pagan 
beliefs have been successfully preserved up to the beginning of the 20th century 
(Eesti Postimees, No. 26, 1884; Wirulane, No. 24, 1884; Saarlane, No. 38, 1896; No. 3, 
1897; No. 2, 10, 1900; Olewik, No. 55, 1905, p. 871; Mart na  1914: 122-124). In the 
last decades of the 19th and beginning of 20th centuries, there existed a rich heritage 
of older popular beliefs and practices in West Estonia. They existed there together 
with the popular forms of Christianity spread by different confessions, occasionally 
intertwining and influencing each other. Therefore it would not be correct to speak 
about the complete havoc wrought at traditional religion by the earlier Christian 
religious movements, just like the reports of the complete victory of the religiously 
awakened over folk musical instruments, clothes, dances, drinking, crime and other 
“sins” at the highest moments of various religious movements are, as a rule, exag-
gerated.
The revivalist movements also changed the attitudes of converts towards non-
believers, as well as towards secular education and literature, government, state and 
laws, which were sometimes considered by believers to come from the Devil. Several 
illegal Free Believers’ congregations claimed that they did not need official permis-
sion from the Lutheran Church and secular authorities for their activities. They ig-
nored several earthly laws and felt themselves free in performing their rituals and 
forming their belief system. Some converts believed that the only power they have to 
ask for permission is Jesus. Others refused to pay taxes and neglected orders of po-
lice or court. In several places of West Estonia conflicts between converts and local 
masters, court officials and Lutheran pastors arose. Some converts also claimed that 
Lutheran schools and school teachers had come from the Devil and did not send
their children to schools where educated pagans were brought up. Several new con-
gregations, especially the Baptist and Free Believers’ congregations, started to teach 
the children of their members by themselves (EAA, f29, n 2," s 5480, 1 148-150; 
EKM, КО, f 47, m 27:19; SCHULTZ 1880: 581-582; Walgus, No. 26, 1884; Normann  
1885: 107-108,113; IzArhiva 1910: 86-87; KÖPP 1926: 83).
Many converts in the 1870s and 1880s started to despise all the non-believers 
and members of the Lutheran Church and considered themselves to be the only real 
believers, the saved and holy people. All the outsiders were labeled children of Devil 
and many “Children of God” gave up all relationship with old friends and relatives 
who had not experienced awakening (Protokoll 1882: 6; Eesti Postimees, No. 6, 1884, 
No. 8, 1889; EAA, f 1278, n 1, s 28, 16, 16p; LlNDENBERG 1891: 490; KURRIKOFF 
1894: No. 102). This change in attitude was caused partly by the several forms of 
repressions by the local people, who were not converted. The converts were fre-
quently mocked at, beaten and threatened to be killed (Teekäija, No. 7, 1925; 
Tutt ar -Dahl  1929: 75; EAA, f 1278, n 1, s 28,1 6). In some pieces of folklore from
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West Estonia the saved people have also been ridiculed (see: Kelle 1963). At the 
same time the preachers and missionaries of the awakened people tried to save the 
sinful souls through their active missionary work all over the West Estonia, other 
parts of Estonia and even in Russia.
The every-day life of awakened peasants also began to differ considerably from 
the life of their “sinful” neighbors. Many converts of the Awakening of Läänemaa 
strove for more moral life, and thus abandoned drinking, smoking and theft. For 
example, in Noarootsi parish in Läänemaa many peasants, afraid of torments of 
Hell, abandoned drinking, smoking and dancing {Protokoll 1876: 23; Kristlik Pere- 
konna leht, No. 11, 1923, p. 162). Missionary Österblom has written that drinking, 
dirty language, smoking and other sins disappeared almost completely from Vormsi 
island. He maintained that the whole communities have ceremoniously buried their 
tobacco pipes (ÖSTERBLOM 1927). However, Österblom’s description of his own 
success cannot be relied upon uncritically.
We can conclude, that the main revivalist movements in West Estonia - the 
Moravian movement since 1740s, movement of Heaven-Travellers and Awakening 
of Läänemaa since 1870s, - have caused changes not only in the lives of the awak-
ened Estonians and Estonian Swedes but also in the cultural and social life of the 
involved peasant communities. The above mentioned changes influenced the old 
folk culture, religious beliefs and everyday life of peasantry. But at the same time the 
converts became somewhat isolated from the mundane and their “sinful” neighbors. 
The direct and long-lasting impact of the religious movements was confined rather 
to people involved in these movements than to the West Estonian peasantry as a 
whole. At the same time, the popular culture had also some influence on peasant 
revivalism. One of the main consequences of the religious movements in West Es-
tonia was the creation of serious alternatives to the Lutheran Church.
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